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C. E. Seaman,
Xmas 1891

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ESSAYS
SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

LECTURES AND PAPERS ON THE
HISTORY OF THE REFORMA-
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CONTINENT.

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LONDON: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., LTD.

ESSAYS
SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL

BY THE LATE

AUBREY L. MOORE, M.A.

HONORARY CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD
EXAMINING CHAPLAIN TO THE LORD BISHOP OF OXFORD
TUTOR OF ST. MARY MAGDALEN AND KEBLE COLLEGES

WITH

MEMOIRS OF THE AUTHOR

LONDON

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., LTD

1890

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PREFACE.

THE welcome accorded to "Science and the Faith" makes it unnecessary to apologize for the publication of a companion volume. If any such apology were needed, it would be found in the fact that Aubrey Moore had in his lifetime contemplated such a sequel, and had set aside about half of the papers contained in this volume for that purpose.

It is more necessary to say a word in explanation of the choice of the other papers and of their arrangement. They may seem at first miscellaneous, and but slightly connected; for they represent Aubrey Moore's work as a reviewer, as a lecturer (papers VII. and VIII. being notes of lectures given in his course upon the Ethics of Aristotle), and as a preacher (the two last having been composed as University Sermons). The arrangement passes from Natural Science through Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy to more definite Theology. But any who look beneath the surface will find a striking unity underlying all. There is

in all a clear belief in the power of Reason and in the reality and authority of Revelation. There is a hearty acceptance of Science, and yet a clear insistence upon its necessary limitations. On p. 147 will be found the author's own statement of the chief problem of the day: "The great metaphysical problem of the day is personality, implying self-consciousness and freedom;" and I believe that this volume will prove a real contribution in defence of those two points, Personality—the Personality of God and of man—and Freedom. One of the strongest statements of Personality will be found in the Sermon on Theology and Law; the most fearless claim for the Reason in the sermon on "The Pride of Intellect." This will be an adequate excuse for including sermons in such a volume as this. These sermons were, moreover, preached on special occasions, and are philosophical rather than hortatory in tone and treatment.

My warmest thanks are due to the Editor of the *Guardian* for permission to republish the reviews which have appeared in his paper; to the President of the Aristotelian Society for leave to print No. IX.; and to many friends who have helped me in the choice of papers and the revision of proofs, especially to the Rev. J. R. Illingworth, Rev. W. J. H. Champion, and the Rev. T. B. Strong. My task has been made easy and pleasant by the kind help of the Rev. D. Moore,

of Holy Trinity, Paddington, and of her who has tended the memory of Aubrey Moore with the same assiduous affection with which she tended him in his lifetime.

W. LOCK.

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MEMOIRS.

I.

THE REV. E. S. TALBOT, D.D., VICAR OF LEEDS,
AND SOMETIME WARDEN OF KEBLE COLLEGE.¹

THE loss of Aubrey Moore claims from the reverent affection of his friends some attempt at a loving estimate of his character and work. In the midst of the grief widely felt by many sorts of men that a life as rich in promise as any in the Church of England, or in the English religious world, should have been so early taken from earth, it moves true thankfulness to remember that the last five years of his life have enabled him to leave a definite contribution of clear and marked significance to our deepest spiritual and intellectual life. To cast the eye rapidly over the writings that he has left, few as they are, is to gain a wonderful impression of calm, strong, candid, coherent, clear-sighted work, of much knowledge assimilated and co-ordinated, of blended spiritual and intellectual insight; but it

¹ Reprinted from the *Guardian* of Jan. 29, 1890, with revisions.

is also to realize that he had proved and uttered the message which he had to give, and that future work might have hardly done more than interpret and expand it. The writings referred to are "Science and the Faith" (containing reviews republished from the *Guardian* and *Quarterly*, with a preface defining the general drift of their thought), an "Oxford House Paper" on "Evolution and Christianity," three sermons in "Keble College Sermons, 1877-88," "Holy Week Addresses" (with a preface on Calvinism, etc.), "Theology and Law: an Assize Sermon," and an essay on "The Christian Doctrine of God" in "Lux Mundi." It is much to be hoped that other pieces of his work may still be issued, possibly his Oxford Reformation lectures which drew so large a class, some of his sermons, and further essays on scientific subjects, *e.g.* on Weismann's modification of the evolution doctrine. His is work of which the unity and the balance made every addition of detail more appreciably interesting and useful.¹

Moore's life may be very briefly given. He was the second son of the Rev. Daniel Moore, Pre-

¹ The wish here expressed has already been carried out in the main. The Essays on Weismann are included in the present volume, and the Reformation Lectures have been published this year by Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., under the title of "Lectures and Papers on the History of Reformation in England and on the Continent."

bendary of St. Paul's and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, and his friends know how much his home was to him, and how much he owed throughout his life to his father's stimulating and loving sympathy with his career, of which he used often to speak with playful tenderness. His school was St. Paul's, where he would have won more distinction but for the chance which made him all the way up the school competitor with one who was afterwards to be associated with him at Keble College, and in contribution to "Lux Mundi," Mr. Illingworth. Moore's power seems to have developed slowly; he did not secure an open scholarship at Oxford, though his First Class in Moderations witnesses to his work at St. Paul's. But a schoolfellow's recollection recalls the promise of future character in the sweetness with which he received and quickly overcame the bluntness of school comment on a physical peculiarity, and the blitheness and energy with which unhindered by it he threw himself into cricket. How well this fits with a friend's remark about him in later life in the *Oxford Magazine* of January 22, that he was "the constant witness to us of the triumph of spirit over matter," and that—

"While gifted with a body which could scarcely fail to make a man constantly self-conscious, and which, quickly wearied by physical effort, must have tended to make him fretful and sensitive, he yet bore the burden so that we for got that he had a burden to bear."

At Oxford distinctions in the schools were followed by a Fellowship at St. John's, where he was tutor for three years by the side of a like-minded friend, R. S. Copleston, now Bishop of Colombo. From an interval spent as a parish priest at Frenchay in Gloucestershire he brought away a great affection for the place and people, and the true priest's sense of pastoral responsibility, which formed so distinctive an element both of his tutorial and intellectual work, and which is seen in the last action of his life, his acceptance of an official Fellowship at Magdalen, carrying with it the religious "cure" of the undergraduates. He never broke his links with Oxford, coming up most terms weekly to give lectures as assistant to Dr. Bright or to attend the meeting of an association of tutors engaged in Oxford work on Church lines, which had then been recently formed as a bond of brotherhood. His true vocation became clear, and it was a great happiness for Keble College that it was the means of bringing him back to the University. Here he found ample scope; he held tutorships simultaneously at Magdalen and at Keble; the "combined system" of lectures enabled him to become lecturer on the Ethics of Aristotle to a very large number of those reading "*Literae Humaniores*." Along with this he was always writing on theology, and carrying on his lectures on Ecclesiastical History, of the teaching of which in the Refor-

mation period he came to have almost a monopoly. Thus his professional work assisted and reflected the unifying character of his mind. His examining chaplainship to Bishop Mackarness (continued under Bishop Stubbs), which was matter of great delight and deep interest to him (the dedication of his last book expresses his regret and love for his chief), his honorary Canonry at Christ Church, his preacherships at St. Mary's and at Whitehall, the offer at the same moment of examinerships in "Literae Humaniores" (this he had accepted) and in Theology, and, though last, not least characteristic, the Curatorship of the Botanical Gardens, are the evidence of his powers and of their repute, evidence which received a last pathetic contribution from the gathering of many sorts of men in Keble Chapel and at Holywell at his funeral. A request addressed to him within the last few weeks before his death through Bishop Potter of New York, to go over to America and give a course of lectures on "The Religious Bearings of Modern Science," is a sign how far his repute was spreading. He declined the offer with extreme regret. It carries no disparagement, for it implies no comparison, of others to say, as was said by the Oxford correspondent of the *Guardian*, that he "has lately occupied a unique position up here." No one was more respected among undergraduates. Not long ago, when some of them wished to form

a small society for the study of economical subjects in a Christian spirit, they turned to Moore, though not a specialist in the subject, for their president and guide. "Science students who wish to believe have lost their best friend," writes one. "I know," so says a very distinguished witness from across the line of ecclesiastical separation, "how the young men loved him, and how he had helped them to rise above their doubts, and take another and more hopeful view of life." But even stronger are two testimonies—one from one of the most experienced and veteran Churchmen in the University, judging with the independence of a senior; and the other from one of the most eminent of younger scientific writers. The former wrote to a friend:—

"Among the men resident in Oxford when 1890 began I know *no one* who was in my eyes more valuable to the Church or to the University. He was, as it seemed, our Christian philosopher, commanding the respect of good intellects, and capable of entering into many lines of thought, social, political, and theological, and getting a hearing from many kinds of men."

And the latter speaks of—

"The extraordinary combination of learning, intellect, kindness, and religion, where each was present in the highest degree. It appeared to me that a nature thus endowed in greatest measure with the greatest attributes of humanity was really, in respect of this combination, the most remarkable man I ever met."

Nor can we withhold the words of a man of

high official position in the University, who spoke of his as "the very best, purest, and most potent influence that I have known in any human friend or helper."

Character and intellectual influence had their share in creating such impressions. And in him the two were singularly alike. In both there was the mixture of strength with tenderness, of a grave and wistful earnestness with a "sweet vein of humour" never far below the surface; of perfect and even retiring modesty with unfaltering firmness. To describe character is almost as futile as to describe features. It must suffice to say that Oxford misses to-day not only one of its strongest minds, but one of its most loveable characters, reflected in a countenance marked by a singular and delicate charm of intellectual and spiritual distinction.

It should be easier to speak of his work, for he had a perfectly distinct and individual place in Oxford and in the Church. He was not an exceptionally learned theologian or original philosopher; but he was felt to be the person who could handle both philosophy and theology with the sureness and ease of an expert, and bring them into mutual contact and illumination. He was not a "scientific man," but he was recognized as the theologian who not only knew a good deal of science, but who saw

scientific fact as scientific men see it, and not with a mere outsider's interest ; and therefore, here too, in the dealings of science with religion he could do a friend's justice to both sides, and could speak words to help their mutual intelligence, to disarm prejudice, and to reassure anxiety. This task, to which he was first almost accidentally turned, became perhaps the most special vocation of his life. He came to it partly through his eager love of botany and flowers, by which so many remember him. When he was on the Kentish coast two or three years ago, staying only some three weeks, he sent to the local paper when he left a list of the local flora prepared by his own collecting, and numbering about three hundred kinds. This love of botany gave him an insight into science through one familiar bit. A happy friendship with one of our ablest young biologists, Mr. E. B. Poulton, in the Keble Common Room, was a great help to him in this respect, and the request to read a paper at the Reading Church Congress on "Evolution" embarked him on the course of serious and responsible utterances on these matters, of which the *Guardian* became the chief channel, and which, as has been said, "lifted a heavy load from many hearts" which had been oppressed by the sound of conflict between God's books of revelation and nature.

But the significance of this piece of his work is not seen unless we realize that it was done so well

because it was done as part of a treatment of the whole speculative problem of religion and philosophy. Many readers of this notice will remember the start of admiration and pleasure with which in the short introduction to "Science and the Faith" they found the evolution teaching fitted into place and interpreted as part of a general and fruitful growth in thought (represented as a change from "mechanical" to "organic" or vital conceptions), and then firmly and quietly limited. In "The Christian Doctrine of God" ("Lux Mundi") Moore was able to set the same thoughts in a wider and more adequate context, to show that present difficulties run up into and illuminate fundamental questions about the Being of God and His relation to the World ("we owe to science," he said, "the rediscovery of the truth of God's immanence in nature"), to claim for Christian revelation a unique part in solving those questions, and to show that in so doing he was in touch with the best traditions of theology. In that essay (pronounced by a severe and unprejudiced judge to be one of the most brilliant he ever read upon such a subject) we realize the value of the large range and many kinds of work which in God's providence Moore had been led to follow up. The philosophical lecturer's familiarity with speculative issues, the theologian's trained intelligence of the real depth of his creed, the ecclesiastical historian's interest

in the phases of alliance between Christian beliefs and the rest of human thought, are all there in full activity. But the power of it comes from the fact that all this material is passed through and fused by a mind which in an eminent degree was always itself, always keenly conscious of the issues of truth, and which with all its delight in dialectic, all its ingenuity and brightness, never treated any piece of knowledge, any subject of debate, without a thoroughness and sense of intellectual responsibility, due to the remembrance that it was part of a whole of truth which influences in every direction the whole of life. It may not be an unprofitable suggestion to any one who wishes to have a lesson in the way in which such a Christian thinker as Moore was realizes this oneness of truth in the departments which we necessarily, but yet shallowly, divide as spiritual, intellectual, etc., that he should read consecutively "The Christian Doctrine of God" and the "Holy Week Addresses." And, whatever the effect upon him, he will hardly regret the suggestion.

But what, we still need to ask, was the characteristic quality of his work—alas! that we must add, his distinctive bequest? We may offer for answer that it was the rare combination in him of the deductive and dogmatic mind with openness to every touch of new thought; a combination in

which both sides were entirely and equally genuine and spontaneous, and which therefore (as one result) enabled him to attract with perfect sincerity and naturalness the most opposite kinds of men. He was, on the one hand, one of those whose privilege it is to begin with faith in the Christian Creed, and, so far as man can tell, to walk steadily in its light. We might almost use of himself words which he used of the process by which the Church historically wrought out her theology—"starting with the inheritance of faith, the belief in the Divinity, and trusting in the guidance of the Spirit," he "threw himself boldly into the rational problem." And he would have spoken of this as being intellectually a great gain, the gain which it is in any science to start with the right method. In his Assize sermon he claims kinship between theology and law, on the ground that both are deductive and authoritative in their character. It was natural to him to go straight to theology, and look for its voice, and guide himself by its scientific distinctions and inferences. In this connection is to be noticed his familiarity with the schoolmen and love of the "Blessed St. Thomas," as he used half playfully to call him. "Few men," says a friend, "ever had his grasp of the real issues underlying 'Realistic' and 'Nominalist' controversies, and their bearing on the history of the Church." The technical and scientific form did not repel,

but attracted him, though the delightful humorous smile as he quoted from them showed how well he knew what everybody knows about "scholastic" limitations. The title of his book, "Science and *the Faith*," implies at once all that is being here said. "Faith" would have been to him a very different matter. He was a Churchman to the backbone, and he never thought to make things better by abating, even when unpopular, its distinctive language ;

"The belief in revelation carries with it a belief in dogma, and every true dogma of Christ's holy Church embodies a revelation, a truth about God which, if realized in our life, is a truth which sets us free."

To separate doctrine from practice is as though we should "fling aside that body of truth which years of scientific research have won from nature, and start afresh in the conflict." "Dogma is not an end in itself, but a necessary means to a good end, the holding fast the sacred deposit of revealed truth." This was to him normal and natural language, and this is the language of a thoroughly and freely dogmatic mind. It was entirely in accord with this that loyalty made him write a firm and explicit refusal to take part in the opening ceremonies of a Nonconformist college, and protest against our taking up Luther and Zwingli commemorations.

But then look at the language which we have to

lay alongside of this:—"We want—which of us does not?—more light on the weary problems which beat and baffle us, and hinder our Christian life." Or in his latest University sermon after pointing out that the sense of stewardship, that is, of ministering what one has received is the true temper alike of priest, philosopher, and scientific investigator, he goes on:—

"It is in this sense of mission and ministry that we find the strength to struggle on through doubt and difficulty and almost despair, in the search for truth."

Such words have all the pathos and passion of the spirit of quest, and show that the steady believer had borne his share of the burthen of "this unintelligible world," and could feel with those whom it oppressed. But to such evidence of his temper we may add the more definite witness of his thought. It was the complement (but to him the consequence) of dogmatism in the science of God, that he should reverence all other teaching. He speaks of—

"The willingness to put ourselves to school with those who in whatever department of life have been in God's purpose the channels by which hitherto He has taught the world. To be teachable it is not necessary to be uncritical, but if ever we are to become true critics we must begin by readiness to learn."

Such golden words show how entirely he realized that the deductiveness of theology had for him no sense of over-bearingness, and that he would as

little reject off-hand in a dogmatic interest what the honest induction of experts in any subject seems to gather as he would ignore the guidance of the Church's Creed in criticizing such new material. Nor was he the least blind to the fact that such inquiry must, in a manner, go behind or take to pieces the very things on which authority rests; that faith will have to listen patiently to reason's investigation of faith's own nature, or that there is a challenge of religion by reason by which in God's providence religion is cleared and confirmed. "Reason interprets religion to itself," and a great contribution to the interpretation "comes from the side of a scientific discovery" of the how and manner of revelation, of the genesis of dogma (see for example "*Lux Mundi*," p. 71). And what underlay all this was, of course, his fundamental reverence for human reason. "Rationalism" was indeed to him "intensely unscientific" as "assuming" that "human belief is the measure of all truth." But he would allow no limit to the area over which reason was to work. "Every question is a lawful one which human reason, enlightened by the grace of God, can understand." The work of reason in making clear, and ever clearer, the bearings of the faith, and in breaking up what have been mistakenly assumed to be such bearings, was as plain to him as the work of the Faith in illuminating and controlling reason.

Nothing better could be desired for the younger men of our time, clerical or lay, than that they should read and re-read what he has said of this in the opening pages of his essay on "The Doctrine of God," noticing as they do so how deeply Moore realized that such reverence for the different sources of truth, such attempt "both to keep and claim" implied "struggle" which "will need the utmost effort moral and intellectual." His firm faith did not send him into these matters "with a light heart." It belonged to the habit of mind thus trained in the discipline of reverence to our several sources of truth, that while he felt the speculative necessity of unity—"philosophy is nothing if it does not completely unify knowledge;" "religion and philosophy both demand that God shall fill the whole region of thought and feeling"—he could quite firmly maintain such practical dualism, such parallelism of thought as in her present state reason must submit to. He absolutely refused to explain spirit in terms of matter. He adhered quite firmly to the distinction between "revelation" and nature, even at the time that he was tracing or claiming freedom to trace the natural history of revelation, or at least of the antecedents and development of revelation. He knew "the difference between the religion of Israel and all other religions" to be "a difference not merely of degree, but of kind." He contended

that the personality of God is, now and for us, as true a *datum* as His immanence or infinity. He who had done science such splendid and generous justice refused absolutely to grant to her—shall we not rather say, to credit her true self with demanding?—that “ethics should become a department of biology,” and prophesied the day when biology should receive light thrown back from a true moral science:—

“Christianity is committed to no theory of the universe, but it is committed to a belief which evolution as at present understood is unwilling, or rather unable to justify—the belief, namely, that God is a Personal Being, and in His innermost nature a God of Love, that the world is a moral world. . . . It is the Christian’s belief in progress and his knowledge gained from experience which justify him in saying that evolution cannot be the last word.”

Nothing is more clearly a part of Moore’s teaching than that we must often hold truths of which we do not yet know the synthesis, that we must constantly draw distinctions where we are unable to draw sharp lines.

Such were some of the features of his thought; but his thought was but a part of the life of his spirit. The temper of that spirit cannot perhaps be better defined than in his own words:—

“Purity, humility, and gentleness are notes of the scholars of the truth.” “Only when we become ‘as a little child’ can we hope to enter into the kingdom of the truth. . . .

Who are they who have proved themselves sufficient for so great a work as the interpreting of truth to man? Those surely who have most clearly recognized the greatness of the truth they handle and the insufficiency of man to do anything but to receive the truth which is given and truly to reflect the truth he sees."

To such thought "revelation" is a climax which finds its prophecy in the true character of all knowledge, and the rational Christian believer is the full-bloomed type of the true student. It is the brightest part of what we owe to Moore that he went by God's grace so far to delineate and to realize an ideal so beautiful, so lofty, and so true.

II.

G. J. ROMANES, ESQ., M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.¹

Among the other obituary notices which you will probably receive of the late Mr. Aubrey Moore, I should like to supply a few remarks with special reference to the aspect of his many-sided mind which was turned towards physical science and contemporary thought. And I desire to publish these remarks in your columns, inasmuch as we now know that he was the writer of the admirable reviews and essays which from time to time have

¹ Reprinted from the *Guardian*, Jan. 29, 1890.

appeared in the *Guardian* with reference to current questions in biology. It is impossible that any sufficiently instructed man can have read these reviews and essays without having been equally impressed by the information and ability which they displayed on the one hand, and the fearless sincerity which they betokened on the other. Now, in as far as these qualities of mind and temper were rendered conspicuous in his writing on Darwinian subjects, they were not only holding up the light of salutary example to other men of his own calling, but were showing to the general public a strength and a beauty of personal character which it was the privilege of his private friends to admire still more deeply in more intimate relations. For, if it were true that no one was more fully imbued with the faith spiritual, it was quite as true that no one was more fully imbued with the faith scientific, or the assured conviction that, lead where she may, it is the first intellectual duty of a man to follow the guidance of science, leaving all "consequences" to take care of themselves. And the fact that in his own individual case no such consequences were felt to be involved in the direction of unbelief, even from the most extreme developments of Darwinian doctrine, has always seemed to me a striking proof of another—namely, that the whole theory of evolution is both logically and practically distinct from any of the ulterior

or fundamental questions relating to Christianity. Logically distinct, because there was no mind of our time more highly gifted in respect of its powers of accurate thought; practically distinct, because I suppose there was no man to whom religious belief was a matter of more serious reality. And when to this we add that, in respect of learning he was probably without an equal in this country, it appears to me that Mr. Aubrey Moore was about the best case that could be pointed to of the possible co-existence in the same mind of an unshaken Christian faith with all the highest elaborations of secular thought.

When I say that, in respect of learning, Mr. Aubrey Moore was probably without an equal in this country, it is necessary to explain that by learning I mean, not special erudition in any single line or department of knowledge, but a general sweep of solid and accurate information comprising many fields. Of course, I am acquainted with a large number of men who are incomparably better informed as biologists, or more deeply read as classical scholars, as students of history, and as theologians. A few other men I have met who are as well read in philosophy, ancient and modern. But I am bound to say that I never met any man who combined such large stores of knowledge in all these several departments of

knowledge ; and it is in this sense that I claim for him the peculiar position above assigned.

The sudden removal of such a man in the prime of his working life is a calamity not only to the University with which he was associated, but to the whole intellectual interests of the generation in which he lived. At Oxford his loss will be lamented by the resident scientific members almost as much as by the clerical ; for, more than any contemporary, he was equally at home among both, and constituted a link of union between these two sections of existing University life which can ill be spared by either. To the country at large his untimely death has removed a rich promise of Christian championship of the order displayed by his essay in "*Lux Mundi*"—an essay so remarkable in its originality of thought and brilliancy of style, that even those of his countrymen who no longer belong to the household of his faith must be poor creatures indeed if they do not grieve at the silencing of his voice.

In these few words I have sought to convey my high appreciation of Mr. Aubrey Moore as a man of intellect and learning, whose great powers were united with a spirit of tolerant sympathy towards all honest search for truth. Of the other aspects of his character I prefer leaving those to speak

who from a longer and more intimate friendship are better entitled to do so, although I cannot close without joining my testimony to what, among all his friends, must be, in an unusual measure, a consciousness of personal loss.

“O strong soul, by what shore
Tarriest thou now? For that force,
Surely, has not been left vain!
Somewhere, surely, afar,
In the sounding labour-house vast
Of being, is practised that strength,
Zealous, beneficent, firm.”

III.

THE REV. W. LOCK, SUB-WARDEN OF KEBLE COLLEGE.¹

STUDENTS of Theology have had a sad list of deaths to mourn within the last twelve months: Dr. Edersheim, Canon Evans, W. H. Simcox, Dr. Hatch, Bishop Lightfoot, Dr. Littledale, and Dr. von Döllinger have followed each other quickly to “the Eternal School”; and now, in the death of the Rev. A. L. Moore, we have another loss coming home to us in Oxford very closely, and one which, if we combine performance with promise, is as sad as any of the others.

¹ Reprinted from the *Oxford Magazine*, Jan. 22, 1890.

Mr. Moore came to Oxford from St. Paul's School in 1867. Strangely enough, he was unsuccessful in gaining a Scholarship, though he tried at several colleges ; so he entered as a commoner at Exeter College. There his excellence was early recognized ; he gained a first class in Moderations and in the Final Schools (1871), and was elected in 1873 to a fellowship at St. John's. There he remained as Tutor till 1876, when he took the living of Frenchay in Gloucestershire, which he held till 1880, and then returned to Oxford at the request of the Warden of Keble College, and became a tutor at that college and also at Magdalen College. These offices he retained till his death, being also elected in 1889 an Official Fellow at Magdalen as Dean of Divinity. From 1878 he was also Examining Chaplain, first to Bishop Mackarness and then to Bishop Stubbs, the former of whom appointed him to an Honorary Canonry in the Cathedral in 1887 ; since 1880 he has lectured as assistant to Dr. Bright. He was Select Preacher before the University 1885-1886 ; Oxford preacher at Whitehall, 1887-1888 ; Curator of the Botanic Gardens, 1887 ; and was just appointed as Examiner in the School of Literae Humaniores. It is a striking tribute to his many-sidedness that he was nominated on the same day Examiner in the School of Theology. He wrote frequently for the *Guardian*, and at times for the

Quarterly Review, and in 1889 republished the more important of these reviews in a volume entitled "Science and the Faith." In addition to separate sermons and addresses at the Church Congress, he also published a set of "Holy Week Addresses," an "Oxford House Paper" on "Evolution and Christianity," and contributed sermons to the "Keble College Sermons," and an Essay on the Christian Doctrine of God to "Lux Mundi."

This list of publications is sufficient to show how varied was his work, and that it is not theologians only who have to mourn his loss. The chief characteristic of his mind was indeed its quick versatility : an excellent practical botanist, he was also a real student of the theories and methods of Natural Science, especially on the side of biology ; a good classical scholar, yet his main interest was centred in moral and metaphysical speculation. Full of interest as he was in social and economic problems, he had been pressed by the undergraduates to take a leading part in a society for the discussion of such problems. His theological lectures has been mainly on Ecclesiastical History, and to many of us it seemed that few were more qualified to write a history of the Reformation, yet he himself felt that his real call was to deal with those parts of Theology which border on Science or Philosophy ; and it is no secret that he refused the request of his friends to allow himself to be

suggested as a successor to Dr. Hatch in the Readership of Ecclesiastical History. As a controversialist he was a keen lover of the fray—lynx-eyed to detect weakness in an opponent's position, trenchant and inexorable in logic, full charged with epigrammatic defiance, yet scrupulously just and with a ready recognition of the difficulties which others might feel in accepting his own position. Many of those whom he criticized most severely recognized this; *e.g.* Mr. Cotter Morison expressed his gratitude for, and his high estimate of, his review of the "Service of Man." As a preacher his sermons often contained a thorough sifting of some theological problem, yet, with the instinct of one who had been a parish priest, there flashed out from time to time some piercing spiritual appeal, "quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart," and uttered with a clear solemnity of tone which rings in the ears still.

For behind all the many-sided work, as the determining motive of it all, there lay the deepest sense of intellectual responsibility, and the conviction expressed so excellently in his last University sermon, that "truth always and everywhere is a sacred trust from God for the service of man." The belief in Christ and His Church was his by inheritance, but he had accepted it with his full-grown mind, at a time when all such acceptance had to be won through the stress of conflict, be-

cause it satisfied at once his passion for righteousness and his intellectual craving for unity. Hence he approached questions like that of evolution with a perfect fearlessness about the result, and but lately he was encouraging others to approach the criticism of the Old Testament in the same spirit.

It is harder to speak of what he was to those who knew him intimately: the patient teacher ever ready to explain difficulties to his pupils, and lavish of his knowledge and of his best thoughts in conversation with his friends: the life and soul of Common-room, and the enlivener of many a dull meeting with his quick repartee and sparkling humour: the constant witness to us of the triumph of spirit over matter: who while gifted with a body which could scarcely fail to make a man constantly self-conscious, and which, quickly wearied by physical effort, must have tended to make him fretful and sensitive, yet bore the burden so that we forgot that he had a burden to bear, and strove with the fretfulness till it seemed almost to have passed away. The most athletic undergraduate, with all his admiration for the prowess of the river and the Parks, yet was moved no less

"Beside that strong
Rare spirit, fettered to a stubborn body,
Endeavouring to subdue it and inform it
With its own splendour."

To know him slightly was consistent with being

frightened by his sharp cleverness: to know him more was to be attracted by it: to know him well was to love and admire the goodness which kept such cleverness in such control.

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WEISMANN'S ESSAYS UPON HEREDITY, ETC.¹

It is certainly not too much to say that Professor Weismann's "Essays on Heredity," are the most important contribution to speculative biology which has been made since the "Origin of Species" was published. Yet, except to professed biologists, Professor Weismann's work has till lately been little known in England. Attention was first drawn to it by an article, entitled "Death," in the *Nineteenth Century* for May, 1885, by Mr. A. E. Shipley; this was followed up by two excellent articles in *Nature* by Professor Moseley, which gave in summary the main conclusions arrived at; and in 1887, at the Manchester meeting of the British Association, Professor Weismann himself took part in a discussion introduced by Professor Ray Lankester, on "The Transmission of Acquired Characters."

¹ Essays upon Heredity, etc. By Professor August Weismann. Edited by Edward B. Poulton, M.A., F.R.S., etc., Tutor of Keble College, Oxford, Dr. Schönland, Ph. D., and A. E. Shipley, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

As far back as 1884, Mr. A. E. Shipley began a translation of the two essays which stand first in the present collection, and he has now co-operated with Mr. E. B. Poulton and Dr. Schönland in preparing the volume before us. Professor Weismann has himself looked over the proof-sheets, which is a sufficient guarantee for the accuracy of the work as a whole, while the essays in their English dress admit of the high commendation that, if it were not for the necessary insertion in brackets of a German technical term here and there, there would be nothing to remind us that the essays are a translation at all.

The essays themselves are eight in number, and are arranged in chronological order, the first being written in 1881, the last in 1888. We are thus able to trace the development of the theory in Professor Weismann's own thoughts, and see how he was led from point to point, till he reached the central position, that in what he calls "the continuity of Germ-plasm" is to be found the true explanation of heredity. And this involves the non-transmission of acquired characters, and the overthrow of the Lamarckian and Neo-Lamarckian theory.

It is only the outside of Professor Weismann's work that we can hope to touch in the present review. And even then we can do little more than state results. For the evidence lies in the mysterious processes of embryological development, a

discussion of which would be as much out of place as it would be beyond our power to attempt.

There are two centres round which Professor Weismann's investigations turn—a speculation as to the *origin of natural death*, and a new *theory of heredity*, and the two are closely connected together, and result in a complete and coherent biological theory.

1. The first essay raises the question of the reason of the great variation in the duration of life among plants and animals. Can this variation be brought under any law? It is assumed, to start with, that duration of life depends upon adaptation to external conditions, and is governed by the needs of the species rather than of the individual. When, then, the individual becomes useless to the species, whether that stage is reached after a longer or a shorter period, we should expect him to have reached the natural term of his life. And we are confirmed in this expectation by finding that, as a rule, life does not greatly outlast the period of reproduction, except in those species which tend their young. In spite of the fact that there is very little accurate information available as to the duration of life in different species, Professor Weismann is able to produce some remarkable statistics in favour of this view, the most striking perhaps being drawn from the "exceptions" which "prove the rule." But this discussion of the duration of life

leads on to the extremely interesting question of the meaning and nature of death. Science has in past days discussed the origin of life, and for the present has put the question aside as an insoluble problem. On this matter, then, Professor Weismann has nothing to say beyond recording his belief that "spontaneous generation, in spite of all vain efforts to demonstrate it, remains a logical necessity." But on the phenomenon of death he has much to tell us. And his conclusions are as striking as they are suggestive.

It sounds at first like a paradox to say that "it is only from the point of view of utility that we can understand the necessity of death," or to talk about death as "a beneficial occurrence," an "adaptation," which has arisen by the operation of natural selection, because a life of unlimited duration would be "a luxury without a purpose." Still more startling is it to be told that, though the higher organisms "contain within themselves the germs of death," there are inferior organisms which are "endowed with the potentiality of never-ending life." But it is only the language which is paradoxical. When the amœba increases by division, neither half is younger or older than the other. The process may go on for centuries; thousands of amœbae may be destroyed, yet the amœbae who survive are as old as, for they are identical with, the first amœba. The same is true of the

low unicellular algae, and the more highly organized unicellular infusoria. They can be killed, but they do not die naturally. In this sense they are immortal. And, as Professor Weismann puts it, "Each individual of any such unicellular species living on the earth to-day is far older than mankind, and is almost as old as life itself."

Assuming, then, that the higher forms are evolved from the lower, when did natural death appear, and how could it have been—for this is Weismann's contention—a gain to the species, brought about by natural selection?

The answer is that when we pass from the unicellular to the multicellular organisms we are at first as far as ever from death. Multicellular organisms, like unicellular, are capable of being killed, but so long as the cells are homogeneous, there is no death. For the dissolution of the cell-colony is not death, since the separated cells still live. But when among the multicellular organisms we reach those in which a division of labour has taken place among the cells—that is to say, when we pass from homoplastides to heteroplastides—a new fact appears. The previously identical cells have become dissimilar, some being perishable, the *somatic* cells, the others, the reproductive cells, retaining the potential immortality, which belonged alike to unicellular organisms and to the cells of the homoplastid colony:—

"The mortality of the somatic cells," says Professor Weismann, "arose with the first differentiation of the originally homogeneous cells of the polyplastids into the dissimilar cells of the heteroplastids. And this is the first beginning of natural death."

At first, while the immortal reproductive cells far outnumbered the perishable somatic cells, the death of the latter would be hardly noticeable. The organism, as a whole, would seem to survive, though a part of it perished. But when, in the individual, the perishable somatic cells came to outnumber the reproductive cells, death would emerge into prominence. For that which lived would be relatively small and unimportant compared with that which died. And when, moreover, the potentially immortal germ cells, owing to the death of the somatic cells, lacked the conditions under which they might build up a new body, they would also die, and so the *natural* death of the somatic cells would become incidentally the cause of death in the germ cells. For instance, if a plant or insect dies before all the reproductive cells have matured, these remaining cells are killed by the death of the *soma*. And thus the mortal secures an accidental triumph over that which in its own nature was potentially immortal.

If we ask—Why did the mortal thus triumph over the immortal? the answer is that it must have been for the good of the species. But this at once suggests the further question, —

If natural selection, operating on the material of minute quantitative variations in the cells, not only produced a quantitative distinction between mortal and immortal, but put a premium on death, why should not immortality some day reappear? If immortality is lost because it proved under certain conditions "a useless luxury," under other conditions it might reappear. Professor Weismann answers—The line between mortal and immortal is less sharp than we might suppose. For the immortal cells, which do not die, can be killed; and the mortal cells do recover the power of indefinite, if not infinite, reproduction, where long life is necessary for the good of the species. The duration of life is seen to be controlled by the good of the species, and long life, where it is so needed, is secured by an increase of the number of cell-generations in the *soma*.

If we further ask—Why, then, may not this increase continue till the line between reproductive and somatic, immortal and mortal disappears? the answer is, that there is no reason, except that we cannot imagine conditions under which such an extension would be for the good of the species. A Tithonus, endowed with immortality but not exempted from the wear and tear of life, is as useless to the species as he is burdensome to himself. The *soma* being in its nature vulnerable, would, if immortal, become of less and less use to

the species, and the life potentially immortal would actually be limited by natural selection. Nature does not feed "useless mouths." The higher organisms, then, contain the germ of death, not because death is a primary necessity for living things, nor because in them a distinction between reproductive and somatic cells exists, but because in the somatic cells the power of indefinite multiplication ceased to be of use, and so was lost. In short, the death of the individual was for the good of the species.

Such is Weismann's theory of the origin of death. And it is interesting to find that, more than twenty years ago, Dr. A. R. Wallace had hit upon a similar explanation. In a note written some time between 1865 and 1870, but published for the first time as a footnote in the present volume, he says that while an organism, which increases by fission, would survive in spite of the destruction of its individual separated parts, those organisms which give off very small portions to form new organisms would be at a great disadvantage as compared with these smaller organisms in the struggle for existence, and would soon cease to exist:—

"This state of things," he says, "would be in any case for the advantage of the race, and would therefore, by natural selection, soon become established as the regular course of things, and thus we have the origin of *old age, decay, and death*; for it is evident that when one or more individuals

have provided a sufficient number of successors, they themselves, as consumers of nourishment in a constantly increasing degree, are an injury to those successors. Natural selection, therefore, weeds them out, and in many cases favours such races as die almost immediately after they have left successors."

Here we have Weismann's theory of the origin of death, not indeed worked out as it is in his Essays on the "Duration of Life" and "Life and Death," but thrown out as a suggestion, which seems to have lain dormant and been forgotten even by the author till the essays of Professor Weismann were submitted to him in proof.

2. The other point in Professor Weismann's philosophy is his *theory of heredity*, which follows as a consequence from his theory of the origin of death and the separation of somatic and reproductive cells in the heteroplastids.

It is clear that in those organisms which increase by simple division the likeness which exists between the divided parts is simply the likeness of identity. The offspring is "a chip of the old block" in a literal sense, except that the question of age does not come in, each part being as old, or as young, as that of which it is a part. There is, as yet, no question of heredity. After the separation, any of the separated parts might by direct action of environment be modified, and so become different from the others, but when they in turn increased by fission their divided parts would, to start with,

be exactly alike, the likeness being still the likeness of identity. Even when the stage is reached in which two unicellular organisms conjugate and coalesce in one, whatever be the immediate advantage of such conjugation, there would presumably be the funding of the characters possessed by each. but so long as reproduction takes place by fission the whole of the parent passes into the offspring, or rather the parent and offspring (if such terms may be improperly applied to the parts of the division) are of one piece.

When, however, we reach those organisms in which two different sorts of cells are produced, and when sexual reproduction makes its appearance, in place of reproduction by fission, the offspring is no longer identical with either parent, but shares the nature of both, being distinct from either. If we still speak of the child as "a chip of the old block," we are more or less conscious that we are speaking metaphorically. Yet the fact of heredity, whether in plants or brutes or men, is too obvious to escape notice, and is taken as a matter of course long before any attempt is made to explain it. Nor does the real difficulty of the problem present itself to us till we ask, How can a microscopic cell contain in the germ not only the whole body in all its parts, but the special characters of parents or more remote ancestors?

It is well known that the fact of heredity plays

an important part in Lamarck's theory of descent ; indeed Lamarck would have explained the structure of organisms mainly through the inheritance by one generation of qualities or characters acquired by previous generations. The long neck of the giraffe was due to constant stretching after the leaves of trees, the web between the toes of a water-bird's foot to the extension of the toes in an attempt to oppose as large a surface as possible to the water in swimming. In both cases the characteristics of the species were supposed to be acquired by minute additions from generation to generation.

According to the theory of natural selection the same facts would be differently explained ; but Darwin did not altogether abandon Lamarckianism, or see that all the facts could be accounted for by natural selection, and that therefore the inheritance of acquired characters was an unnecessary hypothesis. Instead of this, he addressed himself to the question how the use or disuse of an organ in one generation could be transmitted to the next.

The answer was the cumbrous theory of *pan-genesis*, which Darwin himself recognized as only a provisional hypothesis. It was supposed that excessively small particles known as "gemmules" are constantly given off from the cells of the body and collected in the reproductive cells, so that any change in the organism during its life is as it were "registered for transmission" to the offspring.

Apart from the other difficulties of this theory, it has been practically proved by Galton's experiments that the "gemmules" do not exist, and, moreover, the tendency of recent science has been almost entirely in the direction of emphasizing the importance of the Darwinian principle of natural selection, and excluding what remains of Lamarckianism in the doctrine of evolution.

Professor Weismann's theory of heredity is the latest development of this tendency. (i.) It explains heredity by the continuity of the germ-plasm; (ii.) it denies the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characters; and (iii.) it recognizes in natural selection the sole factor in the evolution of species, at least among the metaphyta and metazoa.

The continuity of the germ-plasm.—We have seen that the problem of heredity does not really present itself in those plants and animals which increase by fission or division. For here the parts are at the time of the division alike because identical, and retain their likeness except when acted upon by the environment. But when sexual reproduction appears, the offspring is no longer identical with either parent, but combines in varying proportions the characteristics of both, though we can trace it back to a microscopic cell. This microscopic cell must contain all that grows from it—not like a Chinese puzzle box-within-box (*emboîtement*), nor as containing preformed gemmules (*paogenesis*),

but as the vehicle of the united germ-plasms of the parent plants or animals. At a certain stage in the evolution of organisms, as we have already noticed, a distinction arises between reproductive and somatic cells—the latter being perishable; the former, in the sense explained, potentially immortal. The higher organisms, then, contain—speaking from the purely physical point of view—a mortal and an immortal part, what belongs to the individual and what the individual merely has the use of. There is no primogeniture in nature, but the inheritance is strictly entailed. The individual becomes the vehicle to the next generation of a portion of that “immortal” germ-plasm out of which he himself was built up. Parent and child are thus made of the same “stuff.” Their somatic cells grow out of the same germ-plasm, and the likeness in the result is due to the identity of the source. Thus *heredity is traced back to growth*. If we compare the germ-plasm to the creeping rhizome of a fern, the successive generations would be represented by the fronds as they are successively thrown up along the line of the rhizome. Coming from the same rhizome we expect them to be alike, except so far as they are individually modified from without. But the individual modifications are individual simply, and the next frond has an identical starting-point with the last, and is unaffected by anything which for

good or evil has affected the others from outside. This illustration of a creeping rhizome, however, is a very imperfect one. It would fairly represent the facts if the plant or animal were the offspring of one parent only. But when sexual reproduction appears, the germ-plasm, out of which the individual plant or animal is built up, is the union of the germ-plasms of four grand-parents, 16 so on. The complexity of the germ-plasm rises in geometrical ratio, so that in the tenth generation a single germ contains 1024 different germ-plasms, with their inherent hereditary tendencies. But though the germ-plasm in each generation increases in complexity, it does not increase in mass. For it is constantly being used, as it increases, for the building up of successive individuals, though there is always a part of the germ-plasm which is not used up in the construction of the body of the offspring, but is reserved unchanged for the next generation. The somatic cells belong to the individual, are modified in the life of the individual both by the direct action of environment and by use and disuse, but they also die with the individual; while the germ cells belong to the race, and can only be affected very slightly, if at all, through the somatic cells. As a corollary from this we get—

The non-transmission of acquired characters.—This, of course, does not mean that a new charac-

ter which appears in one of the parents may not reappear in the child, but that nothing can arise in any organism unless the predisposition is already present, and it is the predisposition which is transmitted, not the character :—

“Only those characters can be called ‘acquired’ which owe their origin to external influences, and the term ‘acquired’ must be denied to those which depend upon the mysterious relationship between the different hereditary tendencies which meet in the fertilized ovum. These latter are not ‘acquired,’ but inherited, although the ancestors did not possess them as such, but only as it were the elements of which they are composed.”

With regard to changes produced in the individual by external influences, these, according to Professor Weismann, cannot be transmitted to the germs, and therefore cannot be hereditary. No one expects a cat whose tail has been cut off to become the parent of tailless kittens, though there are always old wives' fables to that effect; nor do we expect a man who has lost an arm in battle to have a family of one-armed children. Even the tyranny of fashion seems powerless to affect the germ-plasm. The deformed foot of the Chinese mother is not transmitted to her children, nor have centuries of Western civilization had the slightest influence on the waist of the British baby. Professor Weismann has an elaborate examination of the various cases of supposed transmission of mutilations, including the case of epilepsy artificially

induced in guinea-pigs and transmitted to their offspring. He also discusses at some length the botanical arguments in favour of the transmission of acquired characters. Besides this he has recorded his own experiments on white mice, seven females and five males, whose tails were ruthlessly cut off. In five generations of artificially mutilated parents 901 young were produced, and there was not a single example either of a rudimentary tail or even of one abnormally short.

The question of the transmission of special talents is a more difficult one, simply because it is less easy to distinguish between what is innate and what is really acquired :—

“The children of accomplished pianists (as Professor Weismann says) do not inherit the art of playing on the piano ; they have to learn it in the same laborious manner as that by which their parents acquired it ; they do not inherit anything except that which their parents also possessed when children—viz., manual dexterity and a good ear.”

All predispositions can no doubt be improved in the course of a lifetime, but the question is whether the improvement can be added to, and handed on with, the predisposition to the next generation. On this point Professor Weismann is quite clear :—

“In my opinion,” he says, “there is absolutely no trustworthy proof that talents have been improved by their exercise through the course of a long series of generations. The Bach family shows that musical talent, and the Bernoulli

family that mathematical power, can be transmitted from generation to generation, but this teaches us nothing as to the origin of such talents. In both families the high-water mark of talent lies, not at the end of the series of generations, as it should do if the results of practice are transmitted, but in the middle. Again, talents frequently appear in some single member of a family which has not been previously distinguished. Gauss was not the son of a mathematician; Handel's father was a surgeon, of whose musical powers nothing is known; Titian was the son and also the nephew of a lawyer, while he and his brother, Francesco Vecellio, were the first painters in a family which produced a succession of seven other artists with diminishing talents."

We may sum up Professor Weismann's theory of heredity in his own words :—

"I believe that heredity depends upon the fact that a small portion of the effective substance of the germ, the germ-plasm, remains unchanged during the development of the ovum into an organism, and that this part of the germ-plasm serves as a foundation from which the germ-cells of the new organism are produced. There is, therefore, continuity of the germ-plasm from one generation to another. . . . Hence it follows that the transmission of acquired characters is an impossibility, for if the germ-plasm is not formed anew in each individual, but is derived from that which preceded it, its structure, and above all its molecular constitution, cannot depend upon the individual in which it happens to occur, but such an individual only forms, as it were, the nutritive soil at the expense of which the germ-plasm grows, while the latter possessed its characteristic structure from the beginning—viz., before the commencement of growth.

"But the tendencies of heredity, of which the germ-plasm is the bearer, depend upon this very molecular structure,

and hence only those characters can be transmitted through successive generations which have been previously inherited viz., those characters which were potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm. It also follows that those other characters which have been acquired by the influence of special external conditions, during the lifetime of the parent, cannot be transmitted at all."

It is obviously impossible to attempt anything like a criticism of Weismann's theory. Its evidence lies almost exclusively in the domain of embryology, and must be judged by professed embryologists. A part of this evidence, to which we have not even alluded hitherto, is Professor Weismann's theory as to the nature and meaning of the polar bodies given off by the unfertilized ovum in both plants and animals; a theory which, if it be generally accepted, will not only be a valuable support to Professor Weismann's main position, as explaining the differences as well as the likenesses which exist between the offspring of the same parents, but will rank among the more important discoveries of modern embryological science.

But in reading these essays we cannot help feeling, what was indeed *a priori* probable in a theory which was diametrically opposed to Lamarckianism, that too hard a line is drawn between the reproductive and the somatic cells. To most people it would seem that, however slight it may be, or however slowly it may take effect, there must be a reaction of the individual life on that of which it is

the vehicle. Professor Weismann, indeed, admits this, but with obvious reluctance. He says—

“I am far from asserting that the germ-plasm—which, as I hold, is transmitted as the basis of heredity from one generation to another—is absolutely unchangeable or totally uninfluenced by forces residing in the organism within which it is transformed into germ cells. I am also compelled to admit that it is conceivable that organisms may exert a modifying influence upon their germ cells, and even that such a process is to a certain extent inevitable. The nutrition and growth of the individual must exercise some influence on the germ cells; but in the first place this influence must be extremely slight, and in the second place it cannot act in the manner in which it is usually assumed that it takes place.”

But if, as he admits elsewhere, a changed climate may somehow affect the germ, and if increased nourishment not only increases the luxuriance of a plant, but “in some distinct way alters the plant,” it may also be true, as is commonly believed, that the acquired habit of intemperance may act upon the germ-plasm of which the drunkard is only the steward, and he may transmit an alcoholized nature to his children; and the *roué* may not only be destroying his individual life, but weakening and vitiating that which he hands down to posterity. It may be a slower process than we had imagined, but it is hard to believe that it does not take place.

Looking at Professor Weismann's theory as a

whole, there are two points which seem to be of special importance.

I. The first is that Weismann's theory makes a definite advance in attempting to account for variability. Hitherto evolution has been compelled to postulate variability, and has neither set limits to the possible variations nor accounted for their origin. Given a practically infinite number of "accidental" variations, evolution sets to work to show why, under the law of natural selection, supplemented by the supposed inheritance of acquired characters, certain forms rather than others survived. But Weismann's theory attempts to explain the existence of variation, and to show that the variations, though innumerable and *practically* infinite, are neither really infinite nor accidental, but from first to last are subject to law. In the lower asexual organisms variation is brought about by external influences acting on the individual, these individual characters, though acquired, being as yet transmissible, because reproduction takes place by simple fission. But when the distinction between reproductive and somatic cells arises, the direct action of environment ceases, or rather it affects the individual, not the species. Sexual reproduction now appears as a new method of multiplying variations. For sexual reproduction, by combining the variations already in existence, increases them in geometrical ratio, and thus

secures "hereditary individual characters to form the material upon which natural selection may work."

2. The second point to notice is that Weismann's theory, if it is true, involves the triumph of the Darwinian principle of natural selection, and will therefore have to run the gauntlet with the modern champions of Lamarckianism, including Herbert Spencer. For Herbert Spencer is committed to the view that what is *a posteriori* in the race is *a priori* in the individual; in other words, that acquired characters are transmitted. According to Weismann no such transmission is possible or necessary. It is not possible if we are to accept the theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm; and it is not necessary if we can explain the facts without it. His contention is that we can; that the Lamarckianism which survived in Darwinism was a *deus ex machina*, which we can now dispense with. The progressive increase of variability has no meaning except as the progressive preparation of material for natural selection to work upon. The same law holds throughout. The conjugation of unicellular organisms, the distinction and the stereotyping of the distinction between somatic and reproductive cells, the introduction of natural death, the beginning of sexual reproduction, are all explained by reference to the same end. And when Darwin tells us that no flower is invariably

self-fertilized, and when Sir John Lubbock assures us that "nature sets her face against self-fertilization" we can see why it is so. For cross-fertilization has a similar advantage over self-fertilization, that sexual reproduction has over reproduction by fission. It multiplies the materials on which natural selection can operate. And to multiply the possible variations in plant or animal is to multiply the chances of survival in the struggle for existence.

Whatever modifications Professor Weismann's theory may receive, it will, at all events, have stated a new problem, a problem of the deepest scientific interest, and pointed the way to its solution. If we may not call it a new departure, it is at least a new development in the theory of evolution.

NOTE.

A doctrine of Heredity which involves the non-transmission of acquired characters, if it ever be proved or generally accepted, can hardly fail to have a bearing upon questions of morals and society and even theology itself. No doubt those who see in evolution a ready weapon for use against the belief in creation will catch at Professor Weismann's theory as a new argument against the doctrine of original sin. For the present it is

enough to say that there is an obvious and triumphant answer from the point of view of Catholic theology, which, however, may be reserved till the difficulty is raised.

But the belief in Heredity has already influenced our judgment of responsibility and our theories of punishment. It is a common argument on temperance platforms that the drunken father or mother is transmitting to the offspring the "craving for drink," which in themselves is an "acquired" character. If we accept Weismann's theory, this is no longer true, or at least it is no longer a true way of putting the facts. For nothing that the parent can do or abstain from doing, in the way of use or disuse, can influence the offspring, which must inherit the joint inheritance of both its parents.

Then there is the great question of education. Is it true, as Weismann's theory requires, that the children of highly educated parents profit nothing by that education, but have an identical starting-point with their parents? It may be true, but if so we shall have to recast many of our common views.

It would seem, for instance, that if the new view of Heredity be accepted in place of the old, and if, so far as the species is concerned, it matters little what the parent does, but matters a great deal what the father *is* to start with, that the legislator

would be bound to copy nature more closely, and sacrifice the good of the individual to the good of the species. This is the inevitable, and sometimes the avowed, tendency of natural science, as distinguished from morals and religion. For morals and religion set an increasingly high value on the individual personal life, while the movement of what we call "nature" seems to be towards the good of the whole at the cost of the parts. This explains the fact of the strange alliance of the modern science of nature with pantheism, and the reappearance in Professor Weismann's theory of what we are familiar with in Spinoza. The individual life, we are told, is nothing but the mortal vehicle of the immortal germ-plasm. "Life," says Professor Weismann, "is continuous, and not periodically interrupted; ever since its first appearance upon the earth in the lowest organisms it has continued without break; the forms in which it is manifested have alone undergone change." So Spinoza speaks of the individual as "a mode of the universal substance," and individual lives as waves in the sea, "shapes which perpetually die away and have no being." Here pantheism and materialism are at one. For it makes no difference whether it is an eternal "matter" of which the individual is the transient shape, or an eternal "spirit" of which for a little while he is the organ.

We do not by this mean to imply that natural

science in general, and Weismann's theory in particular, are opposed to morals and religion, but that they confessedly fail when they attempt to cover the whole of human life. We may say of them as Bacon says of final causes—"not that these causes are not true and worthy to be inquired, being kept in their proper place," but that their excursion into a region not their own "hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract." The moment we apply to morals and religion the principles which seem to dominate "nature," we produce "a vastness and solitude" in the higher life of man. "Love one another" cannot easily be stated in terms of the struggle for existence, nor can "the infinite value of the individual soul" and the doctrine of personal immortality be fitted in with a theory in which "somatogenic" characters are of relatively little account.

This contrast between the natural and the moral is just as marked when we have to face the question of responsibility and formulate a theory of punishment. Heredity is sometimes appealed to as excusing a man from responsibility, or at least as mitigating his guilt. In a well-known story in Aristotle's "Ethics" a man who kicked his father out of doors excused himself on the ground that his father had done the same to his grandfather, and added, pointing to his son—"When I am old he will do the same for me. It runs in the family."

The facts are explainable either on Weismann's view of Heredity, or that of Lamarck, though our judgment as to the guilt is different. According to Weismann's theory the capacity for kicking a father out of doors would have been transmitted from some abnormally ungrateful *protozoon*, to whom that capacity must have been of use. And though no doubt the man should have checked and not exulted in the development of the capacity, nothing that he could have done would have prevented his handing it on to his son. On the Lamarckian theory, each generation would, by use or disuse, have increased the inherent capacity for the exercise. And the effort of the individual to repress it or keep it within strict limits, would have also done something towards getting rid of a hurtful tendency. A part of the fascination which Lamarckianism has for some people is probably due to the fact that by this doctrine of use and disuse, and the transmission of acquired characters, it makes the individual really responsible, if only in part, for his children as well as for himself, and leaves room for the possibility of the extermination of vicious qualities in the species by influences brought to bear upon the individual.

But on Weismann's theory it is different. Assuming that an inherited tendency to kick one's father out of doors is, at the present stage of development, no longer for the good of the species,

what method and theory of punishment are we to adopt? Clearly the only reasonable course is elimination. A recent writer on "Marriage and Heredity" tells us that the Chinese put to death "by the slow process" not only the man convicted of treason, but his son and grandson, on the ground that presumably potential traitors must be got rid of. This is very much what Mr. Cotter Morison's recommendation of a scientific homoculture comes to. We must "suppress" those human beings which show signs of moral or physical taint, and gradually improve the breed.

But there are two difficulties which suggest themselves with regard to this method. First, it has been tried, and the one thing that we are all agreed upon is, not that it failed, for where it was thoroughly carried out it was most effective, but that the attempt itself was wrong. We refer to that form of artificial selection known as religious persecution. The vast majority in the countries where this form of selection was practised were agreed as to the right type to be preserved; and the elimination of what cattle-breeders would call the "curs and screws," or, as they were called in the language of the day, heretics, was carried on with the cheerful co-operation of Church and State. At the Reformation there was, in England and some other countries, some slight change of view as to the type of character to be preserved, but the method

and means of selection continued much the same for at least a century and a half. And our experience of religious persecution has done little to prejudice us in favour of a scientific "suppression." Even if science were as infallible in its judgment of the best type as the Church has sometimes claimed to be, the methods which would have to be adopted would jar strangely with our nineteenth-century ideas of toleration and freedom.

The other difficulty may, perhaps, be due to prejudice. But it is not easy in a moment to recast traditional ideas of justice and adopt a theory of punishment in which suffering would be meted out to those who are the unfortunate, but helpless, vehicles of that over the possession and transmission of which they have no control. We do not shrink from punishing the fathers for the children, but it is only a primitive society which recognizes it as just that if the fathers have eaten sour grapes the children's teeth should be set on edge. If with all the modern opportunities of education a child grows up in ignorance, the School Board rightly punishes the parent. But the more rigorously we apply Weismann's theory of Heredity the farther back we are driven in our search for a punishable subject. We are driven back step by step to the primitive variations among the *protozoa*, where ordinary methods of punishment are not available. The fact that these

protozoa are "immortal," and that the existing individuals are part and parcel of those which have been the ultimate source of mischief, would no doubt enable us to punish them without detriment to our sense of justice. And if corrective measures could be applied to the *protozoa*, we might in some millions of years produce through new æons of evolution a more perfect race than ourselves. It would be a great satisfaction to have contributed to this result, but we still want a *modus vivendi* for the present, and an intelligible scientific theory of punishment.

II.

DARWINISM.¹

THOSE who have read the "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin" will turn with keen interest to the present volume. The relations between Wallace and Darwin, as shown in these letters, did honour to both. Either might have fairly claimed to be the real discoverer of natural selection, yet there was an entire absence of anything like rivalry between them, an ungrudging appreciation of each other's work, and, above all, a willingness to treat their individual claims as subordinate to the truth which both were helping to bring out. Writing to Wallace in 1860, the year of the publication of the "Origin of Species," Darwin says—

"I admire the generous manner in which you speak of my book. Most persons would in your position have felt some envy or jealousy. How nobly free you seem to be of this common failing of mankind! You would, if you had my leisure, have done the work just as well, perhaps better, than I have done it."

In the present volume Mr. Wallace writes more

¹ Darwinism. By Alfred R. Wallace, LL.D., F.L.S., etc. Macmillan & Co.

as if he were Darwin's disciple, than as, what he really is, the independent discoverer of the theory. "I claim for my book," he says, "the position of being the advocate of pure Darwinism." And by "pure Darwinism" we are to understand the pre-eminently Darwinian doctrine, that natural selection is the predominant though not the only factor in the variation of species.

Mr. Wallace, thus, at once puts himself on the side of Darwin and Weismann, as against Lamarck and Herbert Spencer, though this does not imply either the unqualified acceptance of Weismann's theory, or the abandonment of the old opposition to Darwin on the subject of man. The greater part of the book is devoted to the verification and defence of Darwin's main position, not merely that descent with modification is the order of nature throughout the organic world—for this is universally admitted—but that, among the factors in evolution, natural selection is overwhelmingly important.

Those who wish for a clear statement of the evidence for natural selection, and the way in which it acts, as well as of the fundamental fact on which natural selection depends, the struggle for existence, will find what they want in Mr. Wallace's book, together with a statement in Chaps. VIII.—XI. of some of the most recent results of the investigation in the colouration of plants and animals, and the various forms of protective or predatory mimicry.

We wish, however, to call special attention to the proof in Chap. VI. that all specific characters are either useful or correlated with useful characters. The bearing of this upon the question of teleology is obvious. At a certain phase in the development of the evolution doctrine, we heard a good deal of the uncouth word "dysteleology," which meant that so far from everything in nature being designed for good, there were many things like rudimentary organs, which were not only useless but positively hurtful to the organism. At this point, however, Professor Huxley had to step in and check the enthusiasm of the anti-teleologists. It was well to have a crushing argument against theologians and those who believed in design, but the appeal to dysteleology was fatal to evolution itself :—

"For either these rudiments," Professor Huxley said, "are of no use to the animals, in which case . . . they ought to have disappeared ; or they are of some use to the animal, in which case they are no use as arguments against teleology."

Quite lately Mr. Romanes has argued, from the large number of useless specific characters, that natural selection can have had nothing to do with them. But Mr. Wallace points out the distinction between "useless characters" and "useless *specific* characters," and maintains that—at least with regard to the latter—it is only our ignorance which justifies us in calling them "useless." Much that

in Darwin's time was supposed to be useless is now accounted for and shown to have a meaning, to be either directly useful or correlated with that which is useful :—

"Almost every detail," says Mr. Wallace, speaking specially of plants, "is found to have a purpose and a use. The shape, the size, and the colour of the petals, even the streaks and spots with which they are adorned, the position in which they stand, the movements of the stamens and pistils at various times, especially at the period of and just after fertilization, have been proved to be strictly adaptive in so many cases that botanists now believe that all the external characters of flowers are, or have been, of use to the species."

The main interest, however, of Mr. Wallace's volume gathers round the last two chapters, the former of which contains an elaborate criticism of some modern theories of evolution opposed to Darwinism, and a clear statement of the recent speculations of Professor Weismann, while the last chapter deals with the question at issue between himself and Darwin.

Of views opposed to Darwinism four typical theories are discussed, all of them tending, in different ways, to minimize the action of natural selection, while three out of the four stand or fall with the possibility of inheriting acquired characters. The first and most important of these is the view of Herbert Spencer, which, though it runs through his works, has lately received special attention, because an article written by him for a popular review on the "Factors of Organic Evolution" was

triumphantly claimed by the Duke of Argyll as "a great confession" of the failure of Darwinism.

But Mr. Wallace points out—(i.) that the inherited effect of use and disuse of parts is admitted by Darwin in the "Origin of Species;" and (ii.) that, in the present state of knowledge, it is more than doubtful whether both Darwin and Spencer were not wrong in recognizing it at all. The instances adduced can all be explained on the counter-assumption of there being no inheriting of acquired qualities, if we take into account the effects of the withdrawal of the action of natural selection. Where the struggle is going on every useful organ is kept up to its highest limit of size and efficiency; but when the plant or animal is artificially protected from the struggle for existence there is a natural "regression to mediocrity," as Mr. Galton has called it, which would explain, for instance, the reduced size of the wings of many birds in oceanic islands, as well as the diminished size of the muscles used in closing the jaws in the case of pet dogs fed for generations on soft food. According to Herbert Spencer, this is due to the effect of disuse independently of natural selection; according to Wallace and Darwin, and *à fortiori* Weismann, it is due to the fact that an organ, abnormally increased under certain circumstances by natural selection, tends to revert to mediocrity when those circumstances are changed.

Mr. Wallace criticizes carefully, and as we think successfully, not only the view of Herbert Spencer, but that which has been lately defended by the American school of evolutionists, and the view of Dr. Karl Sempen; but he is himself clearly inclined to accept the theory of Weismann, which would cut away the ground from all these theories. According to Weismann's theory, the question of heredity is reduced to one of growth. It is only where propagation is asexual that individual characters are handed on. Elsewhere the individual is only the vehicle for a minute portion of the very same germ-plasm, from which the parent was developed, all that is inherited being handed on, while all that is acquired dies with the individual. The individual, however, is a complex result, inheriting as he does the united germ-plasms of both parents, each of which in turn unites the germ-plasms of two grandparents. Diversity of sex becomes then of primary importance as the cause of variation, and the advantage of cross fertilization is obvious. Such a theory, if proved, would be absolutely fatal to the Neo-Lamarekians, and would triumphantly prove that natural selection is the supreme factor in the origin of species. Mr. Wallace, though he does not speak of Weismann's theory as "proved," is evidently willing to accept it as a good working hypothesis; and, in any case, he is ready to maintain, as against the Neo-

Lamarckians, that "whatever other causes have been at work, natural selection is supreme to an extent which even Darwin himself hesitated to claim for it."

This supremacy of natural selection throughout the animal and vegetable world is, nevertheless, according to Mr. Wallace, limited when we come to man. It is here that we reach the point of difference between Wallace and Darwin. Yet the difference is far less than is generally supposed. For the idea that man is in any sense a "special creation" is as clearly rejected by Wallace as by Darwin:—

"To any one," he says, "who considers the structure of man's body, even in the most superficial manner, it must be evident that it is the body of an animal, differing greatly, it is true, from the bodies of all other animals, but agreeing with them in all essential features. The bony structure of man classes him as a vertebrate; the mode of suckling his young classes him as a mammal; his blood, his muscles, and his nerves, the structure of his heart, with its veins and arteries, his lungs, and his whole respiratory and circulatory systems, all closely correspond to those of other mammals, and are often almost identical with them. He possesses the same number of limbs terminating in the same number of digits as belong fundamentally to the mammalian classes. His senses are identical with theirs, and his organs of sense are the same in number and occupy the same relative position. Every detail of structure which is common to the mammalia as a class is found also in man, while he only differs from them in such ways and degrees as the various species or groups of mammals differ from each other. If, then, we have good reason to believe that every existing

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group of mammalia has descended from some common ancestral form—as we saw to be so completely demonstrated in the case of the horse tribe—and that each family, each order, and even the whole class must similarly have descended from some much more ancient and more generalized type, it would be in the highest degree improbable—so improbable as to be almost inconceivable—that man, agreeing with them so closely in every detail of his structure, should have had some quite distinct mode of origin.” “As we seek in vain, in our physical structure and the course of its development, for any indication of an origin independent of the rest of the animal world, we are compelled to reject the idea of ‘special creation’ for man, as being entirely unsupported by facts as well as in the highest degree improbable.”

Facts, however, tend to show that, while man has general points of affinity with the orang-utan of Borneo and Sumatra, the chimpanzee and gorilla of West Africa, and the long-armed apes of south-eastern Asia, he has peculiarities which separate him from all four, and suggest that he must have diverged from the common stock before the existing types of anthropoid apes diverged from one another. But Mr. Wallace will not hold, with Darwin, that man as a moral and intellectual being has become what he is in the same way and by the action of the same general laws which account for his physical structure. Here, we are told, natural selection alone fails to account for the facts :—

“Because man’s physical structure has been developed from an animal form by natural selection, it does not

necessarily follow that his mental nature, even though developed *pari passu* with it, has been developed by the same causes only."

Certainly not; but the burden of proof rests with those who deny it. And it would seem as if they were at least bound to show us how that other "influence, law, or agency" works, which in man, and man only, is supposed to supersede, or assist, natural selection. Instead of this Mr. Wallace emphasizes the difficulty of explaining the mathematical, the musical, and the artistic faculties, by natural selection, and then leaps to the conclusion that they must have had some origin "wholly distinct" from that which accounts for the animal characteristics.

What, then, is this "wholly distinct origin"? Mr. Wallace apparently holds the view of "a spiritual nature superadded to the animal nature of man," and, of course, with this *deus ex machina* he can account for everything, though he tells us little or nothing of the law by which this spiritual nature acts. But this idea of "superaddition" is full of difficulties. It destroys the unity of man. Instead of the "reasonable soul and flesh" being "one man" we have a highly organized animal with a "superadded spiritual nature." And then, if we are to believe that a creature of the stock of the anthropoids became a man by the superaddition of a spiritual nature, is not a similar superaddition

necessary in the case of each individual man, unless indeed Mr. Wallace is prepared to face the alternative that the spiritual nature, once given, is transmitted with the "germ-plasma" from parent to child? A few pages later on we are told that the progressive manifestations of life in the vegetable, the animal, and man, which Mr. Wallace distinguishes as unconscious, conscious, and intellectual, are only different "degrees of spiritual influx," and therefore do not break the continuity of the whole. But if, as Mr. Wallace holds, this spiritual nature, in all the degrees below man, works uniformly by natural selection, there is a strong probability that the law of its work will be the same in its highest operation, while if it works by some other law, we should expect to be able to trace the beginnings of this law in the world of vegetable and animal life.

Mr. Wallace's anthropology is only less puzzling than his metaphysics. The several stages in the continuous process are said to be marked by the transition from inorganic to organic, from vegetable to animal, and from brute to man. With regard to the second of these, if Mr. Wallace had emphasized the contrast between vegetable and animal, in the strictly scientific region, we should not have dared to criticize him. But when he distinguishes them as unconscious and conscious life, we are tempted to ask—Are the *protophyta*

less "conscious of their own existence" than the *protozoa*? Have we any right to assert either that the brute has an "*ego*," or that the plant has no sensation? The line which separates living from not living is at present as clear as that which separates man from brute, but when Mr. Wallace talks of "sensation" and the "*ego*" of conscious and unconscious life, he passes into the region of metaphysics, where he is as little competent to lead as we are willing to follow.

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III.

MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN.¹

THIS is an essay, almost a first essay, in comparative psychology—that is to say, it is an attempt to apply to the mental and moral nature of man the method which has been so fruitful of results when applied to physiology and morphology. It is not an attempt to merge psychology in physiology, but to compare the psychological facts of which man is immediately conscious with facts supposed to be similar in other living things.

The first difficulty here is one with which Mr. Romanes does not directly concern himself, though for Auguste Comte it seemed to make all psychology impossible—the difficulty, namely, of collecting the facts which are to be dealt with. “It requires art and pains,” says John Locke, “to set the mind at a distance from itself, and make it its own object.” Comte says in effect, the thing is impossible. No “art and pains” can help us. For, *ex hypothesi*, the observer and the observed are

¹ Mental Evolution in Man. By George J. Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.

identical, and the observer is only in the judicial attitude necessary for observation when nothing is going on—*i.e.* when there are no facts to observe. Hume had said almost the same :—

“Should I attempt to experiment on my own mind, 'tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of any natural principles as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon.”

Hence Comte's conclusion is, psychology is no science, but a branch of physiology.

But this view Herbert Spencer will have none of. Between the physiological order and the psychological there is a barrier which at present is absolute :—

“Physiology (we are told) cannot properly appropriate subjective data, or data wholly inaccessible to external observation.” It “ceases to be physiology when it imports into its interpretations a psychical factor, a faculty which no physical research whatever can disclose or identify, or get the remotest glimpse of. . . . Psychology under its subjective aspect is a totally unique science, independent of, and antithetically opposed to, all other sciences whatever.”

In fact, a purely physiological psychology is as impossible as a subjective account of somnambulism. It is only psychology so far as it is false to its physiological method.

All this, we take it for granted, Mr. Romanes would allow. Psychological facts must be primarily and directly known in the consciousness of the individual, even if, with Mr. Sully, we allow that

all introspection is retrospection. But how then about the comparative method? Nobody knows any mind but his own, and not much of that. For as he tries to look back to the earlier stages the words of memory become inarticulate and its characters illegible. And how does he know that other men have minds, or that they are at all like his own? And what about the familiar process of "tossing about psychological babies," as Dr. Martineau calls it, "and wringing from them *ambiguas voces* as to how they feel"? The psychology of other people's children only looks more legible than the recollection of one's own childhood, because we think we read there what we really read into it.

We are not here raising a difficulty which Mr. Romanes is not fully aware of. His answer would be, that other people's minds are to us neither subjects, like our own is, nor objects, like that which we can study physiologically, but *ejects*. The word is borrowed from Professor Clifford, and is used to mean an inference from acts or movements observed, which acts or movements, in our own experience, have been associated with certain psychological facts, and are therefore assumed to be a guarantee for the presence in others of similar facts. In the case of our fellow-men this assumption is undoubtedly made, and if it is not always justified, it is frequently confirmed

by what our fellow-men tell us by means of a language which we have come to understand. But the farther we get back in the history either of the individual or the race, the larger the assumptions which we have to make, and the smaller the help that language can give us. It is no use catechizing a child as to its psychical condition, though we may watch its acts and the growth of its language, and assume that these reflect the growth of its "mind."

Then, however, in our loyalty to the comparative method, we attempt to extend our inquiry to non-human animals, whose conversational powers are more limited than those of a child, we find ourselves making larger drafts on our original assumptions. Before, we were only guilty of "automorphism," interpreting other people's acts by ourselves; now we are guilty of the far graver crime of "anthropomorphism"—*i.e.* interpreting in terms of man the acts and movements of creatures which are not human. Mr. Samuel Butler extends the same method to plants:—

"In its own sphere," he says, "a plant is just as intelligent as an animal, and keeps a sharp look-out upon its own interests, however indifferent it may seem to be to ours."

We are not anxious to maintain the opposite in either case, but it is well to remind ourselves that it is an assumption, and that the assumption becomes greater, and the conclusions less scientific, as we move away from the individual consciousness

and argue about the movements of animal or vegetable life.

So much for the difficulties *in limine*, which are not indeed formally discussed by Mr. Romanes, but of which, of course, he is fully conscious. He starts by telling us that he assumes the general truth of evolution, and its applicability to the whole animal kingdom, both with respect to physical and psychical development, with the one (provisional) exception of the human mind, and he argues for the *a priori* probability of the conclusion that this will prove to be no exception after all.

We are not quite sure whom Mr. Romanes imagines himself to be opposing. He constantly speaks as if the cause of comparative psychology must stand or fall with him, and he were heroically defending it against a strong body of opponents. Who are they? Not evolutionists generally, for whatever they may think of Mr. Romanes' attempt, they are prejudiced in favour of his main contention; not anti-evolutionists, for if so the volume is an elaborate *ignoratio elenchi*, since an anti-evolutionist would not admit the assumptions with which the inquiry starts. Mr. Romanes wishes to prove that human and animal psychology differ not in kind but in degree. Here every one is against Mr. Romanes, including himself, unless he is prepared to say that evolution has abolished

species, instead of showing how species came to be. If a cat and a dog are different in kind, so are a man and a monkey, whatever view we may take of the genetic relations of the pairs. But this is not what Mr. Romanes means by different in kind. In a footnote to page 3, he says that difference of kind means difference of origin, and accuses Professor Sayce of "confusion" for saying that "differences of degree become in time differences of kind." We seem to remember a greater than Professor Sayce teaching us that the categories of quantity and quality disappear in "measure." And if this sounds to Mr. Romanes a trifle metaphysical, we might remind him that whenever science has shown that differences of kind, considered genetically, are differences of degree, no one dreams of supposing that they are any the less differences of kind. The question of origin has nothing to do with it. Only apparently Mr. Romanes is fighting against some one who explains the difference in kind between human and brute psychology by a difference of origin. If this is the view of Mr. Wallace, or Mr. Mivart, or Professor Quatrefages, we must leave them to defend it. And if Mr. Romanes is defending the unity of origin for man and brute, he need not be afraid of theological opposition. Christianity knows of only one origin for all things, however widely they differ in kind. If of man it is said that God

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"breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul," it is also said of the beasts and fishes, "When Thou lettest Thy breath go forth they shall be made; and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth."

On the *a priori* question, then, Christianity has no particular view. The creation of the soul by God is neither more nor less true than the creation of the body by Him, and therefore, if science can by a patient application of its own methods tell us something here too of the *modus creandi*, we may hope that Christians have learned enough from the past to be ready to meet the attempt with something more than glum disapproval. Even those who look upon the attempt with most suspicion may comfort themselves with the wise remark of the learned Gamaliel, "If this work be of men it will come to naught; but if it be of God ye cannot overthrow it."

When, however, we approach Mr. Romanes' volume, with every readiness to avail ourselves of any new light which experience, scientifically organized, can give us, we find ourselves at once in opposition, not indeed because we object to the application of the comparative method to psychology, for, difficult as this is, it is the only way in which the subject can be scientifically dealt with, but because we find Mr. Romanes assuming, as if it were generally accepted, the empirical psychology

of Locke, curiously supplemented and confused by terms borrowed from the Kantian School. At present Mr. Romanes is only concerned with the intellectual difference between man and brute, the question of morals and religion being postponed for future treatment. But he might just as well assume that Hedonism is accepted by all moralists as that Locke's psychology is accepted by all psychologists.

No doubt any investigator is at liberty to assume any psychology he pleases as the basis of his inquiry, and it was natural that a psychology, which can claim to be almost typically English, and was constructed under the influences of physical science, should suggest itself as most likely to tally well with the results of similar investigations in the animal world. But the astonishing thing is that Mr. Romanes should suppose that he is carrying all psychologists with him, and that it is indifferent whether the intellectual difference commonly held to exist between man and brute be stated in the language of Locke or Aristotle. This is what he says:—

"I now pass on to consider the only distinction which in my opinion can be properly drawn between human and brute psychology. This is the great distinction which furnishes a full psychological explanation of all the many and immense differences that unquestionably do obtain between the mind of the highest ape and the mind of the lowest savage. It is, moreover, the distinction which is now universally recog-

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nized by psychologists of every school, from the Romanist to the agnostic in religion, and from the idealist to the materialist in philosophy.

"The distinction has been clearly enunciated by many writers, from Aristotle downwards, but I may best render it in the words of Locke."

Then we have a long quotation from the "Essay," which draws the line between man and brute at the power of abstracting—"the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to." In the next chapter we have ideas classified as follows:—

"The word 'Idea' I will use in the sense defined in my previous work—namely, as a generic term to signify indifferently any product of imagination, from the mere memory of a sensuous impression up to the result of the most abstruse generalization.

"By 'Simple Idea,' 'Particular Idea,' or 'Concrete Idea,' I understand the mere memory of a particular sensuous perception.

"By 'Compound Idea,' 'Complex Idea,' or 'Mixed Idea,' I understand the combination of simple, particular, or concrete ideas into that kind of composite idea which is possible without the aid of language.

"Lastly, by 'General Idea,' 'Abstract Idea,' 'Concept,' or 'Notion,' I understand that kind of composite idea which is rendered possible only by the aid of language, or by the process of naming abstractions as abstractions."

Directly after, the stages in "ideation" are named as follows. The simple or particular ideas are

called percepts; the general or abstract ideas are called concepts; but there is no co-ordinate name for the middle class. Here Mr. Romanes is in the difficulty which Professor Clifford was in when he boldly borrowed the word 'eject' as a *tertium quid* between subject and object. Mr. Romanes follows his lead, and invents the term *Recept*:—

"In addition to the terms 'Percept' and 'Concept,' I coin the word *Recept*. This is a term which seems exactly to meet the requirements of the case. For as perception means a *taking wholly*, and conception a *taking together*, reception means a *taking again*. Consequently, a recept is that which is taken again, or a *re-cognition* of things previously *cognized*."

Of this classification Mr. Romanes, in his summary, says—

"It is a classification over which no dispute is likely to arise, seeing that it merely sets in some kind of systematic order a body of observable facts with regard to which writers of every school are nowadays in substantial agreement."

Now, a scientific man, as long as he keeps to the firm ground of experience, is worthy of all honour. No one doubts the truth of experience. But when he offers us a *rationale* of experience which makes all experience impossible, and from the logical results of which he is only saved by his strong common sense, we may be allowed to express our dissent. Mr. Romanes can only make all psychologists agree with him by adopting what Locke calls "the short cut to infallibility," and saying

that those who do not agree with him are not psychologists. He almost does go as far as this in reference to another matter, which he says "is admitted by all my opponents who understand the psychology of the subject." Certainly no metaphysician would agree with him, for, as every one who has read Green's "Introduction to Hume" knows, that which for Mr. Romanes is the foundation of knowledge, the simple idea, or "perception," or sensation, which is common to man and beast, is the very negation of knowability, and many nothings will not make a something. While if the individual sensation is consciously representative, it is already knowledge, and can as little be shown to exist anywhere except in man as "concepts" can. Curiously enough, almost simultaneously with Mr. Romanes' volume, there have appeared two repudiations of the psychology of "ideation" from different points of view. Father Rickaby repudiates it in the interests of modern scholastic realism, and Mr. Case from the point of view of healthy physical realism.

We do not, however, propose to join issue with Mr. Romanes on his avowed nominalism or his unavowed sensationalism, either of which, to our perverse metaphysical view, is destructive of knowledge altogether, still less to criticize Locke and Hume through him. We propose rather to show how Mr. Romanes builds upon this foundation.

Of course we do not deny that the child, who from the first is potentially rational, as the brute is not, passes through stages of mere sensitive and irrational life and, as it were, lives the life of the brute in miniature, just as its body in the embryonic state sums up the evolutionary series. This is excellently stated in Aristotle, who, while he contends that Man is distinguished from brutes by his rational and his moral nature, both of which, like speech, are peculiar to him, yet admits that as the brute has *φώνη*, but not *λόγος*, so there are traces *ἵχνη*—"footsteps" is Locke's word—of both intellectual and moral qualities in the lower animals. And he adds these remarkable words:—

"This is most clearly seen if we look at the case of children. For in them we find the traces, and as it were the germs, of what afterwards shall be; indeed, if I may say so, there is no difference between the mind of the child and the mind of the brute at this period, so that we are not surprised to find that they have some things which are the same with, some things which resemble, and some things which are analogous to, what is found in the brute."

Nature, he says, makes its transitions little by little, and the continuity of the process conceals the border line—*τῇ συνεχείᾳ λαμβάνει τὸ μέθριον αὐτῶν*.

It is this border line which Mr. Romanes has set himself to discover, and he apparently sets much store by the doctrine of Recepts. These receipts are something between particular and general ideas. They are the "blended" pictures

of Mr. Galton; the "generic" images of Professor Huxley, who however does not clearly distinguish between them and the "concepts;" they are "sensations with a fringe," as Professor James calls them, on which Professor Maguire, of Dublin, remarks, "A sensation with a fringe is more misleading than a sensation on a bicycle." They are not yet truly universal, but are on their way to become so. For, following Locke again, Mr. Romanes tells us that the mind is as yet passive, whereas in "conceptual thought" it is active. But a blurred picture is as much particular as a picture with a sharp outline; if it is really "generic" in the sense of being representative, it is already "general." It becomes a mere *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, doubling the difficulty it was to help to solve. It is Mill's old fallacy of arguing from particulars to particulars. So far as they are particular we cannot argue from them, and so far as we argue from them they are not particular, but typical, and therefore universal. The "recept" of a triangle is like Locke's abstract idea of a triangle, which—

"Must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect it is something imperfect that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together."

Yet the whole object of the present volume, we are told, is to discover whether there is a difference

of kind or only a difference of degree between a receipt and a concept. With a view to this discovery, then, we have five chapters which are full of anecdotes bearing on the "language" of animals and men. For as the term "ideation" is made to cover what is not human, as well as what is human, in the process of thought, and all that leads up to it, so language is made to cover not only speech, but all the noises and gestures which in children precede speech and in brutes take the place of speech.


There is much that is extremely interesting in these chapters, and much which any one may verify and add to by appealing to his own experience. Every one has had some experience of the cleverness of animals and of the quaintly original efforts of children to express themselves. That brutes understand one another and communicate with one another no attentive observer of their habits can doubt. In fact, they have a language, and can even learn to use ours. What, then, is the difference? Here Mr. Romanes, however little we like his terminology, keeps clearly to his point. Brutes have *percepts* and *recepts*; their language never rises above that which, in the human animal, belongs to the receptual or pre-conceptual phase. A human being talks like a parrot at a certain stage, but a parrot never talks like a human being who has grown up to his

manhood. So in language we must not draw the line, if any one does, at sign-making language, but only that kind of sign-making which we understand by speech. And "till the age of self-consciousness dawns" the child has not properly speech, but merely the power of expressing "receptual judgments." Its self-consciousness, before it is capable of "conceptual ideation," is "rudimentary or nascent." Of the gradual attainment of self-consciousness Mr. Romanes says—

"I say 'gradual' because the process is throughout of the nature of a growth. Nevertheless, there is some reason to think that when this growth has attained a certain point, it makes, so to speak, a sudden leap of progress which may be taken to bear the same relation to the development of the mind as the act of birth does to that of the body. In neither case is the development anything like completed. Midway between the slowly evolving phases *in utero* and the slowly evolving phases of after-growth, there is in the case of the human body a great and sudden change at the moment when it first becomes separated from that of its parent. And so there is some reason to believe it is in the case of the human mind. Midway between the gradual evolution of receptual ideation and the no less gradual evolution of conceptual ideation, there appears to be a critical moment when the soul first becomes detached from the nutrient body of its parent perceptions, and wakes up in the new world of a consciously individual existence."

Time and space forbid our attempting to follow Mr. Romanes in his interesting appeal to philology on the *phylogenic* question as he has appealed to language on the *ontogenic*. And there is the less












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reason for doing so because the question which in phylogeny is parallel to the ontogenic question of the dawn of self-consciousness Mr. Romanes wisely refuses to decide. It is interesting to see how man in his embryonic life gathers up the sharply defined types of infra-human existence, but no one dreams of basing zoology on embryology. Similarly, to argue from the origin of self-consciousness in the individual, about which we know so little, to the transition from the man-like ape to the ape-like man, must be, as Mr. Romanes says, "of a wholly speculative or unverifiable character." "As well," he says, "might the historian spend his time in suggesting hypothetical histories of events known to have occurred in a prehistoric age." And he therefore contents himself with criticizing three "alternative—and equally hypothetical"—accounts of the process, the view of certain German philologists, the view suggested by Mr. Darwin, and a modification of this thrown out as a suggestion by Mr. Romanes himself.

What, then, has Mr. Romanes really done in the volume before us? If we take his own account, he has triumphantly proved that the difference between man and brute is one of degree and not of kind. If this means that he has triumphed over somebody who believed that the soul came from God and the body from somewhere else, we congratulate him on his victory over a revived Mani-

cheanism. If difference in kind means, what Mr. Romanes wants to make it mean, difference of origin, there is no such thing as difference of kind either for idealist or realist, for Pantheist, Materialist, or Christian, and Mr. Romanes has only given the *coup de grâce* to a moribund Deism.

In doing this, however, in spite of his unfortunate terminology and impossible metaphysic, he has been led by experience back to Aristotle, whither all biological studies ultimately tend. We have already quoted one passage on the continuity of evolution. We proceed to quote another on "the genesis of conceptual ideation :"—

"All animals have," says Aristotle, "a certain natural power of discrimination which we call sense ; but in some animals which are capable of sensation there is also the power of retaining the sensation, while in others this power is wanting. Those animals, then, which either wholly or in part are without this power, can have no knowledge beyond mere sensation ; while those which have this power may retain the sensation when it is no longer present. There are many animals of this kind, and they are further distinguished by the fact that in some of them out of this power of retaining sensations comes reason, in others it does not. From sense, then, comes memory, and from repeated memories experience (for many memories make an experience) ; and from experience or from every universal which abides in the mind—the unity, that is, which is distinct from the many, and is yet one and the same in them all—comes the beginning of art or science, according as it belongs to the practical or speculative region."

This is, of course, a well-known passage, but it

is worth comparing with Mr. Romanes' view: *αἰσθησις*, sensation, which is common, though in different degrees, to all animals, is what Mr. Romanes means by percepts; *ἐμπειρία*, experience, the result of many particular "percepts" retained by memory, corresponds to his "receptual ideation." But it is in man only that we get the true *ἀρχή*, in Mr. Romanes' language the "conceptual ideation." The child subsumes in its intellectual life the processes of the lower animals; but it rises above them, and till it rises above them it is only potentially human. Let us hear Mr. Romanes:—

"The whole distinction between man and brute resides in the presence or absence of conceptual thought, which in man is but the expression of the presence or absence of self-consciousness." "The distinction between a recept and a concept is really the only distinction about which there can be no dispute." "A receptual judgment is always separated from a conceptual inference or true judgment by the immense distinction that it is not itself an object of knowledge."

It is all the difference between "truth perceived and truth perceived as true," and this difference is reflected in language:—

"The line must be drawn, not at language or sign-making, but at that particular kind of sign-making which we understand by speech." "So that a man *means*, it matters not by what system of signs he expresses his meaning; the distinction between him and the brute consists in his being able to *mean a proposition*." "This is the 'Rubicon of mind' which separates the brute from the man."

Aristotle, and those who follow him, say—Man is different in kind from the brute because man has *reason*, which brutes have not; *speech*, which brutes have not; *morality*, which brutes have not. Mr. Romanes has not yet dealt with the question of morality, but on the other two points he endorses the old distinction. The ideas are, indeed, more precisely limited, which is a gain; and they are expressed in terms borrowed from empiricism, which is a loss. He has told us a great deal about the psychical processes of brutes which Aristotle did not know. But the main distinction is as clear as ever. Ideation covers everything from sensation to thought. Language covers all sorts of noises and sign-making, as well as the language of man. But only conceptual ideation, which is peculiar to man, has a right to the name of reason, and only the expression of it in language has a right to be called speech. *Homo alalus*, if he ever existed, was an impostor, or a contradiction in terms. For "speech created reason: before its advent mankind was reasonless"—*i.e.* it was not mankind at all.

Yet Mr. Romanes claims to have proved that man and brute only differ in degree and not in kind. Certainly he cannot complain if he is misunderstood and misjudged. A more misleading expression it is difficult to imagine, and even when the sense in which "different in kind" is used has been explained, the old and natural use

of the term will be constantly reappearing. The reason of a child is never the same in kind as that of the brute, for from the very first it is potentially that which the brute's never can be. "The greatest of all distinctions in biology," Mr. Romanes says, "when it first arises, is seen to lie in its potentiality rather than in its *origin*." Granted; but it is none the less a difference of kind. The distinction between the adult and the rudimentary intelligence of man is a difference of degree; but between that of the brute and the baby it is a difference of kind. Mr. Romanes thinks little apparently of "the mere fact that it is the former phase (of self-consciousness) alone which occurs in the brute, while in the man, *after having run a parallel course of development*, this phase passes into the other;" but it is just this "mere fact," the power, viz., of passing into the other which makes it *from the first* human and not merely animal. And Mr. Romanes has done good service in showing us what man is by his minute comparison of him with what he is not.

NOTE

ON EVOLUTION AND THE FALL.¹

There is one difficulty in connection with evolution which, for obvious reasons, is not dealt with

¹ Extracted from Oxford House Papers, No. XXI., *Evolution and Christianity*, by A. L. M., 1889. Rivington.

by natural science, but which is constantly felt by religious people, whether scientific or unscientific. All this beautiful theory of evolution, of progressive development from inorganic to organic, from brute to man, and its continuation in the history of man from primitive times to the present day, is confronted by the doctrine of the Fall. While science seems to teach a continuous evolution, Christianity is committed to a theory of degradation. For if the Fall is not a myth or an allegory, it certainly means that the first man was what his descendants are not, and that, in spite of all that we know and much more that we imagine about human progress, the first man, who, if evolution is true, had but just emerged from the brute into the self-consciousness of man, was a higher creature than an Aristotle or a Raphael or a Darwin.

It is clear that everything here turns upon what we mean by "a higher creature." What had Adam which his descendants have not? What did he and they lose by the Fall? Certainly Adam's descendants have much which he had not. No one, for instance, supposes that the first man was supernaturally gifted with scientific knowledge, or that he was a born metaphysician, or a mathematician, or an artist, or a musician. All these things are the result of a gradual growth, and only the merest possibility of them could have existed

in the first man. The same is obviously true of what we call "civilization." Whether or no the first man was "arboreal in his habits"—a fact on which we have no evidence—we are told that he was "naked," and we hear nothing as yet of even shelter or fire.

In what, then, did his greatness consist? Christian theology answers that the first man was not only, as every man is, a free, self-conscious personality, capable, as the brutes are not, of knowing and loving God, but a being who, by the grace of God, was living in happy communion with God. The difference between him and the non-moral animals was that, while both alike obeyed God's Will, he did it consciously, knowing what he did, and rejoicing in the knowledge. And his nature, like theirs, was at harmony with itself. But when Adam set up his own will against God's Will, he separated himself from that Divine communion, and lost the grace which alone had kept his nature true to itself in holiness and righteousness. By that withdrawal of God's grace, man finds himself not only separated from God, but at strife with himself—his free-will not, indeed, destroyed (for man is never on a level with the non-moral world), but weakened, the image of God in him defaced, the vision of God obscured, human nature unable to restore itself to the communion which it had lost and for which it longed.

The change which took place at the Fall was a change in the moral region ; but it could not be without its effect elsewhere. Even the knowledge of nature becomes confused, without the governing truth of the relation of man to God. The evolution, which should have been the harmonious development of the whole man, is checked and impeded in one part, and that the highest part, of his nature. And therefore, in spite of all the physical and intellectual advance which man has made, he is always and everywhere the worse for the Fall. However great his development has been, it is still a retarded development, a development slower than it need have been, less regular and less sure than God meant it to be.

A simple illustration may help us here. A child who is obedient and teachable and willing to learn, who trusts his father or his teacher, may be in actual knowledge as inferior as he is in size and strength to the full-grown man, though the man may be wayward and wilful and self-assertive. And yet, for all that, the child is in a higher moral condition, and capable of a fuller and truer intellectual development ; for he is in a right relation to truth, while wilfulness and self-assertion are antagonistic to truth and impede knowledge. So man before the Fall was in a right relation to God, though he knew nothing of modern science and modern civilization. When that relation was

changed, physical and intellectual development still went on, but the progress of mankind in that knowledge of God, which alone can give a unity to our growing knowledge of nature and of man, was arrested. And it needed that He Who once had raised up man to bear His likeness should Himself provide for his recovery, and raise up a people who should be "a sacred school for the knowledge of God," and prepare the world for the revelation of the Son.

We are not concerned with the question of the evidence of the Fall, but with the question how the Christian belief in a moral change for the worse, happening at a definite time, and yet affecting the whole human race, is consistent with what science has to tell us about evolution. We are here on ground where natural science can help us little. Moral facts cannot be put under the microscope. And even if the Fall has left its mark on human nature in the disorder and loss of harmony of its parts, science cannot trace this back to the Fall, for it cannot compare man, as he is, with man as he came forth from his Creator's Hand. But the history alike of moral science and of religions bears testimony to the existence of a struggle, an antagonism, a disorder in human nature, and to the belief that this disorder is not natural to man, and could not have been meant by God. And a real science of man must some day face the fact,

which is now persistently put on one side, that in this matter man is a great exception in the order of nature. While every other living thing is striving for its own good, man alone is found choosing what he knows to be for his hurt. No theory of evolution is complete, then, which ignores the fact of sin in man. Men have tried again and again to explain it, and they have only succeeded in explaining it away. Sin cannot be explained, for it is irrational—the one irrational, lawless, meaningless thing in the whole universe. And the wilfulness which in the Fall separated man from his true good—that is, God—is reproduced in every sin, and is everywhere a disturbing cause in the reign of law, a check to progress and a barrier to knowledge.

Side by side, then, with all that science tells us of the evolution of man at the first from lower forms of life, and all that history tells us of the progress of man since, in civilization and knowledge, we see the fact of sin casting its shadow upon human history and holding man back from his full development. This is the fact which lies at the basis of all religions, and which moral systems universally recognize, though they can neither explain nor remove it. And science has taught us that we must be true to facts. It is because he is true to facts, that a Christian evolutionist refuses to acquiesce in the easy optimism of

those who see but one side of human development, and ignore the fact of sin ; it is because he sees in sin the great obstacle to the true development of man, that he claims on the side of progress the Gospel of One Who came "to save His people from their sins."

IV.

CREATION AND CREATIANISM.

I HAVE called this paper "Creation and Creatianism," because, so far as I could see, these were the two points on which Christians cannot afford to be hazy and indistinct. Of course, no words can be used which do not carry with them associations other than those which the words imply, and therefore, at the risk of platitudinizing, I have put down certain propositions which none of us will refuse to accept, and which certainly no terms I use are intended to contradict.

1. The first is the truth which, in a one-sided way, Pantheism has seized, a principle which is especially important now in the face of the practical Deism of some scientific writers. *God's Creative activity is present everywhere.* There can be no division of labour between God and Nature, or God and Law. For "if He thunder by law, the thunder is still His voice." The plant which is produced from seed by the natural laws of growth is His creation. The brute which is born of the natural process of generation is His creation. The plant

or animal, which by successive variations and adaptations becomes a new species, is His creation.¹ It follows that terms like "interference" have no meaning. God cannot interfere with Himself.

2. The second principle is that which the equally one-sided system of Deism has seized, and which is the safeguard of Theism against Pantheism, however disguised. *God is not nature, and nature is not God.* Any system therefore which logically carries with it the identity of God and Nature, or obscures the line which separates them, contradicts this principle and is destructive of true Theism.

Now, Creation in its theological sense implies the recognition of both these principles conditioning one another, and hence it has been said, "Belief in creation is a necessary outwork of any true theism whatever; deny creation, and you deny God."² But if Creation includes God's omnipresence in the world of nature, and His separation from Nature, it has more meanings than one, and these have to be defined. Now, the theological distinction is between primary and secondary, or original and derivative creation, or immediate and mediate, or supernatural and natural. God creates in the first

¹ Cf. W. S. Lilly, *Cont. Rev.*, 1883, p. 119. "The budding of a rose and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ are equally the effect of the One Motive Force which is the cause of all phenomena."

² Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, pp. 59, 60. Cf. Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, p. 244. "No one can at the same time accept the Christian religion, and deny the dogma of creation."

sense when the creative act turns that which is not into that which is. He creates in the second sense (*mediante naturâ*, as the Schoolman says) in all those processes to which properly the name of evolution or development is given. Such a distinction is recognized by Haeckel, as creation of matter and creation of form.¹ Of the first, Creation in its narrow sense, science knows nothing; the second properly falls under the cognizance of science.²

In order to bring this question to a point, I will for the sake of argument assume, what I do not believe, that, given a certain *πρώτη ὕλη*, the process known as evolution will cover everything. Haeckel, of course, believes this, for he moves in the region of matter, and spirit for him means matter subtilized. The religious instinct, like the gregarious instinct, is the result of organization.

Now, with those evolutionists who, like Haeckel and Darwin, start from the material side, the defenders of Creation have no real quarrel. Indeed, though science can know nothing of it, a primary creation of matter is even probable. For we must

¹ History of Creation, vol. i. pp. 8, 9.

² "It is plain that physical science and 'evolution' can have nothing whatever to do with absolute or primary creation," Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, p. 261. See too his quotation from Baden Powell's Essay. Cf. also some useful quotations in Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, pp. 360, 361, and Tyndall, *Use and Limits of Imagination in Science*, p. 49. "Evolution does not solve—it does not profess to solve—the ultimate mystery of this universe. It leaves, in fact, that mystery untouched."

choose between this (supposing we believe in a spiritual world at all) and a Pantheism which rarely appeals to scientific minds. One theory evolution certainly militates against, and that is *the eternity of matter*. For the ideal of materialistic evolution is to trace all the variety of material forms back to a unity, and this primal unity, whether it be an amorphous cell of protoplasm with infinite potentialities, or a fiery cloud in which the genius of Shakespeare and Raphael were latent,¹ could hardly have existed from eternity as a barren unity and then at a point in time begun to differentiate. The ordinary scientific evolutionist, whatever his objection to the Mosaic account of Creation, has no quarrel with the belief in a primary or original creation, except that it is "not proven," that it has no analogies in the material world with which we are familiar. Yet even the mystery which surrounds such an original creation has its parallel in that creative process which science traces. One is more common, the other less common, but that is all. For the thoughts "of God are incorporated in creation at one time directly, at another indirectly, both which modes of incarnation of Divine ideas are to us equally incomprehensible."² Only as St. Gregory

¹ Tyndall, *Use and Limits of Imagination in Science*, p. 47. Tyndall, of course, speaks of this as "an absurdity too monstrous to be entertained by any sane mind."

² Heer ap. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, p. 373.

says, "Quotidiana Dei miracula assiduitate vilesunt." We think we understand them because they happen so often.

The instinctive tendency of rational beings is to express the unknown in terms of the known, the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, and, therefore, though materialists have nothing to say to a primary Creation, those who approach the matter from the idealistic side have grappled with the question. And what have they done for us? not expressed Creation in language intelligible to reason, for *Creation* (that is, primary as opposed to derivative creation) *refuses to be rationalized*, but they have reduced *primary* creation to *derivative* creation. In other words, they have reduced all creation to that secondary and derivative creation which is familiar to us as evolution. Those who are more anxious to be orthodox than lucid talk about the Divine Idea passing into reality; those who are more anxious to be lucid than to be Christian talk of the world as a "processio," or proceeding forth from God. This, then, is my first difficulty. Am I to believe that the phrase, "In the beginning God created," is equivalent to the phrase, "The world is an eternal going out from God"? And if not, what has evolution done, and how has it helped us in making Creation intelligible? We have been told that, thanks to evolution, "now we understand Creation." But

evolution,—and evolution I fully and gladly accept, not as a theory, but as a scientific fact, which in one region of Biology I have had some opportunity of appreciating,—evolution has done nothing to explain Creation. It has won from the unknown law of primary creation much which it has transferred to the more familiar law of evolution. We do not now seek by artificial or natural systems of classification to discover the original creations of God. Probably all known varieties came from one. At all events, the sharp line which separates kind from kind is gone, that which separates animal from vegetable is gone, the line which separates organic from inorganic exists still, but how long it will exist who knows, and what does it matter? ¹ But if primary creation is thus limited to a point, whatever that point may be, the line between creation and evolution is still as fixed as ever. We are no nearer knowing, or expressing in terms of reason, the truth that “in the beginning God created.”

Creation, it is said, is an idea never found apart from Christianity. An eternal chaos, an un-

¹ See W. S. Lilly's Article on the religious future of the world, *Cont. Rev.*, January and February, 1883, p. 213. “And what do you say to spontaneous generation? I would say, first that I hardly see how it touches the Theistic or the Catholic position. As a matter of fact, Catholics generally believed it until the other day. St. Thomas Aquinas and Suarez seem to have taken it for granted.” So did Bacon. See his *Hist. Naturalis.*, vol. iii. It is only the *odium scientificum* which has tried to make it a theological question at all.

knowable matter, an ἄμορφος ὕλη on which form is imposed, all these theories we are familiar with apart from the Bible:¹ but not creation. I turn to Duns Scotus, who is often spoken of as *the* Theologian of evolutionists, and I find a clear and distinct formulation in scholastic language of the Bible view of original creation. No doubt he was writing at a time when the Church of the West was peculiarly sensitive to the danger of Pantheism in any form. Scotist and Thomist fought side by side against the pantheistic Averroes, and while they differed on a subject of far less importance than is generally supposed, they were at one in defending the Christian doctrine of Creation as "the bulwark of true Theism." For some time I was puzzled by a passage quoted from Duns Scotus by Dr. Liddon, which seemed to conflict not only with the creed of Creation as the passage from not being into being, but with numerous passages in Scotus' own writings. The passage is this: "Invenio Eam (Divinam Naturam) neque creatam esse, neque creantem. Quid creabit, dum Ipsa omnia in omnibus fuerit, et in nullo nisi Ipsa apparebit." Clearly if such language was orthodox in the thirteenth century, it would be dangerous to speak of it as pantheistic now, though Dr. Liddon

¹ See Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, p. 79. "The notion of Creation, properly so called, is nowhere found in the ancient world apart from revelation and Scripture."

rejects it, and compares it with "some modern theories which deny the dogma of creative activity in God."¹ But at last I discovered that the words quoted came not from the orthodox Duns Scotus, but from the heterodox and pantheistic John Scotus Erigena, who lived four centuries before. John Scotus, like a true pantheist, explains how the world goes forth from God, and rightly denies, on his principles, that there is such a thing as "creative" at all.

Such an exception proves the rule. The idea of Creation is inseparable from our Christianity. It cannot be made intelligible as evolution, for evolution, in the only sense in which it seems consistent with Christianity, presupposes it. In one sentence, *All evolution is creation, but all creation is not evolution.* Christianity is therefore in its essence *dualistic*, and open to the objections commonly brought against a dualistic theory. We may wish that it was not, that it would consent to be rationalized. We may deal gently with those who in their desire for a Monism accept pantheism or even materialism because it is more "philosophical," but the fact of creation, which is unphilosophical in the sense that it cannot be expressed in language that we know, and as that creative activity of God which we call evolution can, that fact stands for us at the very entrance of Christianity. "In the

¹ Liddon, *University Sermons*, First Series, p. 241.

beginning God created the heaven and the earth." "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear" (Heb. xi. 3). We gain nothing by keeping this truth, if it is a truth, as a "skeleton in the cupboard," and complaisantly thanking the evolutionist for explaining nothing.¹

II. From Creation I go on to Creatianism. Whether God called into being some one reality which was to be by His Will the germ of all things, or whether, as St. Augustine suggests,² He created at first many germs which should develop according to their own laws, *i.e.* according to His good pleasure and in His own way, does not affect the fact of Creation. From that primary Creation to the Creation of Man everything may have been, and probably was, the result of that creative activity which we call evolution. At present there are gaps in the process. The problem of archebiosis or archeogony is not solved, and the balance of scientific opinion is against it, so that the inorganic

¹ Similarly in St. Athan., *De Incarn.*, ii., God is shown to be κτιστὴς not τεχνίτης: "Ἔσται δὲ, εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεὸς τεχνίτης μόνον καὶ οὐ κτιστὴς εἰς τὸ εἶναι, εἰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην ἐργάζεται, τῆς δὲ ὕλης οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς αἴτιος."

Cf. the Shepherd of Hermas, ii. 1, Πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον, ὅτι εἰς ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ καταρτίσας, καὶ ποιήσας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι.

² *De Genesi*, *ad lit.* v. 5; Ben. Ed., lii. 186; and see cap. xxii. ; cf. Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, pp. 264, 265.

does not yet shade off into the organic. Similarly, some evolutionists, like A. Wallace,¹ believe that there is another gap between man regarded as a material organization, and the highest of the brute creation. But whether these gaps are bridged over, as they probably will be, or not, the theologian *quâ* theologian has nothing to do with the matter. Whether God's creative power proceeds by steps or "levels of creation," instead of by an inclined plane within the limits specified by the terms "original creation" and "creationism," is a matter, not for theology, but for science to determine.

Those of us who are interested in the progress of science look forward eagerly to the time when the "breaks" on which some people base their theology will disappear, because at present these "breaks" in the chain are so many gaps in our knowledge of a process which we believe can be rationalized, *i.e.* made intelligible to reason. But as at the one end of the chain the fact of Creation meets us and baffles us, defying any attempts to rationalize it, for it does not really make creation intelligible to say that it is *mutatio a non esse ad esse*,² so at the other end of the chain the existence of man as a being in whom God dwells, whose "soul," as we call it, has communion with God, whose nature has been in the Incarnation taken

¹ Natural Selection, pp. 332, *et seq.*

² Duns Scotus, vol. v. p. 461, *tc.*

into God, refuses, as Creation does, to be explained as we explain evolution.

Of course, Creationism is open to all the difficulties of Creation and more. It is crude, unphilosophical, scholastic, old-fashioned, antiquated. For every reason we want to get rid of it, and for that very reason we ought to scrutinize the more narrowly any attempt to do so. An overwhelming balance of Christian authority is in favour of it. If St. Augustine to the last refuses to decide between Traducianism and Creationism, he at least shrinks from appealing to Traducianism, which would have been a powerful weapon to use against Pelagius.¹ Tertullian, as everybody knows, was a traducianist, and Professor Ray Lankester, in a little popular treatise on "Evolution," thinks that he has quieted any possible scruples on the subject by quoting a traducianist sentence from Tertullian. But at least Duns Scotus may be expected to be a traducianist, with his wonderful theory, as it is commonly understood, of a great evolution in which man, the perfect being, is the last term—a being capable of union with God. Now, as a matter of fact, Duns Scotus is entirely at one with his great rival St. Thomas on the subject of Creationism. Not only is the creation of the first man an act of primary creation (*i.e.* a creative act which cannot be expressed in terms of evolution), but there is a

¹ See Dr. Liddon's *Some Elements of Religion*, p. 100.

similar act in the case of every individual soul. He therefore rejects the suggestion of St. Augustine, that if the first soul was created by a primary act, all others may have originated from it, *sicut candela de candela*.¹

In mediæval days the question, of course, arose as to the interpretation of Aristotle's "De Animâ." Not that there was any suspicion of traducianism in Aristotle. The controversy between the Schoolmen and the Arabians was not whether Aristotle was a traducianist (and if Aristotle had been a traducianist, he must have been a materialist, because of his belief in the pre-existence, if not the eternity, of matter), but whether he was a theist or a pantheist; whether the *νοῦς*, which was eternal and imperishable and came in *θροῶν*, was a creation or an emanation. Avicenna and Averroes held the latter; St. Thomas and Duns Scotus held the former view. In spite of the authority of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, the higher criticism of our day has decided in favour of the Arabians, and the fact, which Scotus admits, that Aristotle had no idea of an original creation of matter by God, tells strongly for the pantheistic view.

Now, traducianism is a *modus creandi* which we can understand, which can be expressed in the familiar language of generation; and creatianism is a *modus creandi* which refuses to be rationalized.

¹ See St. Aug., Ep., 157; Duns Scotus, vol. iii. pp. 79, 80.

The opposition is here in the case of the individual exactly what we have already noted in the creation of the world. Traducianism is creation which is intelligible, which can be expressed in terms of reason, which can be paralleled by every-day familiar processes however mysterious. Creatianism is creation which is unintelligible, which is known only as the negation of traducianism. If there is no such thing as creatianism, if all creation can be expressed in terms of traducianism, no doubt the opposition ceases. It ceases because one of the opposing terms is destroyed. But the two opposites cannot approximate to or shade off the one into the other. Those who can express creation as evolution can of course express creatianism as traducianism. But are we prepared to do this? If not, it is no use speaking "with bated breath and whispering humbleness" of that which Catholic antiquity, as well as modern Roman Catholic evolutionists, like Mivart, call creatianism.

There are many who suppose that creatianism implies a scholastic view of the soul as a "thing" put into the body,¹ and they would propose to

¹ Thus Hegel commits himself to the statement (Logic, § 34) that the pre-Kantian metaphysic viewed the soul as a "thing" which is "an immediate existence, such as is evident to the senses" or a "processless ens." But this is perfectly untrue of scholastic metaphysics in which the soul, though an "ens" which has been created "*de non ente*," was in its essence *an activity*, though not in the same sense as God, who is "*actus purus*." In scholastic

explain what is called the "infusio animae" as the establishing of a new relation between the creature and the creator. This theory is discussed in Duns Scotus, who points out the new difficulties which rise out of the phrase, "nova relatio," especially the possibility of "mutatio" in both the related terms, of which God is one. But even this phrase, a "new relation," implies all that creatianism implies, so far as that it is something which evolution cannot explain, which makes man different, not in degree, but in kind, from all the lower creation. What is this but saying that when we talk of "creatio equi" and "creatio hominis" the word "created" has a different meaning? In one case God creates by a process which science can follow; in the other, science is baffled. Haeckel's embryological researches have in no way affected the problem, for whether we talk of a "soul" or a "nova relatio," it cannot be put under the microscope;¹ and if we believe in a "soul" or a "nova relatio," we believe in a break in the process of

terminology, if the same name is given to the Creator and the created, it is not used *univocally*, but "eminenter" of God.

For the "new relation" doctrine see Baden Powell, *Unity of Worlds*, Essay ii. § ii. p. 247. "The difference is not in physical nature, but in investing that nature with a new and higher application. The continuity with the material world remains the same, but a *new relation* is developed in it, and it claims kindred with ethereal matter and with celestial light."

¹ "Physical science as such has nothing to do with the soul of man, which is hyperphysical" (Mivart, *loc. cit.*, p. 285).

evolution infinitely greater than that which separates organic from inorganic. The existence of a "nova relatio" *is* creatianism, for it implies that man is a new and distinct order of being, and this implies a creative act which cannot be reduced to evolution. And here, again, while all traducianism is a form of creation, there is such a thing as creatianism which cannot be expressed in terms of traducianism.

I have tried to keep carefully to the terms of my paper, "Creation and Creatianism," but, at the same time, I cannot but feel that our judgment in this matter determines other questions. St. Athanasius, in his treatise "De Incarnatione," keeps closely together creation and re-creation, 'Ανάγκη γὰρ ἡμᾶς λέγοντας περὶ τῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Σωτῆρος, λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς (ch. iv.), because false views about creation, or indistinct language about creation, logically issues in false or hazy views about the Incarnation. If we can explain creation in terms of evolution, I cannot see why we cannot so explain the Incarnation. The materials for such a process are already to our hand. We have only got to read an Alexandrian, instead of a Palestinian, meaning into the doctrine of the ΛΟΓΟΣ in St. John's Gospel. We have more than one Neo-Platonic catch-word in the Epistle to the Hebrews. John Scotus Erigena has worked it all out for us. The nothing out of

which the Church believes the world to have been created is God's own incomprehensible essence.¹ In creation God passes through the *primordiales causae* into the world of invisible and visible creatures. Our life is God's life. We are in the image of God. The Incarnation differs from creation only in degree. The "processio" of God into the world has its correlated "reversio" when He returns unto Himself. It is much more intelligible than Hegel, quite as philosophical and much more ingenious, because Scotus Erigena contrived to use theological terms, and could claim a good deal of authority from the writings of orthodox theologians. Now, however, we are told that "this religious dogma" of the Incarnation "is only another way of saying that the antithesis of subjective and objective is given to us as already overcome, and that on us lies the obligation of participating in this redemption by laying aside our immediate subjectivity, putting off the old Adam, and learning to know God as our true and essential self."² The pantheistic conception is as certain as in Erigena, but we have not gained much in clearness of expression. The Atonement, according to this last theory, ceases to mean man's reconciliation with God, for the Incarnation is simply the revelation that there is really no enmity to be reconciled.

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¹ De Divis. Nat., iii. 9.

² Hegel's Logic, 194.

V.

TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY.¹

A GROWING interest in moral philosophy is one of the signs of the times, and those who are content with a superficial explanation of new phenomena might plausibly argue that it is due to the fact that the age of supernaturalism has passed away. A people, it may be said, which has outgrown metaphysics and theology is driven to seek aid from the natural and the human. And this is a thoroughly satisfactory explanation, so long as we shut our eyes to the facts of the case. But the moment we fairly face them we find that those who try to write on ethics, as a science independent of metaphysics and theology, invariably fail to stir up anything but a languid enthusiasm ; while those who really are influencing thought and life are more and more fearlessly connecting their ethics with the belief in God. We refrain from mentioning representatives of the former class, but

¹ Types of Ethical Theory, by James Martineau, D.D., LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

among the latter we find the great names of Professor T. H. Green and Dr. Martineau.

Of course, we do not mean to assert that, with these writers, their ethical system is a mere *dependence* of their theology, or that their theology is that of the Catholic Church. It is their greatness that they have vindicated for moral science its rightful basis in human life, even when that life is lived apart from the revelation of Jesus Christ; and have nevertheless seen that its full explanation and justification lies in that which is superhuman.

It is their weakness, if we may say so, that their implied theology, the doctrine of an eternal Conscience in the one case, and of a God Who is personal and moral, and yet an undifferentiated Unit in the other, involves intellectual difficulties greater far than those which beset the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet, for all this, the present generation will owe it to Professor Green and Dr. Martineau that moral philosophy has been raised to a position, in which it awaits its transformation, and, at the same time, its true development, in the light of the Incarnation.

In the main controversies of morals, then, Christianity claims and welcomes the work of such men. John Stuart Mill, no doubt, by a noble inconsistency did much to undermine the foundations on which his own theory rested. But it still remained for men like Professor Green and Dr.

Martineau to examine the sources from which Mill had unconsciously borrowed; to dissociate the Utilitarianism of Mill from that of Bentham; and to rescue ethics from its bondage to physical law.

There is a special attractiveness in this part of Dr. Martineau's work, because, as he tells us in his most interesting Preface, he himself only slowly won his freedom. It was not the influence of any great thinker, but "a fusillade of questions from a class of sharpshooters" which roused him from his dogmatic slumber. Till then, he tells us—

"Steeped in the 'empirical' and 'necessarian' mode of thought, I served out successive terms of willing captivity to Locke and Hartley, to Collins, Edwards, and Priestley, to Bentham and James Mill; and though at times I was driven to disaffection by the dogmatism and acrid humours of the last two of these philosophers, my allegiance was restored and brightened by literary and personal relations with the younger Mill."

But a new intellectual birth was at hand, and its beginnings were seen in a growing dissatisfaction with Mill's metaphysics:—

"I seemed to discover a hitherto unnoticed factor in all the products which I had taken as explained; to recognize, after resolving all knowledge into relations, the presence of an invisible condition of relation itself. . . . I had to concede to the self-conscious mind itself, both as knowing and as willing, an autonomous function distinct from each and all the phenomena known and changes willed—a self-identity as unlike as possible to any growing aggregate of miscellaneous and dissimilar experiences."

And this metaphysical protest was due to "the irresistible pleading of the moral consciousness;" the secret misgivings which he had felt at either "discarding or perverting the terms which constitute the vocabulary of character—'responsibility,' 'guilt,' 'merit,' 'duty,'" resulting at last in the surrender of determinism, and a revision of the doctrine of causation.

At this point Dr. Martineau turned once more to the Greek philosophers, and, under the guidance of a great Aristotelian, Professor Trendelenburg, saw Aristotle in a new light. This experience, he tells us, was essentially—

"The gift of fresh conceptions, the unsealing of hidden openings of self-consciousness, with unmeasured corridors and sacred halls behind; and, once gained, was more or less available throughout the history of philosophy, and lifted the darkness from the pages of Kant and even Hegel. It was impossible to resist or distrust this gradual widening of apprehension; it was as much a fact as the sight of Alps I had never visited before."

From this new and truer metaphysic the transition to theology was natural. The particular averments of the moral consciousness, which are the postulates of an ethical treatise—

"Form the organic connection between ethics and religion, and define the relations between the human and the divine; and so far as they can be lifted out of immediate knowledge and submitted to mediate tests of certainty, it can only be by carrying them into the court of metaphysics, to be tried among the questions of transcendent ontology."

Thus as morals led on from physics to metaphysics, so metaphysics made the transition from morals to theology. Comte's so-called law of the three stages was exactly reversed.

Such a preface gives rise to great expectations, and they are not disappointed, except, perhaps, that one might have hoped for a fuller discussion of some of the underlying metaphysical questions. Of course, as a writer on ethical theory, Dr. Martineau might refuse to be led away into metaphysical speculation. But then a very considerable part of the first volume is devoted to the discussion of metaphysical subjects, the positive bearing of which on the ethical conclusions is not very obvious. There is here a very marked contrast between Professor Green and Dr. Martineau. Professor Green approaches ethical questions as a metaphysician: Dr. Martineau approaches metaphysical questions as a moralist. Those who have the courage to read through the "Prolegomena to Ethics" feel all through that it is the work of a real metaphysician, and yet that, however far from ethics the discussion of "the spiritual principle in knowledge and in nature" may at first seem to be, it all ultimately bears upon the ethical result. Dr. Martineau's interest is primarily with morals and only with metaphysics as the speculative basis for morals,—at least that is the idea which his two volumes leave upon our minds.

We believe this to be the explanation of a difficulty which meets us at the very outset. After more than one honest attempt to accept the *schema* of systems which Dr. Martineau maps out, we are obliged to return to our first impression, that it is neither obviously appropriate as a classification of ethical theories, nor, indeed, anything more than an artificial grouping of some exceedingly interesting essays round the central statement of the author's own beliefs.

The classification begins with a broad distinction familiar to all students of the history of philosophy. The Greek schools "were all essentially unpsychological and objective." "Objective" they certainly were, but "unpsychological" is an unfortunate word to choose as an equivalent. It, of course, does not mean that they did not pay attention to psychology—since we are told that "Plato did not fail to go back into the recesses of the human mind for the springs of private and public life, and the separating lines of right and wrong;" and, again, "The Greeks look for their whole moral world *within*, among the phenomena of conscious and self-conscious nature:" it can only mean that they worked from the outward to the inward; in fact, that their attitude was, as M. Noiré puts it, "naïvely objective." These objective systems, Dr. Martineau goes on, are either *metaphysical* or *physical* according as reason or sense is supposed

to be the organ of our knowledge of the real. And in both cases the moral theory comes to be a deduction from a prior theory of the universe:—

"The genius of the Greeks," he says, "was essentially objective; . . . nor could they readily deal with anything as an inner fact, till they had had their look at it as an hypostatized reality beyond their own centre. Hence, their systems are all either metaphysical or physical in their basis; and their ethical element is in no case intelligible, till it is studied as a sequel to this earlier portion of the scheme."

Here, in spite of our objection to the term "un-psychological," we recognize a division which is intelligible and exhaustive. But a difficulty arises when we ask, Who are to represent physical ethics among the Greeks? Not the Hylicists, nor any pre-Socratic philosopher; not Socrates, who refused to theorize about nature; not his great descendants Plato and Aristotle; not the Sophists nor the Cyrenaics nor the Epicureans, though as phenomenalists they had much in common with modern champions of physical ethics. Can Dr. Martineau mean the Stoics? It is possible. We turn anxiously to find out the chosen representative, and we find—Auguste Comte!—

"Of this doctrine," says Dr. Martineau, "we are fortunate enough to have a thorough-going recent representative in M. Comte; and an English interpreter, perhaps of less original genius, but of far more balanced judgment, in J. S. Mill."

Yet this English interpreter appears far away, in a different branch of the division, among "psychological" moralists, presumably because he admitted, what Comte denied, the possibility of an introspective psychology.

And this is typical of the way in which Dr. Martineau illustrates his *schema*. Without actually giving us a cross-division, he constantly makes us feel that the distinguished parts in the division are not co-ordinate, that in fact the classification is not natural but artificial. This is very marked when we come to the subdivision of metaphysical theories into *transcendental* and *immanent*. According to the one view, the eternal ground of all things is greater than those things of which it is the ground; according to the other, it is convertible with them. Here, again, we have an excellent distinction; and no one can for a moment hesitate as to the representatives of these views in Greek thought. If Plato clearly represents the one, Aristotle as clearly represents the other. Dr. Martineau then gives us a full and minute examination of Plato's system, and we turn, full of hope (for Dr. Martineau is far more of an Aristotelian than a Platonist) to see what he will say about Aristotle, and we find ourselves face to face with Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza, the first two being introduced only to explain the "immanent" doctrine of the third.

Surely nothing can justify the substitution of these names for that of Aristotle. Dr. Martineau explains that in the two contemporaries, Plato and Aristotle, "the divergence of tendency which we desire to notice is too near its commencement to be very striking and conspicuous." But it is a received logical principle that a point of difference is best examined in two cases which most closely resemble one another in everything else; and as for the divergence being "too near its commencement" we would suggest that in that mediæval period, which Dr. Martineau, like many other writers, dismisses in a few lines, the divergence can be clearly traced, and all the more clearly because Plato and Aristotle had, by a little ingenuity, been reduced to a common denominator in the doctrinal system of the Schools. On the other hand, the contrast between Plato on the one hand, and Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza on the other, is rendered almost impossible by the fact that, in the day of these later theorists, thought had passed through the discipline of Christianity and the lawlessness of a reaction from it.

This change in the conditions of ethical and metaphysical problems Dr. Martineau is fully aware of and states most strongly. "The whole complexion of thought and language on ethical subjects," we are told, "alters on crossing the line from heathendom to Christendom." "Nature,

which was a principal before, sank into the accidental and the neutral—the mere scene on which the great drama of real being was performed and flung its lights and shades.” Self-knowledge, the sense of sin, the desire for reconciliation with a personal God—these, if not entirely new factors in the ethical problem, assumed a prominence which they had never had before. Hence “psychological ethics is *altogether peculiar to Christendom.*” Yet, if Spinoza is to be chosen to balance Plato, we must remember that those who prepared the problem for him were, in the one case, a pupil of the Jesuits, in the other, an Oratorian Father. And the change which had passed over metaphysics was as great as that which had passed over morals. Christian philosophy had, for a moment, restored something of the old unquestioning faith in reason as the organ of truth. But the separation of reason and faith, in the later scholastic age, had prepared for the scepticism of the Renaissance. Descartes and his successors had, therefore, to face a metaphysical problem which for Aristotle would have been unintelligible: while the answer ultimately given by Spinoza, though undoubtedly an “immanent” theory, savours more of Plato than of Aristotle. Dr. Martineau says, “The doctrine of immanency excludes theism, while that of transcendency leaves it still possible.” True, so long as we are contrasting Plato and Spinoza

But when we trace the parallel development of Plato's doctrine and Aristotle's in the mediæval period, we find that it is Platonism which is always running off into a mystical pantheism, and Aristotelianism which, in spite of its inherent weakness on the side of personality, leaves it possible for the Aristotelian to hold the Catholic faith. The truth is that the "transcendency" of the Platonic doctrine is more imaginary than real, and largely due to an uncritical acceptance, by people generally, of Aristotle's criticism of the doctrine of ideas.

We have said thus much in criticism of Dr. Martineau's *schematism* of ethical theories, because it seems to us the most artificial and unsatisfactory part of a really valuable work. We are bound to say that the artificiality is much less marked in the second volume, which deals with "psychological" theories, and distinguishes them by the uncouth words "idiopsychological" and "heteropsychological." Surely in these days of paternal government, there ought to be a law to limit the *ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν*.

The first volume is occupied with a discussion of the three typical forms of "unpsychological" ethics—Transcendental Metaphysics, represented by Plato; Immanent Metaphysics, by Spinoza; and Physics, by Comte. These studies, though they go far beyond what is needed for the author's purpose, are exceedingly interesting. That on

Plato includes a detailed examination of the theory of Ideas, and its culmination in the Idea of the Good. The great question to determine is "whether inherent movement or causal activity is attributed to them." On the one side we have the criticism of Aristotle, on the other numerous passages in which Plato certainly treats them as causes. Dr. Martineau seems to accept Aristotle's criticism in the case of the Ideas generally, but to make an exception in favour of the *ἰδ'α τὰ γαθοῦν*, as "a cause which brings them to phenomenal birth." But surely far too much is allowed to Aristotle's criticism. Mr. Jowett, who certainly has a right to speak on such a matter, says plainly that "the stereotyped form which Aristotle has given the Ideas is not found in Plato;"¹ and Lotze, in a most valuable chapter in his *Logic*, points out, not only that the transcendency doctrine ascribed to Plato (and with it the Aristotelian criticism) falls to the ground, but that the "immanent" view of Aristotle is as powerless to explain the possibility of knowledge. The truth, we believe, is that Plato's doctrine included the elements of a contradiction, of which he only gradually became conscious. The "dead hand" of Eleaticism was upon him, and Aristotle, seeing this, made him consistent with himself by denying causality to the Ideas; whereas Plato, inconsistently perhaps,

¹ Introduction to *Parmenides*, p. 124.

yet nevertheless held to the belief that, though eternal, they were causes of movement. If Dr. Martineau allows this to be true of the ἰδέα τὰγα-θοῦ, why not of the εἶδη? And if Aristotle may talk of a *πρῶτον κινῶν οὐ κινούμενον*, and explain or disguise the paradox by the phrase *κινεῖ ὡς ἐκινούμενον*, why should not Plato do the same?

The account of Plato's ideal State, its strength and its weakness, is admirably worked out, but when our author goes out of his way to compare it with the Catholic Church, his statement needs a good deal of qualification. After quoting Hegel's contrast between "the relentless subjugation of the individual" in the Platonic State and the infinite value of each individual soul in the teaching of Christianity, Dr. Martineau turns round upon the Catholic Church, and says its real failure was due to its not having recognized the doctrine of "justification by faith." Here, apparently, the Catholic Church means the mediæval Papacy, which certainly, like all over-centralized governments, tended to ignore subjective conditions in its anxiety to secure external conformity. Yet the antinomianism which shaped itself in the sixteenth-century solifidianism, is both on its moral and metaphysical side farther removed from Christianity than was the mediæval idea of unity.

There is a good deal of special pleading in the attempt to make Plato a theist; and it comes

rather oddly after the statement that Plato and Aristotle were "both realists and both pantheists." One has heard a good deal before now about "the Platonical Trinity," and we incline to think there is at least as much to be said for this interpretation as for the theistic one. At any rate, if Plato is a theist, he is fully aware of the inherent difficulties of theism. It was not without reason that, some hundred years ago, a Bishop of the English Church, arguing with the Unitarians of his day, gave the advice, "If any one thinks that Unitarianism is simpler than Christianity, let him read Parmenides." Dr. Martineau is, however, far too honest to ignore passages which conflict with his theory, and his final conclusion comes to this. If we apply the test of *self-consciousness*, we may no doubt call Plato a theist; if we apply the test of *will*, "we might be obliged to confess that the God of Plato is *impersonal*." Comparing his theology with his ethics, we seem to get an ethics of responsibility resting on a metaphysic of necessity. And Dr. Martineau would like to square the metaphysic with the ethics rather than the ethics with the metaphysic. But neither is possible without explaining away Plato's utterances. And even the mythical passages, as Dr. Martineau truly says, "often express the doctrines most sacred to his faith, though least effectually grounded in his philosophy." It is not the only instance in which

we see moral truth, with a "noble inconsistency," refusing to conform to a speculative theory:—

"Plato, in his 'divine wrath' at the tyrant flung into Tartarus; Malebranche, self-extinguished in the Absolute Holiness; Spinoza, lifted from the thralldom of passion into the freedom of Infinite Love; Comte, on his knees before the image of a Perfect Humanity, are touching witnesses to the undying fires of moral faith and aspiration."

Our space will not permit a close examination of the three studies on Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza, or of the full and sympathetic account given of Comte. But we cannot help noticing, in passing, a most suggestive section on the rejection of final causes, so long as mechanism dominated science, and the reappearance of teleology under the influence of evolution. We may also be allowed to regret a very superficial passage, where Dr. Martineau, after a rapid survey of Greek thought, says of "the intermediate period of Catholic culture" that it is needless to prove that it was "mainly concerned in investigating the relations between God and man." If this means that natural science was in abeyance, it is only partially true; and in any case the whole subject of Dr. Martineau's two volumes falls under the general title of "the relations between God and man." He might have got at least as much from a study of Thomas of Aquin, as from the scepticism of Descartes, or the pantheism of Spinoza, or the positivism of Comte.

The first half of Dr. Martineau's second volume is devoted to the exposition of his own theory, "idiopsychological" ethics as distinguished from the three typical "heteropsychological" forms, the Hedonist ethics of Utilitarianism, the "Dianoetic" ethics of Cudworth and Clarke, and the "Æsthetic" ethics of Hutcheson. These are introduced in a very characteristic passage. "Idiopsychological" ethics leaves us with an order of thinking and a group of convictions distinct from any that can be got from the natural sciences,

"And philosophers do not like to be encumbered in their survey of the world with bundles of first truths as numerous as the elements of a lady's luggage : they cannot move freely till their outfit will all go into a Gladstone bag. So they try to find some one of their packages of thought capacious or elastic enough to hold all that cannot be proved superfluous ; and as, in any case, room enough must be left for the senses, which are solid affairs, it is usually the moral sentiments that are apt to get squeezed, and to come out at the end hardly recognizable."

Hence right is dissolved in the pleasant or the true or the beautiful.

The criticism of these in the latter half of the volume, especially the review of utilitarianism and the ethics of evolution, is admirable. Nor does it detract from its value that the criticism of utilitarianism by Dr. Martineau has much in common with Professor Green's. If it is less searching, it is more popular, and the points are made more

sharply and clearly. The mere heading of the section, "From 'Each for Himself' to 'Each for All'—No Road," speaks volumes. The criticism has often been made before, but seldom with such precision and incisiveness. Mill's attempt to find a qualitative difference in pleasures is only an attempt to throw a bridge over an impassable chasm. The Hedonist, who substitutes others for himself, becomes moral by turning his rational preferences upside down, or "by the practical paradox of attaining pleasure by aiming at something else," "Hedonistic advance" to any higher love being not less impossible than "horizontal movement uphill." Though there have no doubt been moralizing divines "who recommended the cultivation of disinterested and devout affections as a good investment," we may find the cause of it in the low spiritual level of their age, and the effect in the "notorious inefficacy" of their teaching. We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, notwithstanding the provision in our nature for the partial conversion of interested into disinterested feeling, we cannot identify the greatest happiness of self with the greatest happiness of all, nor get duty out of prudence, nor virtue from self-love.

The main issue is not really changed when evolution supplements Hedonism, and the individual, society, and the world are treated no longer

as *constants* but as *variables*. "The difficulty is apparently lessened by dilution," but in reality we only take refuge from "the strong light" of individual experience, "in the earlier twilight, where nobody can tell exactly what goes on." Hence—

"The extreme fondness which evolutionists show for tossing about psychological babies, and wringing from them *ambiguous* *voices* about how they feel, is natural, in proportion as their doctrine is hard to prove." "By spinning out your process indefinitely, you gain time enough for anything to take place, but too much for anything to be seen; in the very act of creating the evidence, you hide it all away; and the real result is, that you may make the story what you please, and no one can put it to the test." . . . "Nothing can be more chimerical than prehistorical psychology."

The truth is that—

"Evolutionary ethics have no psychology of their own; but merely pick up what best suits them of the old materials, and fit it in with the purely *physiological* story they have to tell."

If there is a gap between "Each for Himself" and "Each for All," there is even a greater gap between Hedonism and evolution. If evolution is true, we have no right to treat the increment, whatever it may be, as *illusion*, but as emergence from illusion. You cannot explain it by what it has been, and "strip bare the moral type of thought till you have the naked natural animal, and say, *There*; that is the real live truth when you have got the clothes off." Dr. Martineau

draws an excellent illustration from the evolution of the eye out of a mass of jelly which becomes responsive to light. The question is not, What did the eye come from? but, Does it really see? Has it life-relations with reality? Similarly the real question at issue about conscience is not, Did it come ultimately from something which is non-moral? but, Is it a moral faculty corresponding to a moral environment? If we are to accept evolution, we must believe that everything *is* what it may *become*, not what it *has been*. To prove that, at a certain stage of development, the embryo of a man is indistinguishable, even to the practised embryologist, from that of a dog, carries us no way at all towards proving the identity of creatures which in their perfect form are so different.

It is here that Dr. Martineau seems to us to go beyond Professor Green. He is more fearless in his attitude towards evolution. Professor Green throughout shrinks from admitting the possibility of the evolution of the moral from the non-moral. Dr. Martineau is content to fix attention on the reality of the development, and to emphasize the fact that "each increment contributed by fresh differentiation constitutes a discovery, and connects us by one added link of truth with the real scene of our existence." We can indeed "undress the moral intuition," and lay aside fold after fold of its disguise till we discover nothing at last but

naked pleasure and utility, but "no foresight, with largest command of psychologic clothes, would enable us to invert the experiment, and dress up these nudities into the august form of duty."

The whole chapter is well worth study, and is certainly the best in the critical part of Dr. Martineau's book, at any rate "for the present necessity." For the supposed destruction of the validity of conscience by the discovery of its origin is that which troubles men, and Dr. Martineau is not afraid to claim that discovery, if it be a discovery, as a new proof of the validity of conscience. "It introduces," he says in his preface, "no disturbing problem; it supplies new chapters of natural history, but changes not a word in the eternal law of right." Such a view of conscience, as fearless as it is true, instead of excluding, presupposes historical development and growth, and leaves opponents like Mr. Leslie Stephens valiantly slaying the dead or beating the air.

We have reserved to the last Dr. Martineau's own view, which has already shown itself in his criticisms, but is explicitly stated under the head of "idiopsychological" ethics. Standing midway between the "unpsychological" ethics of Vol. I., and the "heteropsychological" ethics of the Hedonist, Dianoetic, and Æsthetic moralists, it simply asks, *What has the moral sentiment to say of its own experience?*

To those who have neither time nor inclination to read through two octavo volumes, and who nevertheless wish to be acquainted with the great facts of moral science, we confidently commend the first one hundred and twenty pages of Vol. II., which should be read in close connection with the author's intellectual history sketched in his preface. It is a full and fearless statement of the facts, by one who is fully conscious of the arguments commonly urged against them. Dr. Martineau does not shrink from an argument because it is an old one. He knows that an argument is never worn out till it is answered. He appeals to the judgments of the adult moral consciousness, as he appeals to language, "the great confessional of the human heart." What, then, are the objects of those moral judgments which we all pass? *Persons*, not things; *thoughts and feelings*, not mere conduct. Here he can claim on his side Mr. Spencer and Mr. Leslie Stephen, Professor Green and Mr. Bradley, as well as the Christian ethics of the Sermon on the Mount. But he is at issue with the current opinion of moralists when he argues, most truly as we believe, that "criticism, like charity, begins at home," that a moral judgment is primarily a *self-judgment*, and does not begin with "a prior *critique* upon our fellow-men." A further analysis of the moral judgment brings out the distinction between mere

spontaneity and volition. In the *voluntary* there must be a comparison and a power of choice in the presence of simultaneous possibilities. "Moral judgment, then, credits the Ego with a selecting power between two possibilities, and stands or falls with this." It is impossible to treat the determinist problem as neutral, as Mr. Sidgwick would do. "Either free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion." Moral judgment, then—

"Postulates moral freedom; and by this we mean, not the absence of foreign constraint, but the presence of a personal power of preference in relation to the inner suggestions and springs of action that present their claims."

Turning now to the mode in which the moral judgment acts, we find that it is exercised upon incompatible impulses which it distinguishes as higher and lower—*i.e.* by their *moral worth*. Conscience is "the critical perception we have of the relative authority of our several principles of action." This at once explains the variation in the contents of the moral judgment, on which sophists in all ages base their denial of morality. "Among the sinful crowd it is intelligible enough how 'many that are first shall be last, and the last first,' since the life of widest visible aberration from a Divine standard of perfection is not necessarily the most wicked. The publicans and harlots may in the sight of God take precedence of those whose wilful choice of the lower is covered by 'the

smooth surface of a decent life." The fact, too, that every moral judgment is a judgment of moral worth enables us clearly to draw the line between the judgments of conscience and of prudence. The moral judgment is *insight*, prudence is *foresight*: conscience is *given*, prudence is *found*.

This brings us to the most valuable part of Dr. Martineau's constructive work, where we must leave him, without following him into the detailed classification of the springs of action.

Conscience *speaks with authority*. This truth has shown itself in our very conception of duty. For—

"Without objective conditions, the idea of *duty* involves a contradiction, and its phraseology passes into an unmeaning figure of speech. Nothing can be *binding* to us that is not higher than we; and to speak of *one part of self imposing obligation on another part*—of one impulse or affection playing, as it were, *the god* to another—is to trifle with the real significance of the sentiments that speak within us. Conscience does not *frame* the law, it simply *reveals* the law that holds us; and to make everything of the *disclosure* and nothing of the *thing disclosed* is to affirm and to deny the revelation in the same breath."

But—

"The predicate 'higher than I' takes me yet a step beyond; for what am I? A *person*, higher than whom no 'thing' assuredly, no mere *phenomenon*, can be; but only another *Person*, greater and higher and of deeper insight. . . . If it be true that over a free and living person nothing short of a free and living person can have higher authority, then is it certain that a 'subjective' conscience is impossible.

The faculty is more than part and parcel of myself ; it is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself." "The real, eternal objective will of God seems to me to construe very faithfully the sense of *authority* attaching to our moral nature : they are *in* us, but not *of* us ; not ours, but God's."

We have now found the key to Dr. Martineau's classification of ethical theories. It is really a dichotomous division based on the recognition or non-recognition of the truth of personality and the fundamental doctrine of obligation. In the ancient world "the notion of personality was held very indistinctly and with great fluctuation," while, with the exception of Bishop Butler and some writers of the Scottish school, "it is difficult to find any class of recent moralists who have declined to betray their science to the physiologist on the one hand, or the ontologist on the other." Whether personality and freedom are merged in metaphysic, immanent or transcendental, or in physiology, as with Comte and Spencer, or are lost in the false psychology of the hedonist or rational or æsthetic schools, makes little difference. They are only subdivisions of the negative arm of the dichotomy.

But those who, like Dr. Martineau, allow the moral consciousness to speak for itself, must make the transition, as he does, from morals to metaphysics and theology,—must ask, *What metaphysic will furnish an adequate basis and justification for*

the indispensable postulates of ethical doctrine? If morality demands freedom and an objective moral law, we have passed out of psychology into metaphysics and we must go farther. If the law is moral—can appeal to me as a moral being—it must be the appeal of a personality to my personality. Therefore, says Dr. Martineau, morality implies theism. And here he leaves us to face the difficulties of the Parmenides and the criticism of Herbert Spencer, that a Personal Infinite is a contradiction in terms. We are compelled, then, to make a further step, and ask, Is theism any longer a tenable metaphysic? Must it not declare itself Christian on pain of lapsing into pantheism? If so, the doctrine of the Trinity becomes the true and only safeguard of that theism which is the postulate of the moral consciousness.

This final chapter on the metaphysic of morals Dr. Martineau has not written, but he has given us a noble introduction to it.

VI.

PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS.¹

THE publication of a work on moral philosophy by Professor Green will be welcomed by many besides those who have been brought directly within the sphere of his influence. People generally knew little of him. When his unexpected and almost sudden death in March, 1882, called forth the noble testimonies to his life and work of those who knew him well, many were astonished to find how great a man he was who had been taken away from among us. Students of philosophy had, of course, read his two or three review articles, and above all his introduction to Hume. Oxford men were familiar with his earnest, thoughtful face, and they knew that he was "a philosopher," and that the article in the *North British* on the "Philosophy of Aristotle," must be read by any one who hoped for high honours in "the schools." But it was a comparatively small number of men who really appreciated him, and the publication of the "Prolegomena to Ethics," after

¹ Prolegomena to Ethics. By T. H. Green, M.A., LL.D.

his death, seems specially appropriate in the case of one who lived so little for himself and so entirely for the great truths with which he dealt. The greater part of the book, as the editor, Mr. A. C. Bradley, tells us, had been used in professorial lectures, Mr. Green having been appointed Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1877; and about a quarter of the whole appeared in *Mind* in the first half of the year in which Mr. Green died. Mr. Bradley is responsible for the arrangement into books and chapters, the manuscript having been written in paragraphs, and we also owe to the editor a most excellent table of contents which serves as a full and true analysis of the book itself. The short preface of the editor ends with a sentence worth quoting, as showing how Professor Green affected those who had the privilege of being much with him and being able to appreciate him. After acknowledging his debt to Mrs. Green, Professor Caird, and Mr. R. L. Nettleship, Mr. Bradley concludes:—

“ But it would seem to me, and to those who have helped me, out of place to express any gratitude for work given to a book which, more than any writing of Mr. Green's yet published, may enable the public outside Oxford to understand not only the philosophical enthusiasm which his teaching inspired; but the reverence and love which are felt for him by all who knew him well.”

If the theology of the Catholic Church had less in common than it has with the metaphysics of Professor Green, English Churchmen would still owe

to him a heavy debt of gratitude for the unswerving protest of his life and teaching against sophistry and unreality. No doubt there were some who could wrench words and phrases from their context in "Green's philosophy," and use them as mere catch-words in argument. There will always be found some who will take the fine gold of the philosopher and make it a "medium of exchange;" but, as a rule, to have read philosophy with "Green of Balliol" was to have imbibed, at least in some degree, his earnestness in dealing with the great problems of life—to have caught something of his enthusiasm in the search for truth, and his strong faith in the reality of goodness and unselfish work for others. It is difficult to overrate the value of such an influence in an age of disintegration and selfishness, and amongst young men who, as Plato says, are inclined to use philosophy "as puppies use their teeth," in tearing one another to pieces.

The "Prolegomena to Ethics," as arranged by Mr. Bradley, is divided into four books, the first two dealing with the scientific basis of ethics, the last two with ethics proper, and the editor, with great considerateness for readers who may be "unaccustomed to metaphysical and psychological discussions," suggests that much of the author's ethical views may be gathered from the third and fourth books alone. This is no doubt true, but we cannot but express our belief that the "Prolegomena to

Ethics " will owe its place in English philosophy to the earlier rather than to the later books.

It is a serious thing to begin with metaphysics when we have almost talked ourselves into the belief that anything which we cannot "touch and taste and handle" is unreal, or at best a field for intellectual gymnastics. And this Mr. Green felt. It was only the necessity of the case which compelled him to do as he has done. It may seem strange indeed to some that after nineteen centuries of Christianity, and at a time when the Christian morality is accepted by all civilized nations, it should be necessary to write "*Prolegomena to Ethics*" at all. The science of ethics implies a metaphysic of ethics undoubtedly, but is not that metaphysic of ethics supplied by Christian theology on which from the first Christian ethics has been based? Such a question can only come from one who ignores or has reason to doubt what certain people now take for granted—viz., that dogmatic theology has had its day, and the Church remains only as a fossilized shell in which a living germ is still hidden. Some, indeed, go further, and deny the existence even of the germ; but then they believe in a kind of moral archebiosis which in the physical world they are slow to accept. Thus, the Introduction to the "*Prolegomena to Ethics*" speaks of people who are "wearied of the formulas of a stereotyped theology, but still demand free in-

dulgence for the appetite which that theology supplied with a regulation-diet" (p. 1). Mr. Herbert Spencer, in the "Data of Ethics," goes further. He is quite willing to believe that dogmatic theology is a thing of the past, but he has a profound mistrust of metaphysics. We are, therefore, told in his Preface that—

"The establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific (*i.e.* positive) "basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative."

Supposing, now, for the sake of argument, that dogmatic theology has something still to say in the present as it has had in the past, we find that ethics becomes the battle-ground of the three great tendencies of the human mind—the positive, the metaphysical, and the theological. Mr. Spencer is prepared to give us a natural science of morals, and nothing could be more acceptable to the present age than this, if it does not demand too great a sacrifice of common sense. Mr. Green, on the other hand, is anxious to find "some independent justification" for ethics "in the shape of a philosophy which does not profess to be a branch either of dogmatic theology or of natural science" (p. 2). And there are still some, and we venture to think an increasing number, who are reactionary enough to hold that there is no basis for the Christian

virtues except the Christian verities. Still we should be quite wrong in supposing that the controversy between science, philosophy, and theology in this matter could be represented as a triangular duel, or a "*bellum omnium inter omnes*." For metaphysics and theology fight side by side against any attempt to make ethics a part of natural science. It is only when metaphysics adopts, as it sometimes does, a sublimated Christianity in which the Christ of the Gospels and the Epistles is lost sight of in the Christian Idea, that theology is compelled to reassert the historical character of the Catholic faith.

The "Prolegomena to Ethics" is mainly directed to the establishment of morality on the basis of self-consciousness. Such a view necessitates a criticism of those theories which involve a physical theory of conscience and of will, whether in the form given to it by Mr. J. S. Mill, or in the ethics of evolution as formulated by Mr. Herbert Spencer. Against both of these it is necessary to show the reality of the spiritual principle in nature and in man, and the true relation of man to nature. This is the subject of Book I, which is headed "Metaphysics of Knowledge." It is clearly impossible without unfairness to summarize a closely reasoned discussion which includes much valuable criticism. For a summary can do little more than state in a bald, dogmatic form the conclusions ultimately arrived at, indicating roughly and in outline the method

by which such conclusions are established. Still, for understanding the theory of ethics developed in Books III. and IV., it is necessary to do this.

At the end of the Introduction two questions are suggested for consideration, of which the second depends upon a negative answer being given to the first :—

“Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature in that sense of nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge?”

This is the question of Book I. If the answer be in the negative the further question is suggested—namely, whether that principle in knowledge which is not natural has not another expression in the consciousness of a moral ideal. Thus the Second Book leads us on from the critique of the speculative to that of the practical reason.

It would be difficult to find in the English language so clear a statement of great metaphysical principles as we have in Book I. on the metaphysic of knowledge. Metaphysicians, from Heracleitus to Hegel, have a tendency to adopt a defiant attitude towards ordinary people. There is nothing of this in Professor Green. Even when he is dealing with the most abstruse subjects he *wishes* to be understood; and the wish to be understood carries him on far towards the attainment of his object. Whether it is that English people are too matter-of-fact to be metaphysical, or that they

have been hopelessly miseducated by traditional systems of philosophy, the fact remains that what is almost a truism to a metaphysician is a paradox to "the plain, honest man." To be told that all reality consists in relations, and relations are impossible except for an intelligence capable of relating, sounds strange to people whose common view of the real is that it is something which is independent of consciousness, that is, "unrelated." Ever since the days of Locke a mysterious "entity," called matter, is supposed to exist as a source of reality, though it is unknown and unknowable. Even Kant did not succeed in laying the ghost which hampered the English philosophy, and which the good Bishop of Cloyne in vain sought to exorcise. For this unknown something, which for Bishop Berkeley was the haunt of materialism, reappears in the Kantian "thing-in-itself," while for the English "philosophers of relativity," it remains as "a skeleton in the cupboard." Hegel dared to say that it was a ghost which any man of sound common sense could afford to laugh at, since the intelligible is the real and the real is the intelligible, and we can do better without the ghost than with it, because, as Mr. Green tells us in a different context, "nothing can be known by reference to the unknown."

But if the real is the related, and relation implies a relating consciousness, we cannot explain con-

sciousness by that nature which presupposes it. Discarding, then, the materialistic solution, can we accept the Kantian *dictum* that the "understanding makes nature"? Popular thinking opposes the external order of nature to our thinking, and the antithesis has been emphasized by Locke as if the order of nature were one thing and real, while our thinking is another and unreal. But nature as a system or unity is so for a conscious intelligence, and yet we do not make that unity for ourselves. It seems, then, that we have the conception of an order of nature on the one side and that order itself on the other. Either, then, we must suppose "some unaccountable pre-established harmony," through which there comes to be such an order corresponding to our conception of it, or we must recognize the fact that "our conception of an order of nature and the relations which form that order have a common spiritual source" (p. 35). At any rate, we cannot reduce one to the other:—

"Intelligence, experience, knowledge, are no more a result of nature than nature of them. If it is true that there would be no intelligence without nature it is equally true that there would be no nature without intelligence" (pp. 37, 38).

Nature, then, in its reality implies a principle which is spiritual, or at least not natural (p. 56). What, then, is our relation to this principle? We are conscious of an order in nature, and this

consciousness cannot be a part of the process of nature. Popular psychology has, indeed, familiarized us with the term "phenomena of consciousness." Knowledge may be *of* phenomena, but phenomena are related in time to other phenomena, the consciousness is not. Few better instances of Mr. Green's psychological analysis can be found than the sections (58-64) which he devotes to the theory of perception adopted by Mr. Mill and Mr. Lewes, and the result of his analysis is the conclusion that—

"A sensation excited by an external irritant is not a perception of the irritant or (by itself) of anything at all; every object we perceive is a congeries of related facts, of which the simplest component, no less than the composite whole, requires in order to its presentation the action of a principle of consciousness, not itself subject to conditions of time, upon successive appearances, such action as may hold the appearances together, without fusion, in an apprehended fact" (p. 70).

But our consciousness seems to admit of growth. How is this to be explained? Probably what seems to be a growth of consciousness is really a process by which the animal organism becomes "a vehicle of the eternal consciousness :"—

"We must hold that there is a consciousness for which the relations of fact which form the object of our gradually attained knowledge already and eternally exist; and that the growing knowledge of the individual is a progress towards this consciousness."

The system of related facts which we call the

objective world implies a mind or consciousness for which it now exists, and as that eternal consciousness reproduces itself in us the world tends to become for us also a system of related facts, though there can never be for us that "wholeness" which there must be for "the mind which renders the world one." It has always seemed to us that Bishop Berkeley, the best misunderstood of English philosophers, had a glimmering of this truth. He never escaped from the terminology of Locke nor overcame the confusion between sensation and thought; yet he seems to have seen that the popular theory of ideas admitted of being turned against its materialistic defenders. If a thing's *esse* is its *percipi*, then, since the human mind "exists not always," things must be either "nowhere when we perceive them not," or they must be "ideas in the mind of God." Hume, of course, sneers at the good Bishop's "lessons in scepticism," yet in turning the prevailing philosophy of "ideas" into an argument for the existence of God he already foreshadowed the truth that reality implies an eternal consciousness, and nature the existence of a mind without which nature would not be.

The consciousness which in knowledge asserts its freedom by distinguishing itself from impressions is seen in morality distinguishing itself from mere wants and animal impulses to satisfy them. For the animal system of man is organic not only

to *impressions* but to *wants*. And a want is no more identifiable with a motive than an impression is identifiable with a thought. In a motive no less than in knowledge, there is something non-natural, not as though a motive were made up of animal instinct *plus* self-consciousness; for it is one and indivisible, resulting from "the determination of an animal nature by a self-conscious subject other than it" (p. 95).

Any one who is familiar with a certain long and hopelessly confused footnote in Mill's "Utilitarianism," on motives and intentions, will appreciate the admirable clearness of Mr. Green's discussion (secs. 103 and *seqq.*) and his criticism of the misleading phrase, "the *strongest* motive." With the clearer view of what *motive* means, the freedom of the will, which is necessarily implied in morality, becomes intelligible. We are not shut up to either of the one-sided heresies of "determinism" or "indeterminateness." Freedom *in* motive is not freedom *from* motive. It is not "some unaccountable power of unmotivated willing," nor is an act determined by character one that a man cannot help doing. "It has no *must*, in the physical sense, about it. The 'can't help it' has no application to it." To say, then, that a man's action is the joint result of his character and his circumstances is only true and compatible with human freedom, if we recognize the existence of "a self-dis-

tinguishing and self-seeking subject, as making both character and circumstances what they are" (p. 111).

A free will, however, is not necessarily a good will, any more than a strong character is a good character, though it may be true that the weak man cannot be a good man. Hence a fuller discussion of the nature of will in its relation to desire and reason is necessary in order to establish the distinction between the good and the bad will which is the basis of ethics. To *will* is to identify one's self with one of those tendencies towards different objects, which, till that identification, are external to the man. An act of will is thus never *mere* desire. In *willing* a man seeks to realize himself in that which he wills. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is, but the character of the man and the distinction between the good and the bad will depends upon the nature of that object in which self-realization is sought.

This brings us at once to ethics proper and the criticism of the Utilitarian theory. Not that Professor Green ever allows himself to be driven by reaction from Hedonism into a one-sidedly ascetic view. "Self-satisfaction is the form of every object willed" (p. 161), and "in all self-satisfaction, if attained, there is pleasure" (p. 165). This is the truth that underlies the false notion that pleasure

is always the object of desire. Mr. Green is never happier than when he is disentangling the confusions of Utilitarian psychology. One has heard much of the way in which Sir William Hamilton wielded the metaphysical scythe. We venture to think that there are passages in the "Prolegomena to Ethics" which will bear comparison with any of Sir William Hamilton's criticisms. If the style is less trenchant, it is only because Mr. Green has no interest in merely proving an opponent wrong. He is anxious to discover in the confusion that which made a false theory seem true. "A lie which is all a lie" has no echo in the human spirit. If, therefore, a false theory is commonly received or is capable of plausible presentation, it is owing to some truth which it has seized and misinterpreted.

Nothing could be better than the way in which Mr. Green unravels the confusion of pleasure and the good in his criticism of Utilitarianism. The criticism is indeed as old as Aristotle; just as the confusion is inherent in Cyrenianism; and none knew this better than Mr. Green. The conscious activity or self-realization is not the same as the pleasure which always accompanies self-realization, though "because they occur together some people think they are the same," διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν.¹ Few critics would have

¹ Eth., X. v. 7.

resisted the temptation to exhibit an antagonist fairly "hoist with his own petard," when a champion of association psychology is found naively unconscious that "uniform conjunction in experience" does not constitute identity. But Mr. Green is only careful to disentangle the truth from the error, and to show that what man seeks is never merely pleasure, but the self-realization of which pleasure is the invariable concomitant.

Still, whether for the Utilitarian or the ideal moralist, a criterion has to be established by which to distinguish the good will from the bad. If the end of human action is always pleasure, there must be good pleasures and bad; if the end of life is self-realization, there must be a true and a false way of attempting it. In the case of the voluptuary and the saint, either the pleasures they seek are different in kind or they seek self-satisfaction in different ways.

The Utilitarian of to-day, with a noble disregard of his principles, asserts that pleasures differ in kind, and Mr. Mill appeals to this difference as an unquestionable "fact."¹ When, however, we look closer into the matter we find that on strictly Utilitarian grounds one pleasure is *intrinsically* better than another only because it is a greater pleasure on the whole. This is by no means enough for Mr. Mill, and, therefore, he bases the

¹ Utilitarianism, pp. 12, 13.

qualitative distinction of pleasures on the comparative excellence of those who pursue them. This, no doubt, is valid reasoning for any one who makes self-realization and not pleasure the end of action, but—

"It is altogether against Utilitarian principles that a pleasure should be of more value because the man who pursues it is better. They only entitle us to argue back from the amount of pleasure to the worth of the man who acts so as to produce it" (p. 170).

If, then, the Utilitarian attempt to establish a criterion of right and wrong in a difference in kind among pleasures fails us, what answer have they to give who speak of self-realization as the end of action? The impulse of self-realization according to the direction it takes is, we are told, "the source both of vice and virtue." Only the vicious self-seeking and self-assertion—the quest, for instance, for self-satisfaction in the life of the voluptuary—is ultimately self-defeating, while the differentia of the virtuous life is that it is governed by the consciousness that there is—

"Some perfection which has to be attained, some vocation which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable, whatever the individual may for the time desire" (p. 184).

What this ideal is we do not know at once. We only know that disinterested obedience to

it is what the "Categorical Imperative" enjoins. We feel that, as an ultimate standard, it must be "an ideal of *personal* worth," that the idea of a spirit cannot realize itself except in spirits. Unless, therefore, we give up as insoluble the constant spectacle of unfulfilled human promise, we are led on to the conclusion that our personal self-conscious being which comes from God is for ever continued in God—which we suppose to be the Pantheistic conclusion—or else that the life which is lived on earth under conditions which thwart its development is—

"Continued in a society with which we have no means of communication through the senses, but which shares in and carries further every measure of perfection attained by men under the conditions of life that we know" (p. 195).

That there should be such an end of human perfection is the demand which our spirit makes upon us, which is implied in the very idea of development, for a process *ad infinitum* cannot be a process of development at all. And when that which is being developed is not a natural organism but a self-conscious subject, the end of its becoming must be "a subject in which the idea of the human spirit is completely realized." This consideration suggests the true notion of the spiritual relation in which we stand to God. We exist not merely *for* Him but *in* Him. He is the Being "with Whom we are in principle one ;

with Whom the human spirit is identical in the sense that He *is* all which the human spirit is capable of becoming" (p. 198).

Such an ideal, known only at first vaguely and in outline, creates its own filling, and in history we can trace the process. The first step in the process, or rather that which the whole process implies, is the realizing of the fact that a perfect self-development is only possible when others share in the same development. The idea of an *absolute* good is seen to be the idea of a *common* good. The supposed objection that this notion of a common good is but the development of a gregarious instinct, which we see in brutes, calls forth a criticism which is of far wider application than that in which it is here used. However dependent upon feelings of animal origin social interest may be, it cannot be a product of them nor evolved from them :—

"Any history that might be offered of it, which should enable us to connect its more complex with its simpler forms, would be much to be welcomed. But the same cannot be said for a history which should seem to account for it by ignoring its distinctive character, and by deriving it from forms of animal sympathy from which, because they have no element of identity with it, it cannot in the proper sense have been developed" (p. 211).

Similarly when the idea of an absolute and common good expresses itself in social requirements, in laws written or unwritten, in the recognition of some-

thing which *ought* to be, whatever the individual likes or dislikes, no so-called histories of the origin of justice can help us:—

“Though our information about primitive man were very different from what it is, it could never be other than a contradiction to found upon it a theory of a state of mind underlying the earliest forms of social union, which should represent this state of mind as different in kind from that which, upon fair analysis of the spiritual life, now shared by us, we find to be the condition of such social union as actually exists” (p. 216).

Sight cannot be generated when there is no optic nerve, nor can the idea of an absolute and common good, which is alike the foundation of morality and of the institutions of daily life, be the product of that which is irrational and non-moral.

So much, then, is necessarily implied in morality, that there should be the idea of an absolute good, which is a good for others as well as for one's self. But the earliest moral ideals and that which the modern age has caught from Christianity seem wide as the poles asunder. In what, then, does the process or evolution of morality consist? To this the answer is that there has been a gradual widening of the area of common good and a gradual determination of the idea. We have been slowly learning that a common good is a good *for all*:—

“The change is not necessarily in the strength, in the constraining power, of the feeling of duty—perhaps it is

never stronger now than it may have been in an Israelite who would have yet recognized no claim in a Philistine, or in a Greek who would yet have seen no harm in exposing a sickly child—but in the conceived range of claims to which the duty is relative. . . . It is not the sense of duty to a neighbour, but the practical answer to the question, Who is my neighbour? that has varied" (p. 220).

The modern world has accepted, if it has only in part realized, the idea of human equality, an idea which for Greek ethics was simply unintelligible. Even for Aristotle the slave was a living tool, and it was as absurd to suppose him capable of true *εὐδαιμονία* as to admit him to political rights. Nowadays people—Christian, non-Christian, or anti-Christian—accept the equality of all men as, in theory at least, a self-evident truth. "*For practical purposes,*" as Professor Green notices with considerable emphasis on the limitation, the Kantian maxim, "Act so as to treat humanity always as an end never as a means," and the Utilitarian formula, "Every one should count for one and no one for more 'han one," are coincident. Professor Green, however, declines to say who is mainly to be credited with the promulgation of humanitarian views unknown to the Greek world :—

"It is not to the point," he says, "to discuss the share which Stoic philosophers, Roman jurists, and Christian teachers may severally have had in gaining acceptance for the idea of human equality" (p. 222).

He prefers to think of it as but the natural fulfil-

ment of a capability given in reason itself. That the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount should thus be left to take its place as a phase in a natural development seems to us to imply a false estimate of the influence which Christianity exerted upon ancient moral theories. It is, no doubt, true that the precept of the older revelation, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," had never attained, even for the Jew, its full meaning. Indeed, the Jewish people had narrowed, instead of widening, the area covered by the term "neighbour," and Christ had to interpret it in its true universality. It is true, too, that the world was prepared for such humanitarian teaching by the vision of a great World Empire, no less than by the unifying tendencies of Roman law and the utterances of Stoic philosophers. And yet, when Christ enunciated a principle as far-reaching as and much more generally intelligible than either of those formulas of the rival moral system of our day—"Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you do ye even so to them"—it was a new truth, and its finality is beyond dispute.

It is, perhaps, in those passages in which the ancient and the modern ideals are contrasted that we are least able to follow Mr. Green. Though he disclaims any wish to "hold a brief for the Greek philosophers against the founders of the Christian Church, or for the latter against the former"

(p. 306), we cannot help feeling that the fear lest we of the modern world should think ourselves "better than our fathers" often leads him to minimize the real difference between the highest moral systems of the pre-Christian age and the ethics of Christianity:—

"Religious teachers," Professor Green tells us, "have, no doubt, affected the hopes and fears which actuate us in the pursuit of virtue, or rouse us from its neglect. Religious societies have both strengthened men in the performance of recognized duties and taught them to recognize relations of duty towards those whom they might otherwise have been content to treat as beyond the pale of such duties; but the articulated scheme of what the virtues and duties are in their difference and in their unity remains for us now in its main outlines what the Greek philosophers left it."

If "religious teachers" and "religious societies" include Christ and the Catholic Church this is surely misleading. It fails to recognize what Christianity did for the moral ideal, and still more the new power which it gave for the realizing of that ideal. We have not the slightest wish to underrate the results of Greek ethics or to deny the fact that much of the teaching of Aristotle is final. But it seems to us not only inadequate, but unfair to credit the philosopher with the doctrine that "every form of real goodness must rest on a wish to be good, which has no object but its own fulfilment" (p. 271), and then to contrast with this "the appeal to semi-sensual motives which has been common

and perhaps necessary for popular practical effect in the Christian Church." No doubt the Aristotelian formula τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα implied disinterested interest in an ideal. In Christianity this is replaced by the disinterested love of God for what He is, and the love of men as made in His image. A few pages later (p. 280), Professor Green admits that "the fact that Christian preachers have not been ashamed to dwell upon such compensation ought not to be taken to imply that the heroism of charity exhibited in the Christian Church has really been vitiated by pleasure-seeking motives:" but the fact is nevertheless appealed to in order to emphasize the contrast between the teaching of Aristotle and the Christian preacher. And yet Aristotle, who was certainly not hampered by the necessity of "popular practical effect," allows and authorizes the appeal to "semi-sensual" motives in the case of all except a very few:—

"For the mass of men," he tells us, "are governed by moral compulsion rather than reason, and penalties rather than an ideal. And so some people hold that though it is the duty of lawgivers to exhort men to virtue and to stimulate them τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, in the belief that those whose character has been properly trained will listen to them, yet for the disobedient and less noble natures they must apply correction and punishment, while the morally incurable they must banish altogether."¹

If it be answered that he whose life was "steered

¹ Ethics, X. ix. 10.

by the rudders of pleasure and pain" was imperfectly moral, because he did not act τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, it is also true that he in whose life the hope of heaven and the fear of hell are the dominant principles falls equally short of the Christian ideal.

We cannot now follow Professor Green into his comparison of the Greek virtues of courage and temperance with the Christian fortitude and self-denial. The superiority of the Christian type is of course everywhere admitted, but it is difficult to feel that the contrast, especially between the σωφροσύνη of the Greek—meaning, as it did, little more than moderation in eating, drinking, and the sexual passion—and the soberness, temperance, and chastity of Christian ethics is fully recognized, when it can be said that "the sexual temperance which they" (the philosophers) "demanded, they demanded on the true ground, but not in full enough measure" (p. 289); nor can we accept without a good deal of interpretation the statement that "there is no true foundation for the strictest sexual morality other than the social duty which they asserted." It was not the fact of social equality which St. Paul appealed to against the prevailing vice of the ancient world. It was the dignity of the nature which had been taken into God, and the indwelling in the regenerate man of the Personal Spirit of God.

The failure to appreciate what is distinctive in

Christianity, even considered as a moral system, seems inseparable from the view, apparently accepted by Mr. Green, that the history of ethics is a history of "the natural fulfilment of a capability given in reason itself." For Christian morality is indissolubly bound up with the dogma of the Incarnation and the Sacramental teaching of the Church. The Divine life, which is set before man as his ideal, is for those whose nature has been transformed by a Divine power; and it is the belief that such a transformation of human nature has taken place that makes the Christian ideal a possibility for man. For the claim of Christianity is that, while it sets before man a new and higher ideal in the life of Him in Whom dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, it gives a new moral dynamic to enable him to realize it. But we can no more take our moral ideal from Christianity and our moral dynamic from Paganism than we can base the unselfish Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill on the Hedonism of Epicurus and of Hobbes.

Mr. Green, in two remarkable lay sermons, has shown us what his attitude towards the faith of Christendom is. We are not now anxious to discuss this, nor is it necessary in reviewing the "Prolegomena to Ethics," except when that false view, as we hold it to be, shows itself in an imperfect conception of the nature of the Christian ideal. For the rest, if we are unable to believe that Mr.

Green has found a metaphysical substitute for dogmatic theology, we at least are conscious that we owe him much for having given to the world the strongest attack which has yet been made upon theories which would reduce morality in the last analysis to a calculation of pleasures, or destroy it by a physical theory of conscience and of will.

VII.

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WILL.

Freedom of the Will.

(a) *As a practical question.* (β) *As a speculative question.*

(a) AS A PRACTICAL QUESTION it is taken for granted that man is an ἀρχὴ πράξεως, that he can choose or reject. No arguments for this are advanced till it is denied, and it is never denied till we try to fit in the fact of freedom with the general view of the world and God. It rests upon—

(i.) The consciousness that we are free, which is never denied even by those who explain it away.

(ii.) The feeling of responsibility varying concomitantly with the consciousness of freedom.

(iii.) The transference of this to others in the vulgar notion of moral desert.

(iv.) The practice of legislators and of the judicial system.

(β) AS A SPECULATIVE QUESTION. How are we to reconcile freedom with what we know of

the universe and God? Here "freedom" has to run the gauntlet with—

- (α) A metaphysical pantheism.
- (β) A theological theory of omnipotence
- (γ) A physical doctrine of determinism.

(α) THE STOICS. Here we get the first collision between moral freedom and physical necessity: *εἰμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη* is supreme everywhere; human freedom is therefore only a mode of necessity. Chrysippus struggles in vain with the difficulty, but at last responsibility disappears in fate.¹

(β) JOHN CALVIN. Theological necessitarianism dates from John Calvin, though the reaction from Pelagianism in St. Augustine gave a colour of necessitarianism to Augustinianism. The "*Deus ducit volentem duci*" of St. Augustine reminds one of Seneca's (Ep., 107. ii.) "*Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.*" But Calvin, starting with the omnipotence of God, made Him responsible for all human actions, evil as well as good. He did not *allow*, He *willed* evil. The "double predestination" was not more immoral than this, though the injustice was more obvious.

(γ) Determinism. Hobbes, Hume, and Mill maintained mechanical Determinism. H. Spencer and his followers maintain physiological Determinism. Kant's answer to the difficulty consists in an

¹ See Zeller, *Gesch. d. Griechischen Philosophie*, III. Th. 1 Abth. pp. 168, 377.

attempted division of territory; he separates the moral and the physical, the sphere of liberty and the sphere of freedom.

The difficulties of the Kantian view are threefold.

(a) It involves a hopeless dualism between man and nature, and between the free and the necessary in man.

(β) All our knowledge of nature and man tends to bring them together.

(γ) Freedom comes to mean "unmotivated volition," mere indeterminateness, which is morally as worthless as a determined will.

Men ask—Does the Will mean the balance of motives, or has it a casting vote?

Answer. Neither one nor the other.

They talk of the freedom of the will as something *innate* instead of a thing to be *won*.¹

Psychology of the Will.

What is the Will? The animal system in man is organic to the satisfaction of *wants* and *impulses*: the *feeling* of want leads to "desire" for a wanted object.² "The essential ingredient of *desire* is the

¹ Cf. Noah Porter, pp. 79, 80. What the Will is *not*. It is *not* (a) power to carry out volition; *not* (β) power to choose without motive, etc.

Janet, *Theory of Morals*, p. 372, distinguishes between—(a) External determinism (acts done *βίαια*). (β) Internal determinism (acts done from *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*). (γ) Rational determinism or liberty, which is "the power of acting according to conceptions or ideas."

² Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 92.

sense of the inferiority of the *actual* to the *ideal*."¹ But the animal impulse ceases to be merely animal when it is determined by self-consciousness.²

Self-satisfaction is the form of every object willed by man—whether as in the highest life self-satisfaction is sought in the realizing of a vocation, or as in the vicious life in pleasure.³

Will, then, is "the man's direction of himself to the realization of a conceived or imagined

¹ Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 578.

² Cf. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 95. "The motive is not made up of an (animal) want and self-consciousness, any more than life of chemical processes and vital ones. It is one and indivisible; but, indivisible as it is, it results, as perception results, from the determination of an animal nature by a self-conscious subject other than it; so results, however, that the animal condition does not survive *in* the result."

³ Cf. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 182-184. From this characteristic of being an object to himself "arises the impulse which becomes the source, according to the direction it takes, both of vice and virtue. It is the source of vicious self-seeking and self-assertion, so far as the spirit which is in man seeks to satisfy itself or to realize its capabilities in modes in which . . . its self-satisfaction or self-realization is not to be found. . . . It is one and the same principle of his nature . . . which makes it possible for the voluptuary to seek satisfaction, and thus to live for pleasure, at all, and which according to the law of its being, according to its inherent capability, makes it impossible that the self-satisfaction should be found in any succession of pleasures. . . . And hence the differentia of the virtuous life, proceeding as it does from the same self-objectifying principle which we have just characterized as the source of the vicious life, is that it is governed by the consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be attained, some vocation which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable, whatever the individual may for the time desire; that it is in ministering to such an end that the agent seeks to satisfy himself."

object"¹ or the putting one's self forth in desire for the realization of some object present to us in idea. It is not merely selecting, but selecting *for a reason*.

Thus Will can be identified with neither *reason* nor *desire*, nor is it a third thing co-ordinate with both (Plato) nor a fusion of the two (Aristotle), yet it includes both.

It includes (α) the instinctive craving for a good, an ideal to be realized—in Aristotelian language βούλησις, w^h though a part of ὁρεξις is already, as being βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ, λογιστικόν τι. (β) A representation to ourselves of some good to be realized (φαντασία). (γ) The rational deliberation as to how it shall be realized (βούλευσις). (δ) The identification of self with the best means for the end (προαίρεσις).²

¹ Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 151, 152.

² Cf. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 158. "Will, then, is equally and indistinguishably desire and thought—not however *mere* desire or *mere* thought, if by that is meant desire or thought as they might exist in a being that was not self-distinguishing and self-seeking, or as they may occur to a man independently of any action of himself; but desire and thought as they are involved in the direction of a self-distinguishing and self-seeking subject to the realization of an idea. . . . The will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is. The motive issuing in his act, the object of his will, the idea which for the time he sets himself to realize, are but the same things in different words. . . . In willing he carries with him, so to speak, his whole self to the realization of the given idea. All the time that he so wills, he may feel the pangs of conscience, or, on the other hand, the annoyance, the sacrifice, implied in acting conscientiously."

The growth of the Will.

The Freedom of the Will is *the power to win freedom.*

The weak man cannot be a good man, the strong man *may* be. Man's heritage is *the power to choose.* The τέλος is not φυσικόν τι determined for us. We create our own τέλος, our own φαντασία, which is a mere φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν or the real τὸ ἀγαθόν in proportion as we use our "power of self-emancipation."¹

Every act of choice wins or loses freedom. Hence "every choice is for eternity" (Goethe). We have φύσει "a capability of effort" (the germ of *will*) and capacity of distinguishing a right and a wrong, or a higher and lower (the germ of *conscience*). We never absolutely lose either. We are what we are according to our use of these capabilities.

So in Aristotelian language. The σώφρων is *free*; the ἀκόλαστος is a *slave*; the ἐγκρατής and the ἀκρατής are winning or losing freedom. As

tiously. He may think that he is doing wrong, or that it is doubtful whether, after all, there is really an objection to his acting as he has resolved to do. He may desire some one's good opinion which he is throwing away, or some pleasure which he is sacrificing. But, for all that, it is only the feeling, thought, and desire represented by the act of will, that the man recognizes as for the time himself. The feeling, thought, and desire with which the act conflicts are influences which he is aware of, influences to which he is susceptible, but they are not *he*."

¹ Janet, *Theory of Morals*, p. 400.

a matter of fact the σώφρων and the ἀκόλαστος are equally unreal characters; for the lower nature never ceases to struggle, the higher never ceases to protest.

Morality is the struggle to be free—*vice* is the abandonment of the struggle. Hence the goodness of acts is judged by the EFFORT *περὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή* (Eth., II. iii. 10). The same thought is expressed in ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί (II. vi. 14) ῥᾷδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν (ibid.).

The problem of Eth., III. v., man's responsibility for his character, is suggested by this fact. There is an *effort* in virtue, therefore man is responsible; there is no effort in vice, therefore he is not responsible. To know implies *learning*, to be ignorant implies a mere *laissez faire*. Hence we commend a man for action, but shrink from blaming him for *indolence*. Even Aristotle (III. xii.) thinks a man more to blame for ἀκολασία than for ἐειλία, because it required less effort to resist ἡδονή than λύπη. Cf. III. ix. 2. χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ἢ τῶν ἡδῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.

What is the place of education in the self-emanicipation of the will? It is the protection of the Will in its first struggles to be free, and the presenting to the conscience of the highest conceptions of the good. But no external force can give the will freedom. Freedom must be won. Education

tries to neutralize the forces called by the general name of ἡδονή, which, ἡ βίη καὶ γοητεία, would make the development of freedom impossible.

The μουσική of Plato, and the ἔθος of Aristotle; the swimming-belt of Horace, the "sentiment" of Hume, all have for their object the *protection* of the Will while it is weak. The wildest advocate of "free trade" in politics believes in "protection" in morals.

Revelation itself is Divine education. It enlightens the conscience by putting before it a Perfect Ideal; and, like human education, strengthens the will by an appeal to love.

The special virtues recognized by any age or society are thus the highest known forms under which τὸ ἀγαθόν is recognized. To be virtuous, however, is not to conform to those conceptions, but to choose them τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα as an embodiment of the good. What is the good when I am in presence of fear, or sensual appetite, or lust of money, or base ambition, or mere self-love in society? For the Greek, the answer is given in Eth., III. vi.-xii., IV., and V.

We may now explain some of the puzzles due to the confusion of formal freedom (liberum arbitrium) with real freedom, libertas.

(a) *The Will is always free*¹ because in all

¹ Cassen: Prolegomena to Ethics, ii. p. 308.

willing the man is his own object. (In acts which are done δι' ἀγνοίας, "circumstances master a man," says Hegel: the will does not will. In acts done βίῃ, the will is free though the act is not.)

(β) *The Will is always determined*, it cannot act without a motive, and the motive of the will is always *good*, or conceived of sub specie boni. But this is self-determination; and SELF-DETERMINATION is equivalent to FREEDOM. Necessitas naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis.¹

"To act by motives is to act freely, to act without motive is to act under necessity, physical necessity is the only necessity, and moral necessity is freedom."²

(γ) In the sense of *real freedom*, however, the good will is free, not the bad one.³

Liberty, as actual freedom, is a thing to be won, and it can be won only by realizing the law of one's being.

The man who, by his formal freedom of self-determination, identifies himself with impulses not for his true good is a *slave*; he who seeks satisfaction in what is for his true good is *free*. In the former case, he uses his freedom to make himself a slave; in the latter, he wins freedom by self-emancipation from nature.

This (Hegelian) view of freedom which we find

¹ S. Thomas. Aq., 1^a, 82, 1 ad. 1. ² Stirling, p. 19.

³ Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, ii. 324.

in Green and Stirling is also the view of Christian philosophers—St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas.

With St. Paul, the natural man is a slave, the spiritual man is free. Freedom is the power to will the right, to live according to the true human "idea," or the will of God. The ideally perfect man, according to St. John, "cannot sin."¹ The Pelagian argument that liberty means the possibility of doing right or wrong is met by St. Augustine thus:—

"Si liberum non est nisi quod duo potest velle, id est et bonum et malum; liber Deus non est, qui malum non potest velle" (Op. Imp. c. Julian I. c.).

Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitii peccatisque non servit (De Civ. Dei, xiv. xi. 1).

See too St. Anselm's "Cur Deus Homo?" bk. i. ch. xii. Can God lie? And St. Thos. Aq. Summa, 1^a lxii. viii. ad. 3: "Major libertas arbitrii est in angelis qui peccare non possunt, quam in nobis qui peccare possumus."

II.^a 2^a lxxxviii. iv. ad. 1. Sicut non posse peccare non diminuit libertatem, ita etiam necessitas firmata-e voluntatis in bonum non diminuit libertatem, ut patet in Deo, et in beatis. . . . Unde Augustinus . . . "felix necessitas est quae in meliora compellit."

II.^a 2^a xliv. i ad. 2. Obligatio praecepti non opponitur libertati nisi in eo cuius mens aversa est ab eo quod praeceptum; sicut patet in his qui ex solo timore praeceptum custodiunt. Sed praeceptum dilectionis non potest impleri nisi ex propria voluntate; et ideo libertati non repugnat.

¹ St. Aug. De Lib. Arb. i. 32: "Libertas quidem nulla vera est nisi beatorum et legi aeternae adherentium" (Cf. too De Civ. Dei, xxii. xxx. 3).

3^a qu. xiv. art. ii. Duplex est necessitas : una quidem coactionis quae fit ab agente extrinseco : et haec quidem necessitas contrariatur et naturae et voluntati, quorum utrumque est principium intrinsecum.

1^a qu. 105, art. iv. ad. 2^{um}. Moveri voluntate est moveri ex se, *i.e.* a principio intrinseco.

VIII.

A SUMMARY OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
AS COMPARED WITH MODERN
ETHICAL THEORIES.

MAN is distinguished from the rest of the animal kingdom by the possession of reason. This reason shows itself in the search for knowledge, and the search for an end, πάντες ὁρέγονται τοῦ εἰδέναι: hence arise metaphysics and science (Eth., I. i. 1). Hence, too, Ethics and the practical sciences; πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. As rational, man always aims at truth, for truth is the correlate of reason; but in speculation it is τἀληθές ἀπλῶς, in practice it is ἀληθεία ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὁρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.

Man's superiority to the brute is shown in both φρόνησις and σοφία, for both are impossible for the irrational, but φρόνησις is lower than σοφία. In σοφία, man approximates to God; while brutes, though strictly incapable of φρόνησις, show signs (ἔχνη) of that which in man is φρόνησις. In the

Politics, 1253^a 16, it is said to be the property of man that he passes moral judgments, ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον αἰσθῆσιν ἔχειν, yet in the Natural History (588^a 20), it is admitted that traces are to be found in the brutes of moral states. So man is φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον (Pol., 1253^a 2. 8., Eth., 1097^b 11), yet among gregarious animals we see the beginnings of this (Z. 588^a). Brutes, by a sort of φυσικὴ δόναμις (588^a 30), show a resemblance to the conscious life of man. They are to humanity as the child to the full-grown man. If man is the perfect animal, animals are imperfect men, and so right down the scale, for Aristotle feels the break between living and not living, as little as the break between brute and man or plant and animal. Οὕτω δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀψύχων εἰς τὰ ζῶα μεταβαίνει κατὰ μικρὸν ἢ φύσις ὥστε τῇ συνεχείᾳ λανθάνειν τὸ μεθόριον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ μέσον ποτέρων ἐστίν· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος τὸ τῶν φυτῶν πρῶτόν ἐστι· καὶ τούτων ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον δοκεῖν μετέχειν ζωῆς· ὅλον δὲ τὸ γένος πρὸς μὲν τᾶλλα σώματα φαίνεται σχέδον ὥσπερ ἔμψυχον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῶν ζώων ἄψυχον. Ἡ δὲ ματάβασις ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰ ζῶα συνεχὴς ἐστίν (588^b 4, etc.).

Still the line which separates man from brute is a real one since man can consciously set before himself an end, an ideal of knowledge or of action. He alone has *speech* λόγος. Mere sounds φωναί, indicate sensation, but speech indicates σύμφηρον and

βλάβερων, δίκαιον and ἄδικον (Pol., 1253). He not only instinctively satisfies wants, he seeks for *good*; he not only feels, he seeks to *know*. The ὁρεξις of man and of the brute is different. In the brute it is ἐπιθυμία and θυμός; in man it is these *plus* βούλησις, which, being a wish for good, is implicitly rational. It is λογιστικὴ ὁρεξις, as opposed to the ἄλογοι ὁρέξεις.

Contrast with modern thought. It is clear that for us this question is far more complicated. Evolution has brought out the close affinity of man with the brute, but (a) the breach between ἄψυχον and ἔμψυχον is more marked, and (β) though we trace the beginnings of consciousness in the animal world, it still remains true, as Tyndall puts it,¹ that the chasm between physical processes and facts of consciousness remains "intellectually impassable." Herbert Spencer admits the same while asserting the origin of consciousness out of unconsciousness, of the physical from the physiological.²

The great metaphysical problem of the day is personality implying (a) self-consciousness, (β) freedom. Can these be put on one side as illusory or reduced to the unconscious and the necessary? Is man a thing of nature, or is he, as he thinks he is, greater than nature? If so, is not conscious

¹ Scientific Materialism, p. 420.

² See, too, Fiske, *Destiny of Man*, pp. 62-65.

personal life, on which ethics, religion, and law depend, as much a new departure with regard to nature as the living is to the not living?

The practical end. Here Aristotle has no hesitation, and he claims every one on his side. Man, as a practical being, sets before himself GOOD, τὸ ἀγαθόν, not an abstract ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ, which is an object of reverence and worship as well as of desire, but τὸ ἀγαθόν, the good, which, in the region of art, mechanic or aesthetic, is a tangible result (ἔργον), in the region of practice, a condition which is not passive, but active. This is admitted to be εὐδαιμονία, welfare or well-being, rather than what we understand by happiness.


But man is a social as well as an active being, φύσει πολιτικόν ζῶον, and the individual cannot be abstracted from the family and the state. Πολιτικὴ deals with the welfare of the state; οἰκονομική with the welfare of the family; τὰ ἠθικά with the welfare of the individual. Yet Ethics is πολιτικὴ τις, because man is a πολιτικόν ζῶον, and to abstract his happiness from that of the whole is to make happiness impossible.

Contrast with modern thought. When we turn from Aristotle to the modern world, we find that a new conception has appeared, that of *duty*. There is a life which I *ought* to live apart from the fact that such a life is both happy and the only happy life and also the life which wins by its moral

beauty. There are endless views as to what our duty is, and why it is our duty; but few would accept Bentham's paradox that the word "ought" *ought* to be banished from morals. This sterner view is due to two causes, the Stoic necessitarianism, and the religious sanction. Whether we talk of a perfect life as "following nature" or as conformity to the will of God, it has a character of necessity and universality which the Greek εὐδαιμονία certainly had not; and in both cases it subordinates man to what is conceived of as greater than himself. The Kantian conception of "Duty" lies between the Stoic and the religious view; it has the sternness and inflexibility of the one, and the moral authority of the other.

The method of realizing τὸ ἀγαθόν. Εὐδαιμονία as equivalent to τἀγαθόν is the well-being of the whole man, therefore it is an activity or perfect realization of his being (ἐνεργεία). But his nature is not like God's, ἀπλῆ. He has body as well as soul, and the soul is not a simple whole; that which is an irrational principle of life in the plant, and of life and movement in the animal, is capable in man of transfusion by the rational. Yet the irrational rationalized is distinguished from that which is reason in itself. Man's nature, though not like God's, μία καὶ ἀπλῆ, is yet a unity, a σύστημα, in which there is a naturally higher and a naturally lower. And, just as in the world of nature, τὸ φυτόν












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οὐκ ἐδημιουργήθη εἰ μὴ διὰ τῷ ζῶον, τὰ δὲ ζῶον οὐκ ἐδημιουργήθη διὰ τὸ φυτὸν (Περὶ φυτῶν I. ii. p. 817^b 25-40), and as the whole vegetable and animal kingdom was made for man, οἷητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν (Pol., I. 1256^b 16), ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκῆναι τὴν φύσιν (ibid., ^b22), so in man the lower exists for the higher.

The first thing, then, is to secure the subordination of the animal nature to the rational with a view to εὐδαιμονία, which is defined as the realized consciousness of living the most excellent life in the most favourable circumstances. Ψυχῆς ἐνεργεία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Excellence, ἀρετή, is physical, moral, or intellectual, but physical excellence is clearly subordinate and exists for the higher and more distinctively human excellences. As Plato put it, and Aristotle says much the same, γυμναστική, which is the counterpart of μουσική, is subordinate because it does for the body what μουσική does for the soul, and the perfection of the soul is that for which both exist.

A well developed and well trained physique is a condition of perfect εὐδαιμονία. He who is misshapen or hideous may as little aspire to εὐδαιμονία as a slave may. [Οὐ πᾶν γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν πανάσχεις ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος (Eth., I. viii. 16) ; εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον (ibid., X. vi. 8).] Here

Aristotle is immensely behind Stoicism, which he criticizes by anticipation, or rather his conception of *εὐδαιμονία* has dragged him down to a lower view of *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. The Stoic sage was happy on the rack; the slave Epictetus might vie with Marcus Aurelius. A life made happy by suffering was impossible for Aristotle and a paradox to us; but a life "perfected by suffering" is a familiar Christian idea.

But the real destroyer of man's well-being was not bodily weakness or the servile condition; the *πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετήν* were, after all, rare. The real destroyer of happiness was that which introduced *στάσις* into the *σύστημα*, the insubordination of that lower nature which might be permeated by reason, but often struggled against it. It was this which set man against man in the political *κοινωνία*, and the man against himself. The inordinateness of the passions was the first problem for Aristotle. No man can be in a state of well-being unless he is at peace with himself, and in charity with, or at least in relations of justice with, his neighbour.

The moral *ἀρεταί* occupy the major part of Aristotle's Ethics; but first we must get clear the conception of moral virtue, before discussing them in detail. A virtuous life is life according to law or right reason, *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*. This *ὀρθὸς λόγος* is known to us first as an external standard,

embodied in the written or unwritten law of the state, and "writ small" in the *πατρική πρόσταξις*. In the early days of moral training obedience covers the whole ground, *τὸ ὅτι* not *τὸ διότι*. The law is to the child as yet "positive," not "natural." The child does just acts, but he is not yet just. He acts from instinct or habit, not from reason. It is not virtue, and yet it is a necessary preparation for virtue, *i.e.* for a state in which he not only acts *κατὰ λόγον*, but *μετὰ λόγον*, does right and for the sake of right, when by an almost imperceptible transition and a progressive purification of moral motive, childish obedience gives way to manly virtue, and the man not only *does* right, but *is good*, and in his conscious conformity to the law becomes a law unto himself, *οἶον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ . . . κάνων καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν*.

The virtuous act is known by the fact that it not only avoids excess and defect, but realizes a law of symmetry. Like a work of art, it manifests a sort of perfect proportion. You can neither add to nor take away from it without spoiling it. It lies between two vices of which one leans more to virtue's side than the other, yet in its nature it is perfect, *ἀκροτήε*. You cannot have too much of it, just as you cannot have too little of vice.

The virtuous man does virtuous acts in a right spirit. He is in conscious accord with the *λόγος* or moral law which enjoins right action. He acts

εἰδώς, προαιρουμένως καὶ προαιρουμένως δι' αὐτὸ, βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων. Of these the second is the all-important condition, for a man cannot act προαιρουμένως unless he acts εἰδώς, and a formed ἔξις προαιρετική is a guarantee for permanence. The test (σημεῖον) of the formed habit is, that a man acts from free choice and feels pleasure in it. And this is equally true whether the προαίρεσις is good or bad. We can infer nothing as to the moral character of the acts from the pleasure which ensues, we can only infer that the habit, good or bad, is formed.

The steps, then, in the formation of a virtuous character, according to Aristotle, will be as follows:—

(α) Obedience to the law of right, secured, in the state, by pains and penalties, in the family, by affection and the father's command.

(β) The formation of ἦξις under these influences.

(γ) The transition from δίκαια πράττειν to δίκαιος εἶναι, when the child gradually becomes capable of rational choice and loves right for right's sake.

This last step, however, needs further examination. What is προαίρεσις? It is different from spontaneity (τὸ ἐκούσιον), in which all animals share, because it implies what animals have not, βούλησις, wish for an end, and βούλευσις, deliberation with a view to the end. If man had not νοῦς, permeating even τὸ ὁρεκτικόν, he would not have a conception of τέλος, nor could he deliberate with a view to it.

But man is born a moral as he is born a rational being. He can choose between alternatives, and know them as higher and lower, *i.e.* as more or less conducive to the τέλος. He is thus an ἀρχὴ in a sense in which no other animal is, and because he is so, and can take either of two courses, all human affairs belong to the region of the contingent τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως εἶναι. Human action can, therefore, never fall under the science of the necessary. Ethics deals only with τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, and does not offer mathematical accuracy. As a practical matter of fact, Aristotle holds the freedom of the will, reduces to an absurdity the semi-necessitarianism which made a man irresponsible for vice, and treats perfect determinism as not worth discussing.

Three modern questions are here involved—What is the moral standard? What is the moral criterion? What is the moral faculty?

(a) Of these the first was the more important for Aristotle, the last the great question of modern days. For we are practically agreed as to the moral standard. Cynic and Cyrenaic, Stoic and Epicurean lived different lives and justified the difference by their moral theories. For us one type of character has won its way to security, the Christian type, the morality of the Gospel. So far as men differ about the moral standard now, they differ rather in their views of the history of morals,

how the present type came to be what it is, whether it can be accounted for by a progressive natural evolution, or whether the Christian ideal was not a revelation, and a new departure prepared for, indeed, but not the product of previous development. As we take the Christian type, so Aristotle took the Greek type, but he did not concern himself as to how it had come to be what it was, or why it was the fullest known expression of reason. We claim the Christian standard as a standard for man as man, and criticize the moral standard of the Ethics as local and national, and therefore transient. This is felt directly we attempt to transfer the virtues of the Ethics to modern life. We feel the *μονοκωλία* of Greek ethics, as Aristotle felt the *μονοκωλία* of the Spartan type of character.

(3) In dealing with the question of *criterion*, i.e. why is one act more right than another?

(i.) Aristotle absolutely discards *pleasure*. Pleasure is neither good nor bad, nor do pleasures differ in kind except in the sense that they belong to different *ἐνέργειαι*. It may be relative, as accompanying a process of restoration, or absolute, and so far good as the reflex of an activity, but you can get no criterion from pleasure.

(ii.) Aristotle has no idea of judging acts by their tendency to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He is as little a Utilitarian

as a Hedonist, though he would say that a perfect life *ἔχει τὴν ἡδύνην ἐν αὐτῇ*, and is also conducive to the good of all. But the criterion, as with Plato, is psychological. Each act is good as it promotes the activity of a true *ἐνεργεία*, and "the better the part, and the better the man, the better the *ἐνεργεία*." The activity of the highest *ἐνεργεία* is the highest good. Morality is lower than philosophy, because the *ἐνεργεία* is lower and less unmixed; within the area of morality each virtue is higher as it promotes the ascendancy of reason over animal impulse. How do we know higher from lower? By experience. He who has tried all gives a judgment which is beyond criticism, and he tells us of the marvellous happiness of the divine life of philosophy, *βίως θεωρητικός*.

(γ) Finally, the question of the moral faculty raises no difficulty with Aristotle. It is reason, not reason in its speculative activity (*σοφία*), but in its active region (*φρόνησις*). If we call this *φρόνησις* conscience, we are reading between the lines. For *φρόνησις* is simply reason exercised in matters moral, speaking in the imperative (*ἐπιτακτική*) as well as judging what is right. It presupposes the wish for real good and the knowledge of what it is and how to attain it. And where *φρόνησις* is perfect, as in the *σπουδαῖος* who *is* the *φρόνιμος*, there is a perfect harmony between *ὄρεξις* and *λόγος*. Nature is thus at peace with itself, and

the moral man may rise to the higher life of *θεωπία*.

Now, the modern question is complicated by the fact that we mix up the inquiry as to the *origin* of the moral faculty with the question of its present nature and authority. We cannot separate the two. We either undermine or sustain the authority of what we all agree to call *conscience* by the theory we hold of its origin. Is it from beneath, or from above? Does it grow out of the beast in us, or is it a revelation from God? Is it an *a priori* principle, or is it merely enlightened self-interest, which has discovered that selfishness does not pay?

There are only three possible ways of dealing with conscience.

I. To accept it as an ultimate fact, authoritative, unique, and inexplicable.

II. To justify its authority by showing that it is divine, not human.

III. To undermine its authority by explaining that it is human, not divine, though a divine halo in early days surrounds it.

Kant's great work is to have splendidly vindicated the fact of the authority of conscience. It challenges obedience unhesitating and unquestioning. But men cannot stop here. Childlike trust is beautiful, but impossible for the old age of the world. We must ask for credentials, we must "scrutinize the imperial claims" of conscience. We

must know who it is who commands? And when the question is asked it must be answered. We cannot go back to simple acceptance. As Dr. Martineau puts it, "A sovereign title must either be perfect or good for nothing; against a detected pretender there can be no high treason."¹ We then enter on one of the two alternative courses. We defend its authority either by appealing to something else in human nature or by something outside and above human nature.

The former group of theories are subdivisible. The question being, Why is right, right? we have the answer of—

(a) Hedonism, Utilitarianism, evolutionary ethics, in an ascending scale, declaring that Right is right because it is pleasant either to the individual, or the community, or to humanity at large, producing the highest or the highest possible amount of pleasure to each, consistent with the welfare of the whole.

(β) The "moral sense" school of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, who teach that Right is right because it is immediately and instinctively recognized as *morally beautiful*. Against this intuitive judgment there is no appeal, and hence it looked like an answer to the selfish hedonism of Hobbes. But *de gustibus non disputandum* is a dangerous principle of subjectivism to introduce into morals. If

¹ See the whole passage, *Study of Religion*, i. pp. 25, 26.

the variety of moral tastes is appealed to in order to discredit conscience, the representing it as a moral sense robs its judgments of universality.

(γ) The rational school of Cudworth and Clarke answer that Right is right because it is *true*, and Conscience is assimilated to the speculative reason, discerning at a glance the eternal and immutable truths of morals, as it discerns the necessity of mathematical truth.

Here we find the "moral sense school" and the "rational school" both opposing the "selfish school," both attempting to justify the absolute authority of conscience, but in doing so they rob it either of its *uniqueness* or its *authority*.

The other line is that of what may be called theological ethics, which connects conscience with the divine rather than with the human. This in no way implies that morality is a *dépendance* on religion, or conscience the product of Faith, but rather that conscience is, as Cardinal Newman calls it, "the creative principle of religion." To make morality "positive" instead of "natural," is to destroy it, and it is truer to base the will of God on morals than morals on the will of God.

We start, then, from morals, from the authority of conscience, and the fact that *right is right*. But, as Mantineau puts it, "*Ethics must either perfect themselves into religion, or disintegrate them-*

selves into Hedonism."¹ "Conscience may act as human before it is discovered to be divine."² But if we seek for an explanation at all, we must ultimately choose between some form of theology or some form of Hedonism. "The attempts to construct intermediate theories have only shown by their instability, the irresistible logical tendency to the single line of cleavage, which puts religious thought on the one side, and the eudaemonist on the other" (p. 26).

There is no discussion of these questions in Aristotle. The moral faculty is reason, and reason is divine, but it is rather an immanent principle in man, leading him to know his own good, realized in the political community, and it is assumed that to know is to obey.

Moral evil. This brings Aristotle to the question of moral evil, so far as the question was known to the Greek world. Aristotle, like Plato, might have said of reason as Bishop Butler says of conscience, that "if it had might as it has right, it would govern the world." But it doesn't govern the world. Why is this? What is the explanation of ἀκρασία? Socrates and Plato denied the existence of such a state, δέινον γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν. Aristotle admits ἀκρασία, but, in explaining it, resolves it into a condition which is not ἀκρασία. The ἀκρατής is the man who knows right and yet

¹ Study, p. 26.

² Ibid., p. 22.

does wrong, and all that the Seventh Book tells us is, how it happens that knowledge may be latent or dormant, and if not overpowered yet outwitted by passion. There is nothing in Aristotle of the sense of *sin*, for sin implies a personal God, as crime implies the laws of society.

Still the fact remains that the lower does triumph over the higher, the body over the soul, the selfish over the social, the animal over the divine. And just as the family guards against atomism and leads on to the *πόλις*, so *friendship* guards against individualism and prepares the way for perfect justice. Friendship introduces the man to another self, *ἑτερος αὐτός*, whom he loves unselfishly, and in whom he sees the extension and the counterpart of his own best self. The friendship of the good, which is the only true friendship, is thus a realized love of *τὸ καλόν* divested of the lower and selfish elements of gain or pleasure. We live in our own acts, and in friendship we live in one another's acts. We need friends not for gain, for the perfect life is complete in itself, but because goodness loves to see itself reflected, and even the divine life of philosophy is twice blest when the philosopher finds a true *σύνεργος*, and God loves the philosopher because in him He sees a dim and imperfect reflection of His own *θεωρία*.

IX.

SOME CURIOUS PARALLELS BETWEEN
GREEK AND CHINESE THOUGHT.

[A Paper read before the Aristotelian Society, April 29, 1889.¹]

THERE are at the present time three religions, if we are right in calling them religions (a question which we may postpone for the present), which have a legal standing in China. They are *Confucianism*, *Taoism*, and *Buddhism*. Of these, Buddhism has no claim to be indigenous, as it never found its way to China till after the Christian era. With regard to Taoism, we find ourselves at once in a difficulty; for Taoism, as it exists now, has little or no real affinity with the older Taoistic literature. Dr. Legge² speaks of it as "begotten by Buddhism out of the old superstitions of the country;" and in his article on Lao-Tze in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," he draws a sharp distinction between Taoism as a philosophy and

¹ This paper embodies the substance of a note on Chinese Philosophy prefixed by A. L. M. to H. A. Giles's *Chuang-Tzú*, Mystic, Moralist, and Philosopher.

² *Tao-té-Ching*, p. 4.

Taoism as a religion. Similarly, Mr. Giles¹ speaks of it as a hybrid superstition, a mixture of ancient nature-worship and Buddhistic ceremonial, with TAO as the style of the firm. Dr. Edkins, in his "Religion in China" (p. 58), says that the mass of the people believe in all three religions, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and explains the fact by saying that they are supplementary to each other. Confucianism being *moral*; Taoism, *materialistic*; and Buddhism, *metaphysical*; in criticism of which we may suggest that, if this were true, even if we could accept the cross division implied in his theory, they would be, not supplementary to each other, but mutually destructive.

It is, however, with Chinese thought, rather than with Chinese religion, that I am concerned; and here we are on a surer ground, for we may at once put aside Buddhism as an exotic, and Taoistic religion as being largely composed of foreign elements.

We are left, then, with Confucianism and Taoism, meaning by the latter term the philosophical system, not the popular religion. Both probably arose out of a religion of which we know nothing, except so far as we can piece it together from the rival systems which claimed to represent it. But it is a question whether either can rightly be called religious. And, in any case, the parallelism to

¹ Chuang-Tzū, pref. xv.

Greek thought is independent of any religious elements which were contained in them, or lay behind them.

The main characteristics of Confucianism and Taoism are clear enough, and are independent of the question as to the authenticity of certain documents on which Sinologues are divided.

Confucianism is primarily a system of conduct ; Taoism is primarily a mystical philosophy. And, whatever may have been the relation of their respective founders to one another, the documents which remain to us represent two rival systems. The one is moral, the other metaphysical. Confucianism is recognized by the state as orthodox ; Taoism is a heresy. Yet both were attempts to interpret and to rationalize the religion out of which both grew. Neither Lao-Tzū nor his younger contemporary, Confucius, professed to be founders of systems. They were rival interpreters, and the Confucianist interpretation received State sanction. Hence Confucianism has become "the religion of China *par excellence*." ¹ Mons. Edgar Quinet's account of it is worth quoting. He says—

"Rationalism is the religion of China ; positive faith the only heresy ; the strong-minded man the only pontiff. . . . Its principles are the equality of all its members, intellect is the sole ground of pre-eminence, personal merit the sole aristocracy. Everything there is exactly measured, cal-

¹ Legge, *Sacred Books*, III. pref. xiii.

culated, weighed, by the laws of human nature ; its one idol is good sense."

And he asks why it is that all this wisdom has produced only a sublime automaton ; and finds the answer in the fact that, according to Confucianism, "man is deprived of any ideal above himself."

"Chinese society," he says, "makes man the final end, and so humanity finds its goal in its starting-point. It is stifled within the limits of humanity. In this dwarf society, everything is deprived of its crown. Morality wants heroism ; royalty, its royal muse ; verse, poetry ; philosophy, metaphysic ; life, immortality ; because, at the summit of everything, there is no God."¹

Renan,² in the same way, speaks of Confucianism as "the least supernatural of all religions ;" and he adds, "hence its mediocrity." From the great Confucianist classics which remain to us, most of which are now accessible in the "Sacred Books of the East," we are able to judge of the truth of this. If Positivism is rightly described as "Catholicism *minus* Christianity," Confucianism may be called Positivism *minus* its universality. Confucianism has not even the "enthusiasm of humanity," like that which Positivism has caught from Christianity. It is rationalism pure and simple ; a system of conduct, hardly even a philosophy, summed up in rules regulating man's duty to his neighbour.

Of Taoism, the religion of Lao-Tzū, it is less

¹ Quinet, *La Genie des Religions*, pp. 224-225.

² Quoted by Lilly, *Ancient Religions*, p. 110.

easy to speak, because we have less trustworthy documents. If the "Tào-tê-Ching" is genuine, as Dr. Legge believes, it is the only work of Lao-Tzū which we have. If not, we know nothing of Lao-Tzū's teaching except through his followers. But, without deciding this question, its contrast with Confucianism is obvious. It is idealistic and mystical, it is metaphysical from first to last. It is contemptuous of Confucius and Confucianism. In its opposition to a mere practical system, a religion limited to the finite, Taoism must have appealed to those deeper instincts of human nature to which Buddhism appealed later on. Action, effort, benevolence, usefulness,—all these, in theory, have a place in Confucianism. But its last word is worldly wisdom. To the Taoist all this savours of "the rudiments of the world." Its "charity and duty," its "ceremonies and music," are the "Touch not, taste not, handle not," of an ephemeral state of being, and perish in the using. And the sage seeks for the Absolute, the Infinite, the Eternal. He would attain to Tao.

It would have seemed as if in these rival systems we should look in vain for parallelisms to Greek thought. Metaphysics and morals were never separated in the best days of Greek life, as we find them separated in Taoism and Confucianism. Socrates professed to deal with ethics, and put metaphysics aside; but the questions which he

raised in the moral region were metaphysical questions, and suggested by a metaphysical cause. In Plato, the moral life rests on a metaphysical basis; and in Aristotle, while a sharp dividing line exists between the sphere of the necessary and the sphere of the contingent, between θεωρητική on the one side and πρακτική and ποιητική on the other; yet, φρόνησις, or the philosophy of Life, is the handmaid of σοφία, the philosophy of Truth, and the moral life shades off into the life of philosophic contemplation. Yet, though in Greece of the time of Plato and Aristotle the metaphysical and moral are distinguished, but not yet separated, we are still able to find in it parallels to both Confucianism and Taoistic ways of thinking. Due allowance, however, has to be made for the fact that Confucianism and Taoism were developed by antagonism to one another, and therefore for a more complete parallel to Taoism we must go to Neo-Platonism, while the closer parallelism, if it exist, to Confucianism must be sought amongst the Sceptics who had abandoned metaphysics for empiricism and a merely practical system.

I propose, then, to point out the parallelism as it exists between Confucianism and Greek ethics, and between Taoism and Greek metaphysics, as we know them in the fourth and fifth centuries, B.C.

Confucius was born in 551 B.C., a hundred years earlier than Socrates. His character and the main facts of his life and doctrine are as matter-of-fact as his system. There is nothing ascetic or spiritual in his teaching. He never, so far as we know, dealt with higher and deeper questions, such as the existence of God, the soul, immortality. He was content to ask, How shall I do my duty to my neighbour? How shall I live as a good citizen? This is exactly the problem in Aristotle's Ethics; and, if we remember that, whatever may have been Aristotle's theological or metaphysical basis, he steadily keeps it apart from his moral philosophy proper, we shall feel that he is at least so far on common ground with Confucianism.

Now, the Aristotelian answer to the moral question is, as every one knows, summed up in the doctrine of the Mean, a doctrine which we can trace growing up in Socrates and taking definite shape in Plato. The virtuous life is the rational life, that is the harmonious life, the life of balance and equipoise. The virtuous man is at peace with himself; the vicious man's soul is in a state of *στάσις*. There is a one-sidedness (*μονοκωλία*) in which culture is neglected in the interests of bodily training, and a one-sidedness in which bodily training is forgotten through exclusive devotion to culture. The metal (to use another metaphor from Plato's "Republic") may be brittle from

want of tempering, or it may lose its strength by being tempered over-much. So in regard to pleasures, the true life implies the *μετρητικὴ τέχνη*, the art of measurement, the power of striking the balance, as it were, so as to secure the normal development of nature; or, as we have it in terms more closely approximating to those of Aristotle, it is a *μετριότης*, a mean state secured by imposing the law of reason on the lawlessness of the passions, the indeterminate element in human nature. The vicious go beyond or fall short of this state of equipoise, and so their nature is destroyed in various degrees and different ways.

The Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean is the final statement of this view. The attempts which have been made to connect it with *ΜΗΔΕΝ ΑΓΑΝ* and the praise of moderation and *μέτρω ἔργα* in Hesiod are often thoroughly misleading; for the value of the Aristotelian doctrine is not its negative teaching as to the avoiding of extremes, which would give us no standard, and leave us with a glorification of the commonplace; its real value is its positive teaching, that virtue is the realizing of a law, the law of one's being, which, though it varies in one as compared with others, is absolute for the individual. It is the preservation of that harmony which vice destroys, the state of perfect balance which may be lost in either of two opposite ways. Reason (*λόγος*), which never quite

lost for a Greek its earlier meaning of a law of proportion, was the principle which secured this order. Virtue was the life *κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον*, or, rather, the life *μετὰ λόγον*, and vice the lawless and irrational life. If it is not clear in Aristotle whether this *λόγος* is external or immanent, this is only the difficulty which appeared "writ large" in his account of the world where the reign of law prevails. There, too, he cannot settle the question whether it exists like a general commanding an army, or as an immanent principle of order in the army itself. It only needed that this should be expressed in Stoic language, as *κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν*, to arrive at the conclusion, already implicit in Aristotle, that the man who is in harmony with himself is *ipso facto* in harmony with the world, for it is the same *λόγος*, or balancing principle, which in nature shows itself as law, and in man as rationality.

Now, it is a remarkable thing that one of the chief Confucianist writings, which deals with the theory of morals, should have for its title "The Doctrine of the Mean." This treatise (known as *Chung Yung*) is a part of the "Li-Ki," or "Book of Rites," one of the five great canonical works of Confucianism. In 1861 it was translated by Dr. Legge, with the title "The Doctrine of the Mean." When in 1885 he retranslated it for the "Sacred Books of the East" (vols. xxvii. xxviii.),

he changed the title to "The State of Equilibrium and Harmony." The meaning of these terms, which are united in the title, we find explained in the opening section. The treatise is the work of Tzse-zse, the grandson of Confucius, and a contemporary of Socrates.

It will be perhaps better to give some extracts from this treatise, and then to point out the parallelism between it and the Aristotelian philosophy. There is a good deal in the treatise which is unintelligible, and a considerable portion, including some eleven sections (§§ 48-59), which seems to have been interpolated from a treatise on "Filial Piety." The actual description of the perfect character, though in some points it is curiously like the Greek ideal, is necessarily moulded by the circumstances of Chinese life, and the remains of ancestor worship still show themselves, and perhaps explain the atmosphere of reverence which we look for in vain in Aristotle. The doctrine of the Mean is, however, the main point of likeness. I quote Dr. Legge's latest translation, with a few verbal alterations.

§ 1. "What Heaven has conferred is called *the Nature*. An accordance with this nature is called *the Path* [of Duty]. The regulation of this path is called [the System of] Instruction.

§ 2. "The path must not be left for an instant ; if it could be left, it would not be the path."

Here we have already a theory of Virtue as $\tau\acute{o}$

κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, the realizing the law of one's being. This is TAO, the path, and it is by education that life must be regulated and restrained to the Path.

§ 5. "When there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, we call it the state of *Equilibrium*. When those feelings have been stirred, and all in their due measure and degree, we call it the state of *Harmony*. This Equilibrium is the source of all action, and this Harmony the universal Path.

§ 6. "Let the states of Equilibrium and Harmony exist in perfection, and heaven and earth would be in their due order, and all things would flourish.

§ 7. "The perfect man exhibits this state of equilibrium and harmony, inferior men the opposite of this. The perfect man does so because he is perfect, the inferior men fail to do so because they are inferior.

§ 8. "The master said, 'Perfect is the state of equilibrium and harmony! Few have they ever been who could attain to it.'

§ 9. "The master said, 'I know how it is that the Path is not walked in. The cunning go beyond it, and the stupid fall short of it. The worthy (? the great) go beyond it, the unworthy do not come up to it. There is nobody but eats and drinks, but they are few who can distinguish flavours.'"
(Cf. διδκρισις χυμῶν.)

These first sections are, as it were, the text of the treatise, and the commentary upon them is often very obscure. Still some points suggest a curious parallel to the Greek view of the virtuous or rational life being, in contrast with vicious lives, a mean, while in itself it realizes the idea of human nature.

The title of Tze-tzse's treatise really consists of

two substantives, the one signifying Equilibrium, the other Harmony, and the two ideas are intended to be combined, which in English can only be done by making the one adjectival. We must speak of a state of equilibrated harmony, or harmonious equilibration, and neither phrase is unobjectionable. The meaning, however, is clear. The condition of the perfect man combines movement and rest. Mere ἀπαθεία would give equilibrium without harmony; the πάθη unregulated would be the destruction of harmony. The perfect man, who is said to "embody the Mean" (§ 19), is the only being in whom nature realizes its τέλος.

"The perfecting of nature is characteristic of heaven," we are told. "To attain to that perfection belongs to man. He who possesses that perfection hits what is right without an effort, and apprehends it without any exercise of thought; he is the sage (for, as with Aristotle, ὁ σπουδαῖος is ὁ φρόνιμος, so with the Confucianist). The sage naturally and easily embodies the right way. He who attains to perfection is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast" (§ 19).

And this τελειότης puts the perfect man in a state of harmony, not only with himself, but with all that is. The well-being which Aristotle speaks of as εὐδαιμονία is not something added to or won by his perfectness. The perfection is εὐδαιμονία.

"It is only he of all under heaven who is entirely perfect," we are told, "that can give his full development to his nature. Able to give its full development to his own nature, he can also give the same to the nature of other men. Able

to give its full development to the nature of other men, he can also give the same to the natures of all that is. . . . Thus he forms a ternion with heaven and earth" (§ 22).

"Perfection," we are told, "is seen in self-completion, and the path is self-directed" (§ 25). But selfishness is as carefully excluded as in Aristotle. For the development of the true self implies the completing, not the destruction, of other selves. "He who is perfect does not only complete himself; his perfection enables him to complete all other beings also" (§ 28). His self-completion shows his moral goodness, the completion of others his wisdom. And thus his nature is truly developed, both in itself and in its relation to others.

All this, however, is more closely connected with the idea of balance and harmony than in Aristotle. It is indeed like a fusion of the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean with the Platonic view of virtue as a harmony, or rather, perhaps, it is the Aristotelian doctrine with the implicit idea of harmony brought out into prominence. Like Aristotle, Tzsc-zse sees the difficulty of hitting the Mean, and uses the same metaphor, "In archery we see something like the way of the perfect man. When the archer misses the centre of the target he turns round and seeks for the cause of failure in himself" (§ 40). Aristotle's illustrations are well known, *οἷον τόξωται σκόπον ἔχοντες*, etc. (I. ii. 2),

ῥᾷδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τῶν σκόπου, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν (II. vi. 14). But the perfect man becomes a law to himself, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον, because he embodies the principle of harmony and equilibrium. What he does he does because he is perfect, τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. Hence he is not only a law unto himself (οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ), he becomes a standard for others. The movements of the perfect man mark out for ages the true path for all, his actions are a law for others, his words the pattern for others. Those who are far from him look longingly for him, and those who are near are never weary of him (§ 50).

The interesting thing is that, while we can hardly imagine two types of life more unlike than that of the Greek and the Chinaman, the theory of virtue as the life of equilibrium secured by reason is the same in both. The life of the Chinaman is stilted, artificial, formal, controlled by what looks like a traditional system of positive law, endless, and to us, meaningless conventionalisms of ritual and behaviour, of ceremonies and music; the life of the Greek is a life of free and happy, almost instinctive, kinship with nature; the doctrine of virtue as the harmony of nature, that which puts man in tune, as it were, with the external world and his fellow-man—the idea of right as the morally beautiful—all this seems to be quite natural to the Greek. Yet, behind all

the positive laws and the conventionalities of Confucianism, we find the same idea of reason as the great balancing power of life, and the doctrine of the Mean the centre of its moral theory.

There was a time when historians of Greek philosophy used to point out what were considered to be the characteristics of Greek thought, and then to put down to "Oriental influence" anything which did not at once agree with these characteristics. How and through what channels this "Oriental influence" was exercised, it was never easy to determine, nor was it always thought worthy of much discussion. In recent times, however, a greater knowledge of Eastern systems has familiarized us with much which, on the same principle, ought to be attributed to "Greek influence." And the result has been that we have learned to put aside theories of derivation, and to content ourselves with tracing the evolution of reason and of rational problems, and to expect parallelisms even where the circumstances are widely different.

We used to be told that the Greek mind, in its speculation and its art, was characterized by its love of order, harmony, and symmetry, in contrast with the monstrous creations of the Oriental imagination, and the "colossal ugliness of the Pyramids;" and it was said with reason that the

Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean was the ripe fruit of the practical inquiries of the Greeks, and was the ethical counterpart of their artistic development. Yet we find the doctrine of the Mean in an undisputed Confucianist writing of the time of Socrates, and no one will seriously suggest that Aristotle had private access to the Li-Ki.

I turn now to that other system of Chinese thought which represents its *metaphysical*, as Confucianism represents its *moral*, conclusions. Here again we must remind ourselves that—whatever may have been the case in the sixth century B.C.—in the times of Chuang-Tzŭ and Tzse-zse metaphysics and morals had parted into divergent channels; metaphysics had become mystical, and morals a merely practical and utilitarian system, which had been further paralyzed by being enforced by the state and based almost exclusively on authority. We must further remind ourselves that neither Taoism nor Confucianism claimed to be new, but were rival interpretations of that which lay behind both—the *doctrine of Tao*. We have seen how Confucianism gave a practical interpretation of the doctrine. The life of practical morality, that is Tao, "the Way." He who realizes the state of equilibrium and harmony walks in "the Way," reaches the perfection which Heaven willed, develops his nature according to

its own law, and so finds himself in accord with the universe, with men, and with himself. This practical system was that which came to be considered orthodox, and the deeper and more speculative interpretation of Tao came to be looked upon as heresy, but as a heresy which was tolerated, not persecuted.

It is obvious to any student of the history of thought that when the practical and speculative elements in human nature are thus separated the divergence will rapidly increase. Metaphysics divorced from morals will become, as it always does, more and more mystical, and even defiantly antinomian; while morals deprived of its metaphysical or theological basis become a stereotyped system of rules of conduct, as powerless to furnish a motive for conduct as it is to stimulate moral progress.

I propose to take the philosophy of Chuang-Tzŭ as an undoubted representation of Taoism, though of course representing a later development of the doctrine. What Lao-Tzŭ, the founder of Taoism, taught it is impossible to say, while the authenticity of the "T'ao-T'ê-Ching" is still under dispute. But the philosophy of Chuang-Tzŭ, who lived some two centuries after Lao-Tzŭ, and was probably a contemporary of Mencius, is now thrown open to ordinary people by Mr. Giles' translation. It is a *philosophy*, and not in any sense a *religion*.

It has no right to be considered a Sacred Book, unless we are prepared to number Aristotle's metaphysics among the Sacred Books of Greece. Indeed, till the middle of the eighth century of our era (742 A.D.) it was not so classed.

Chuang-Tzū's philosophy is a protest against Confucianism, and an attempt to restore the idealism of Lao-Tzū. Confucius sums up everything in duty to one's neighbour, ignoring the supernatural and the invisible; Chuang-Tzū protests against this mere worldly wisdom, and, under cover of the name of Lao-Tzū, develops a pure mysticism.

The main positions of Chuang-Tzū's philosophical system are summed up in the first seven chapters, the rest of the volume being an expansion and a commentary.

Chuang-Tzū's first chapter is mainly critical and destructive, pointing out the worthlessness of ordinary judgments, and the unreality of sense knowledge. The gigantic Rukh, at the height of 90,000 *li*, is a mere mote in the sunbeam. For size is relative. The cicada, which can just fly from tree to tree, laughs with the dove at the Rukh's high flight. For space also is relative. Compared with the mushroom of a day, P'eng-Tsu is as old as Methuselah; but what is his age to that of the fabled tree, whose spring and autumn make up

16,000 years? Time, then, is relative, too. And though men wonder at him who could "ride upon the wind and travel for many days," he is but a child to one who "roams through the realms of For-Ever."

This doctrine of "relativity," which is a commonplace in Greek as it is in modern philosophy, is made the basis, both in ancient and modern times, of two opposite conclusions. Either it is argued that all sense knowledge is relative, and sense is the only organ of knowledge, therefore real knowledge is impossible; or else the relativity of sense knowledge leads men to draw a sharp contrast between sense and reason, and to turn away from the outward in order to listen to the inward voice. The one alternative is scepticism, the other idealism, and, in its later developments, mysticism. The Greek thought the earliest representatives of the former are the Sophists, of the latter Heracleitus.

There is no doubt to which side of the antithesis Chuang-Tzŭ belongs. His exposure of false and superficial thinking looks at first like the destruction of knowledge. Even Socrates was called a Sophist because of his destructive criticism and his restless challenging of popular views. But Chuang-Tzŭ has nothing of the sceptic in him. He is an idealist and a mystic, with all the idealist's hatred of a utilitarian system, and the mystic's contempt for a life of mere external activity, even

perhaps with something of the religious man's fear and distrust of worldliness. "The perfect man ignores *self*; the divine man ignores *action*; the true sage ignores *reputation*" (p. 5). The Emperor Yao would have abdicated in favour of a hermit, but the hermit replies that "reputation is but the shadow of reality," and will not exchange the real for the seeming. But greater than Yao and the hermit is the divine being who dwells in the mysterious mountain in a state of pure, passionless inaction.

For the sage, then, life means death to all that men think life, the life of *seeming* or reputation, of *doing* or action, of *being* or individual self-hood. This leads on to the "budget of paradoxes" in Chap. II. As in the moral and active region we escape from the world and self, and are able to reverse and look down upon the world's judgments, so in the speculative region we get behind and beyond the contradictions of ordinary thinking, and of speech which stereotypes abstractions. The sage knows nothing of the distinction between subjective and objective. It exists only *ex analogia hominis*. "From the standpoint of Tao" all things are one. People "guided by the criteria of their own mind," see only the contradiction, the manifoldness, the difference; the sage sees the many disappearing in the One, in which subjective and objective, positive and negative, here and

there, somewhere and nowhere, meet and blend. For him, "a beam and a pillar are identical. So are ugliness and beauty, greatness, wickedness, perverseness, and strangeness. Separation is the same as construction: construction is the same as destruction" (pp. 19, 20). The sage "blends everything into one harmonious whole, rejecting the comparison of this and that. Rank and precedence, which the vulgar prize, the sage stolidly ignores. The universe itself may pass away, but he will flourish still" (p. 29). "Were the ocean itself scorched up, he would not feel hot. Were the milky way frozen hard he would not feel cold. Were the mountains to be riven with thunder, and the great deep to be thrown up by storm, he would not tremble" (pp. 27, 28).

"Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ."

He is "embraced in the obliterating unity of God," and passing into the realm of the Infinite finds rest therein (p. 31).

It is impossible in reading this chapter on "The Identity of Contraries" not to be reminded of the greatest of the pre-Socratic thinkers, in some ways the greatest of Greek metaphysicians, Heraclitus. The disparagement of sense knowledge, and the contempt for common views is indeed equally marked in Eleaticism, and there is much in

Chuang-Tzŭ which recalls Parmenides,¹ so far as the contrast between the way of truth and the way of error, the true belief in the One and the popular belief in the Many, is concerned. But no one can read Chuang-Tzŭ without feeling that, with him, the "One" is not the dead Unit of Eleaticism, which resulted from the thinking away of differences, but the living Unity of Heracleitus, in which contraries co-exist. Heracleitus, indeed, seems to have been a man after Chuang-Tzŭ's own heart, not only in his obscurity, which won for him the title of ὁ σκοτεινός, but in his indifference to worldly position, shown in the fact that, like the Emperor Yao, he abdicated in his brother's favour (*Diog. Laert.* ix. 1), and in his supercilious disregard for the learned like Hesiod and Pythagoras and Xenophanes and Hecataeus,² no less than for the common people³ of his day.

"Listen," says Heracleitus, "not to me, but to reason, and confess the true wisdom that 'All things are ONE.'"⁴ "All is One, the divided and the undivided, the begotten and the unbegotten, the mortal and the immortal, reason and eternity, father and son, God and justice."⁵ "Cold is hot,

¹ See the fragments in Ritter and Preller's *Hist. Phil. Græc.*, §§ 93 and 94, A. B. Seventh edition.

² *Heracl. Eph. Rell.*, xvi., ed. Bywater.

³ ὁ χλοοίδωρος Ἡράκλειτος. *Timon ap. Diog. Laert.*, ix. 1.

⁴ Οὐκ ἐμεῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκουσάντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστὶ ἐν πάντα εἶναι. *Heracl. Eph. Rell.*, i.

⁵ *Hippolytus Ref. haer.*, ix. 9.

heat is cold, that which is moist is parched, that which is dried up is wet."¹ "Good and evil are the same."² "Gods are mortal, men immortal: our life is their death, our death their life,"³ "Upward and downward are the same."⁴ "The beginning and the end are one."⁵ "Life and death, sleeping and waking, youth and age are identical."⁶

This is what reason tells the philosopher. "All is ONE." The world is a unity of opposing forces (*παλιντροπος ἁρμονίη κόσμου ὅκωσπερ λύρας καὶ τούτου*).⁷ "Join together whole and not whole, agreeing and different, harmonious and discordant. Out of all comes one: out of one all."⁸ "God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, repletion-want."⁹ The very rhythm of nature is strife. War, which men hate and the poets would banish, "is the father and lord of all."¹⁰ But "men are without understanding, they hear and hear not,"¹¹ or "they hear and understand not."¹² For they trust to their senses, which are "false witnesses."¹³ They see the contradictions, but know not that "the different is at unity with itself."¹⁴ They cannot see the "hidden harmony, which is greater

¹ Heracl. Eph. Rell., xxxix.² *Ibid.*, lxvii.³ *Ibid.*, lxxviii.⁴ *Ibid.*, xxxvi.⁵ *Ibid.*, v.⁶ *Ibid.*, lxix.⁷ *Ibid.*, xlv.⁸ *Ibid.*, xlv.⁹ *Ibid.*, iv.⁹ *Ibid.*, lvii.⁶ *Ibid.*, lxx.⁶ *Ibid.*, lix.¹¹ *Ibid.*, iii.¹⁴ *Ibid.*, xlv.

than the harmony which is seen."¹ For they live in the external, the commonplace, the relative, and never rise above the life of the senses. "The sow loves the mire."² "The ass prefers fodder to gold."³ And men love their "private conceits" instead of clinging to the universal reason which orders all things,⁴ and which even the sun obeys."⁵

Of the fragments which remain to us of Heraclitus, the greater number belong to the region of logic and metaphysics, while Chuang-Tzŭ, in his opposition to Confucianism, devotes much space to the more practical side of the question. He not only ridicules those who trust their senses, or measure by utilitarian standards, or judge by the outward appearance;—he teaches them how to pass from the seeming to the true. The wonderful carver, who could cut where the natural joints are,⁶ is one who sees not with the eye of sense, but with his mind. When he is in doubt he "falls back upon eternal principles;" for he is "devoted to TAO" (chap. iii.). There is something of humour, as well as much of truth, in the rebuke which Confucius, speaking *pro hac vice* as a disciple of Lao-Tzŭ, administers to his self-

¹ Heracl. Eph. Rell., xlvii.

² *Ibid.*, liv., and notes.

³ *Ibid.*, li.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xci., xix.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xxix.

⁶ Cf. Plat. Phaedr., 265, κατ' ἄρθρα ἧ πέφυκεν καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγύναι μέρος μὴδὲν κακοῦ μαγεύου τροφῆ χρώμενος.

confident follower who wanted to "be of use." "Cultivate *fasting* ;—not bodily fasting, but the fasting of the heart." TAO can only abide in the life which has got rid of self. So the Duke of Shê is reminded that there is something higher than duty,¹ viz. *destiny*—the state, that is, in which conscious obedience has given way to that which is instinctive and automatic. The parable of the trees (pp. 50-53), with its result in the survival of the good-for-nothing, is again a reversal of popular outside judgments. For as the first part of the chapter had taught the uselessness of trying to be useful, so the last part teaches the usefulness of being useless. And the same thought is carried on in the next chapter, which deals with the reversal of common opinion as to persons. Its motto is : Judge not by the appearance. Virtue must prevail and outward form be forgotten. The loathsome leper Ai T'ai To is made Prime Minister by the wise Duke Ai. The mutilated criminal is judged by Lao-Tzû to be a greater man than Confucius. For the criminal is mutilated in body by man, while Confucius, though men know it not, by the judgment of God is *πεπηρωμένος πρὸς ἀρετήν*.

This protest of Chuang-Tzû against externality, and judging only by the outward appearance, is

¹ Cf. Herbert Spencer's well-known paradox, "The sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases" (*Data of Ethics*, p. 127).

the first step in the protest against the Confucianist. The sage, as conceived by the Taoist, cannot be content with the visible and the world as it is known to the senses. He seeks for the Absolute, the Infinite, the Eternal. He seeks to attain to TAO.

It is here that we reach (in chaps. vi., vii.) what properly constitutes the *mysticism* of Chuang-Tzū. Heraclitus is not a mystic, though he is the founder of a long line, which through Plato, and Dionysius the Areopagite (so-called), and John the Scot in the ninth century, and Meister Eckhart in the thirteenth, and Jacob Böhme in the sixteenth, reaches down to Hegel. Heraclitus despises the world and shuns it; but he has not yet made flight from the world a dogma. Even Plato, when in a well-known passage in the Theaetetus,¹ he counsels flight from the present state of things, explains that he means only "flee from evil and become like God." Still less has Heraclitus got so far as to aim at self-absorption in God. In Greek thought the attempt to get rid of consciousness, and to become the unconscious vehicle of a higher illumination, is unknown till the time of Philo. Yet this is the teaching of Chuang-Tzū. "The true sage takes his refuge in God, and learns

¹ Theaet., 176, A. διδὼ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρή ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὅ τι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὕσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.

that there is no distinction between subject and object. This is the very axis of TAO" (p. 18). Abstraction from self, then, is the road which leads to TAO (chap. vi.). The pure of old did not love life and hate death. They were content to be passive vehicles of TAO. They had reached the state of sublime indifference, they had become "oblivious of their own existence." Everything in them was spontaneous; nothing the result of effort. "They made no plans; therefore failing, they had no cause for regret; succeeding, no cause for congratulation" (p. 69). "They cheerfully played their allotted parts, waiting patiently for the end. They were free, for they were in perfect harmony with creation" (p. 71). For them One and not One are One; God and Man. For they had attained to TAO, and TAO is greater than God. "Before heaven and earth were, TAO was. It has existed without change from all time. Spiritual beings draw their spirituality therefrom; while the universe became what we see it now. To TAO the zenith is not high, nor the nadir low; no point of time is long ago, nor by lapse of ages has it grown old" (p. 76). The great legislators obtained TAO, and laid down eternal principles. The sun and moon, and the Great Bear are kept in their courses by TAO.

"Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;
And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong."

He who would attain to TAO must get rid of the thought of "charity and duty," of "music and ceremonies," of "body and mind." The flowers and the birds do not toil, they simply live. That is TAO. And for man a state of indifference and calm, the *ἀταραξία* not of the sceptic but of the mystic, a passive reflecting of the Eternal, is the ideal end. "The perfect man employs his mind as a mirror. It grasps nothing, it refuses nothing. It receives but does not keep. And thus he can triumph over matter without injury to himself" (see p. 98).

It would of course be presumption to attempt to assign a meaning to TAO, and still more to discover an equivalent in Western thought. But it may be lawful to say that Heracleitus often speaks of Λόγος as Chuang-Tzŭ speaks of TAO. It is Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*), or Fate (*εἰμαρμένη*), or Mind (*γνώμη*), or Justice (*δική*). In nature it appears as balance and equipoise; in the state as Law; in man as the universal Reason, which is *in* him but not *of* him. Sometimes it is identified with the mysterious name of Zeus, which may not be uttered;¹ sometimes like the *Ἀνάγκη* of the Greek poets, it is supreme over gods and men. If it is hard to say what is the relation of TAO to God, it is not less hard to define the relation of Λόγος to Zeus. To speak of Chuang-Tzŭ and Heracleitus

¹ Heracl. Eph. Rell., lxxv.

as pantheists is only to say that, so far as we can translate their language into ours, that name seems less inappropriate than Theist or Deist. But it is doubtful whether the distinction between Pantheism and Theism would have been intelligible to either philosopher, and certain that, if they could have understood it, they would have denied to it reality. Both held the immanence of the Eternal Principle in all that is. Both taught that the soul is an emanation from the Divine, and both, though in very different degrees, seem to teach that a life is perfect in proportion as it becomes one with that from which it came, and loses what is individual in it.

Of Heracleitus' views on ethics we know practically nothing except what we may infer from his contempt for practical life and practical politicians. In Aristotle, however, where, as we have seen, ethics and metaphysics, though distinguished are not separated, we get a new parallel to the teaching of Chuang-Tzū. While Aristotle is dealing with the problems of Ethics—What is *εὐδαιμονία*? What is *ἀρετή*? What is the voluntary? What is free choice?—he deliberately puts metaphysical and theological questions on one side, but in the progress of his investigation, as he follows his usual order from the material, formless, unreasonable, unstable, to that which is immaterial, pure form, pure reason, and eternal, he is led to determine the

relation of the moral and practical life to *θεωρία*. And the result, as every one knows, is that the practical life of morality is declared to be the second best; it is the human life, while *θεωρία* is divine. And Aristotle adds, "it is not true that man ought to live the human life, rather he ought to live the life which is superhuman, *κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων*," the divine life, which in a certain sense is his own, because *νοῦς*, the divine element which is in him but not of him, is his true self. Aristotle has not further developed his view of *θεωρία*, and consequently the great mediæval controversy as to whether he was a theist or a pantheist is incapable of a final solution. Few, however, would refuse to accept the interpretation of Averroes as harmonizing better the statements of Aristotle than the contradictory view of St. Thomas. And if this Averroistic view is true, or at least may be taken as a logical development of Aristotle's principles, we get to a conclusion curiously like that of Chuang-Tzū.

Chuang-Tzū, of course, by reason of his antagonism to Confucianism, speaks more slightly of morality than Aristotle does, yet Aristotle consistently treats man as an inferior part of creation. If the *σόφρος* is infinitely greater than man, being not only eternal while man lives in time, but ordered by law while human life admits the element of uncertainty, the study of the eternal

must be higher than anything which has man for its object. Some of Chuang-Tzū's utterances go much further than this, and indeed justify the charge of antinomianism so often brought against mystics. The statement that "good and evil are the same," may embody a deep truth for the sage, but "take no heed of time, nor of right and wrong" (p. 31), is, to say the least, dangerous teaching for the masses. Elsewhere, however, Chuang-Tzū recognizes morality, but of course subordinates it to metaphysics. "What," he asks, "is Tao? There is the Tao of God and the Tao of man. Inaction and compliance (? self-surrender) make the Tao of God; and action and entanglement the Tao of man. The Tao of God is fundamental (essential?); the Tao of man is accidental. Great is the difference which separates them" (p. 134). "Sovereignty begins in Virtue and ends in God. Therefore it is divine" (p. 135). Thus virtue is the connecting link between God and man, while Tao spreads throughout all creation (p. 136). It is something higher than Charity, for it leads on to Inaction. "Charity and duty to one's neighbour are as resting-places established by wise rulers of old. You may stop there one night, but not for long. The perfect men of old took their road through charity, stopping a night with care to their neighbour, on their way to ramble in transcendental space" (p. 183). The destruction of selfishness is

a step towards the destruction of self. And "He who is unconscious" of his own personality, combines in himself the human and the divine (p. 145). "The man of perfect virtue," unlike the perfect man of Confucian morals, "recognizes no right nor wrong, nor good, nor bad," but the divine man rides upon the glory of the sky where his form can no longer be discerned. This is called absorption into light. He fulfils his destiny. He acts in accordance with his nature. He is at one with God and man" (p. 151). His rest is like the rest of God, an *ἐνεργία ἀκινήτας*: "semper agens, semper quietus," as St. Augustine has it. "The TAO of God operates ceaselessly." So does the Tao of the sage. He acts, but acts instinctively, with no sense of effort and no consciousness of self. He is in accord with man, and this is human happiness; he is in accord with God, and this is the happiness of God (p. 159). Finally the contrast between the human and the divine life is brought out in a conversation between the sage and the Emperor Yao, who boasts of his goodness and corporal works of mercy (p. 165). All that, the philosopher says, is well, but there is something higher. "Be passive like the virtue of God. The sun and the moon shines; the four seasons revolve; day and night alternate; clouds come and rain falls. Alas!" cried Yao, "what a mistake have I been making. You are in accord with God; I am

in accord with man." In a supposed conversation between Lao-Tzū and Confucius this is made the difference between them.¹

This idea of absorption in God, which Chuang-Tzū reached, belongs to a post-Aristotelian age. But we can see the preparation for it in the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical, and the subordination of morality to *θεωρία*. If we could imagine the practical part of Aristotle's ethics separated from its connection with *θεωρία*, as in later days his logic was divorced from his metaphysics, we can understand how rapidly it would have degenerated into a mere eudæmonism, while the metaphysics divorced from the ethics would naturally and perhaps necessarily have developed on Neo-Platonic lines into a pure mysticism.

The conclusions which I draw from these parallels are, I think, not without bearing on modern questions.

1. Ever since the days of St. Clement of Alexandria, there has been a tendency to explain parallelisms of thought by the assumption that one philosophy had borrowed from the other. The early Christians on finding fragments of truth in heathen philosophy, jumped to the conclusion that the Greeks had stolen from the barbarians, *i.e.* the Jews. Numenius had already suggested that Plato was a Greek Moses, *Μωϋσῆς ἁγνιστὸν*,² and

¹ See Chuang-Tzū, p. 166.

² *ap. Clem. Alex. Strom.* i. xxiv. 150.

St. Clement, with all his liberal recognition of truth in Greek philosophy, cannot get beyond the idea that it is borrowed or stolen wisdom. One might have supposed that we should have outgrown this. But this is only partly true. Even in our own days, the attempt has been made (by Gladisch and Röth) to find an Oriental origin for Greek philosophy. There are still to be found people who think that Christianity borrowed from Buddhism, while some suppose that the debt was on the other side. People similarly suppose that the Sûfis of Islam must have come under Buddhist influence. There have been endless attempts to show that the doctrine of the Trinity is, or is not, to be found in Taoism, in Hinduism, and elsewhere; the underlying assumption being that, if it is, it is a borrowed doctrine. In the same way "people think," as Hegel says, "that by pronouncing a doctrine to be Neo-Platonic, they have *ipso facto* banished it from Christianity."¹ But it is wildly improbable that Aristotle should have borrowed his doctrine of the Mean from the grandson of Confucius, or that Chuang-Tzū should have had any knowledge of the philosophy of Heraclitus, or that the Taoistic view of the human life of morality and the divine life of the contemplation of the Eternal should have influenced Aristotle's view of the relation of the practical to the speculative life.

¹ Phil. of Arist., p. 343, Eng. Tr.

It remains, then, that we frankly recognize the truth, that the development of the reason, and the problems which successively present themselves for solution, follow certain laws, which are only slightly modified by the circumstances of the various countries and civilizations. Nothing can well be more unlike than life in China and in Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., yet we find reason dealing with the same problems, and following the same laws of evolution in its attempted solutions.

2. The other conclusion which seems to me to follow from the comparison I have drawn between Greek and Chinese thought, is that the attempt to separate the practical from the speculative, to banish metaphysics and limit man to what he can touch and taste and handle, results not in the paralysis of the speculative reason, for reason will speculate in defiance of such attempted limitations, but in the paralysis of the system which professes itself independent of metaphysics and theology. When such a separation exists, reason will sooner take refuge in a dreary philosophy of inaction than acquiesce in a mere system of conduct which is too stagnant to give the stimulus necessary for producing the action which it enjoins.

NOTE.

ON THE RELATION OF TAOISM TO CONFUCIANISM.

It would be interesting to know whether in the undisputed utterances of Lao-Tzŭ (*i.e.* putting on one side the "T'ao-Tê-Ching"), Quietism and the glorification of Inaction are as prominent as they are in Chuang-Tzŭ. One would be prepared *a priori* to find that they are not. Lao-Tzŭ was born at the end of the seventh century B.C., and was, therefore, some fifty years older than Confucius, with whom, in 517 B.C., he is said to have had an interview.¹ By the time of Chuang-Tzŭ, who was possibly contemporary with Mencius, and therefore some two or three centuries after Lao-Tzŭ, Confucianism had become to some extent the established religion of China, and Taoism, like Republicanism in the days of the Roman Empire, became a mere *opposition de salon*. Under such circumstances any elements of mysticism latent in Lao-Tzŭ's system would develop rapidly. And the antagonism between the representatives of Lao-Tzŭ and Confucius would proportionately increase. But philosophy does not become mystical and take refuge in flight until it abandons all hope of converting the world. When effort is useless, the

¹ Chuang-Tzŭ, ch. xiv. p. 182-189.

mind idealizes Inaction, and seeks a metaphysical basis for it. For mysticism and scepticism flourish in the same atmosphere though in different soils, both, though in different ways, implying the abandonment of the rational problem. The sceptic, the agnostic or positivist of to-day, declares it insoluble, and settles down content to take things as they are; the mystic retires into himself, and dreams of a state of being which is the obverse of the world of fact.

The triumph of Confucianism in the centuries which intervened between Lao-Tzū and Chuang-Tzū would account for the antagonism between Taoism and Confucianism as we find it. But it fails to account for the way in which Confucius is sometimes represented as playing into the hands of Taoism. On p. 85 f. n. the translator explains it as a literary *coup de main*. Dr. Chalmers, quoted by Dr. Legge,¹ says that both Chuang-Tzū and Lieh-Tzū introduced Confucius into their writings "as the lords of the Philistines did the captive Samson on their festive occasions, 'to make sport for them.'" But there is not a hint of this given in the text, though throughout one long chapter (chap. iv.) we find Confucius giving a Taoist refutation of Confucianist doctrines when defended by his own pupil Yen Hui. It might seem like an attempt to draw a distinction between Confucius

¹ Encycl. Met., Art. "Lao-Tzū."

and Confucianism, though elsewhere Confucius is ridiculed as wanting in sense.

May not the explanation be as follows?—

(i.) Lao-Tzŭ and Confucius were probably much nearer to one another philosophically than the Taoism of Chuang-Tzŭ and the Confucianism of Mencius. The passages in which Confucius talks Taoism would, on this hypothesis, represent a traditional survival of their real relations to one another. The episode of Confucius' visit to Lao-Tzŭ "to ask about the TAO," would, whether it records a fact or not, tend in the same direction.

(ii.) From the first we may assume that the one took an ideal, the other a practical and utilitarian view of TAO "the Way"; Confucius finding it in social duties and the work of practical life, Lao-Tzŭ in the hidden and the *inward*, the "interior life," as Christian mystics would call it. Thus the historian Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien,¹ says, "Lao-Tzŭ cultivated the TAO and virtue, his chief aim in his studies being how to keep himself concealed and unknown." Seeing the decay of the dynasty he withdrew himself out of sight, and no one knows where he died.

(iii.) The divergence between the two views, the ideal and the actual, the mystical and the practical, would increase with time, each intensifying the other by opposition and reaction, until the practical

¹ Quoted by Dr. Legge, *loc. cit.*

won its way to security, and the mystical got left out in the cold, perhaps persecuted, certainly suspected and treated as heterodox, and naturally retaliating by scornful criticism of the dominant view. When this stage is reached, Mencius regards Lao-Tzū as a heresiarch, while Chuang-Tzū often treats Confucius with contempt and ridicule. For "the Way that is walked upon is not the Way," and "the TAO which shines forth is not TAO" (p. 25). But Confucianism being "established," the Taoists are now "dissenters," and not being strong enough to disestablish Confucianism become more and more mystical, and content themselves with a policy of protest.

If there is little direct evidence for this theory as to the relations of Taoism and Confucianism, there is a curious parallel in Western thought. When Plato was known only in a neo-Platonic disguise, and Aristotle judged by the "Organon," it was possible for partisans to represent the two philosophers as typical opposites, and to assume that "every one is born a Platonist or an Aristotelian," forgetting that Aristotle was Plato's pupil, and both were followers of Socrates. Later on, when Aristotelianism became "established" as the Christian philosophy, Platonism, which survived in the more mystical schoolmen, fell under suspicion, and not unfrequently justified the suspicion by developing in the direction of Pantheism. It was not till the

thirteenth century that the world appealed from Platonists and Aristotelians to Plato and Aristotle, and discovered that the divergent streams flowed from neighbouring springs. Such an appeal, it is to be feared, is hardly possible in the case of Lao-Tzŭ and Confucius, especially as the authenticity of the "Tào-Tê-Ching" is still in controversy among Sinologues.

X.

SPENCER'S ECCLESIASTICAL INSTITUTIONS.¹

"THERE can be no true conception of a structure without a true conception of its function." This is the opening sentence of *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, and it is the best criticism of the book itself. If from first to last we get no true conception of ecclesiastical institutions, it is because the author starts with an utterly inadequate view of the function of religion. Even Mr. Spencer fails when he tries to give us the play of "Hamlet" with the Prince of Denmark left out.

The first two pages and a half—of which one page is given to a dialogue between Sir Samuel Baker and a chief of the Latooki, a born Positivist, named Commoro—are thought sufficient to disprove the theory "that religious ideas have a supernatural origin." The rest of the volume has, therefore, only to deal with the question—"What is their natural origin, and how do they express themselves in ecclesiastical institutions?"

¹ "Ecclesiastical Institutions." Part VI. of "The Principles of Sociology." By Herbert Spencer, Williams and Norgate.

It is obvious here that Mr. Spencer is either playing with words or deluded by words. "That religion has a supernatural origin" might mean that all religions, however debased, are a groping after a supernatural reality, whom Christians worship as the Triune God. And this Mr. Spencer cannot consistently deny, though he would assert that that reality, which we may speak of as neither "He" nor "It," is, and always must be, unknowable. But by "the supernatural origin of religion" Mr. Spencer seems to mean the existence of "an innate consciousness of Deity." And this he is prepared to deny, in the interest of his hypothesis of "ghost-worship."

"It is strange," Mr. Spencer remarks, "how impervious to evidence the mind becomes when once prepossessed." Yet so prepossessed is he in favour of his own theory, that he does not take the trouble to find out what "theologians at large" really do say, before he refutes them. This is in keeping with what he has done elsewhere. For instance, in the "Data of Ethics" it occurred to him to discuss "theological ethics," and the chosen representative was a perfectly unknown Quaker, who had committed himself to some more or less immoral statements, which Mr. Spencer saw his way to refuting. In the present case, a theologian is in no way bound to believe that man is by nature a ready-made monotheist, or that he at

once recognizes God, the soul, and immortality as "postulates of the practical reason." That man is a "religious animal" is as much implied in his worshipping the ghosts of his ancestors as in any other worship. But, of course, Mr. Spencer's contention is that there are some tribes in which religion of any kind does not exist. "All religion," he says, on the authority of Schweinfurth, "in our sense of the word religion" (a very important limitation, by-the-bye) "is quite unknown to the Bongo." Therefore not only is the religious idea not innate, but the religious instinct is not universal in man.

We do not propose to discuss here the much-debated question as to the existence of tribes of atheists. If it could be proved, we should no longer be able to point to the universality of the instinct of worship as an argument in favour of a real Object of worship. St. Paul no doubt asserts of the Romans of his day, and by implication of other Gentiles, that they were "without excuse" in rejecting God; and theologians have held that there is no such thing as invincible ignorance of God. If this is what Mr. Spencer means by "an innate consciousness of Deity," then there would seem to be a clear issue raised between him and the theologians. But the question cannot be settled off-hand on the basis of an uncritical conversation between savages and the casual traveller.

The existence of God does not stand or fall with the results of a dialogue between Sir Samuel Baker and Commoro or between Mr. Gardiner and a Zulu; nor is the question seriously affected by the experience which some gentlemen record as to deaf mutes. The fact that an intelligent Zulu once asked questions which Bishop Colenso could not answer did not, as some people fondly imagined, disprove the inspiration of the Pentateuch.

Mr. Spencer is just as unable to appreciate the position of a Christian theologian, when, having shown to his own satisfaction that religion in various primitive or savage nations is ultimately traceable to a ghost theory, because "from the supposed reality of dreams, there resulted the supposed reality of ghosts, whence developed all kinds of supposed supernatural beings," he goes on to ask whether it is possible to believe that the religion of the Hebrews is to be ranked in a different category. Now, while entirely rejecting, as fanciful and utterly unproved, the hypothesis of the natural genesis of religion from dreams, we as entirely agree that the Hebrews stood originally on the same level with other primitive nations. Indeed, if Mr. Spencer had proved that the Hebrews were originally *worse* than the surrounding nations, more barbarous and savage than they were, it would only have been in keeping with what the Bible tells us of God's purpose, choosing

the weak and the contemptible and the despised, to do His work in the education of the world. The Hebrews were constantly reminded of this, lest they should assume that they had been chosen for any pre-eminence of theirs over the surrounding nations.

If, then, they were chosen by God, as Christians believe, to be the vehicle of His revelation of Himself—whether it was the first revelation or a restoration of a lost knowledge does not affect the present question—it was natural (i.) that the old barbarous, idolatrous, and polytheistic tendencies should only gradually give way; and (ii.) that the new truth should be anthropomorphically conceived. What Mr. Spencer has got to explain is not the existence of anthropomorphism, and the survival of an idolatrous tendency, which no reasonable Christian would deny, but the rapid progress of “deanthropomorphization,” and the vigorous protest of the prophets against idol-worship as treason against God. For it is this which has made the otherwise utterly insignificant Hebrews of such supreme importance in the history of the world.

It so happens that, so far as the religion of the Hebrews is concerned, we are not dependent on travellers' tales, but have documentary evidence, which we presume even Mr. Spencer accepts, since he quotes from it when it suits his purpose. It is

worth while then to ask whether he has fairly represented the Hebrew Scriptures. And yet in doing so we feel that an apology is due to our readers for offering them a criticism of statements which, but for the great name of Herbert Spencer, might be put aside as childish and unintelligent, if not intentionally dishonest. The anthropomorphisms are exaggerated; the parallelisms are strained; the language is misunderstood; great questions are settled without discussion so as to make for the theory which the author has set himself to prove. We venture to recommend to Mr. Spencer not only a closer acquaintance with the words of the Old Testament, but also some slight study of LXX. or Aramaean English.

We are told, first, that "the plasma of superstitions amid which the religion of the Hebrews evolved was of the same nature with that found everywhere." This may be readily granted. Also "that sundry traditions they held in common with other peoples." This, so far from being denied, is commonly quoted (rightly or wrongly) as a proof of something quite different from what Mr. Spencer is contending for. We now come to the theology. And here we are told that "under the common title *Elohim* were comprehended distinguished living persons, ordinary ghosts, superior ghosts or gods," *Il* or *El* being applied to heroes and to the gods of the Gentiles:—

"Out of these conceptions grew up, as in other cases, the propitiation or worship of various supernatural beings—a polytheism. Abraham was a demigod to whom prayers were addressed. 'They sacrificed unto devils, not to God ; to gods whom they knew not, to new gods that came newly up, whom your fathers feared not.' That the belief in other gods than Jahveh long survived is shown by Solomon's sacrifices to them, as well as by the denunciations of the prophets. Moreover, even after Jahveh had become the acknowledged great-god, the general conception was essentially polytheistic."

Of course, Mr. Spencer, no less than the most Orthodox Jew or Christian, is at liberty to believe that the Hebrew monotheism rose out of a previous polytheistic belief, though there is little evidence to be adduced from the Old Testament, the worship of other gods being generally, if not always, represented as the worship of *strange* gods, the gods of the heathen nations round about. If the golden calf was a return to Apis worship, the idolatry against which the prophets protest is mainly an *imported* idolatry, or at least is so represented. Still we readily concede to Mr. Spencer that the readiness with which the Jews assimilated foreign idolatry may be urged in proof that there was a survival of the polytheistic tendency, if not of the old polytheistic worship. If, as Mr. Spencer suggests, the belief in good and evil angels is enough to make a religion "essentially polytheistic," then *cadit quæstio*, not only so far as the Hebrews are concerned, but so far as concerns Christianity too.

Calmly assuming, as if there was no doubt about it, that Jahveh "was originally one god among many—the god who became supreme," who from being "originally a local potentate" came to be considered "a local god—'the God of Israel,'" Mr. Spencer adds, "The command, 'Thou shalt have none other gods but Me,' did not imply that there were none, but that the Israelites were not to recognize their authority." And yet we do not believe that Mr. Spencer is consciously dishonest. He is only blinded by his prepossession in favour of an *a priori* assumption, which requires that the monotheistic idea should only gradually emerge. Whatever traces of idolatry there may be, and there are many, and whether that idolatry was a survival, or a revival, or an importation, all the authoritative teaching is on the side of the truth of One only God. The phrase the "God of Israel" expresses, not the existence of other gods, but the unique relationship in which the Hebrews believed themselves to stand towards the One God. To argue that the mention of other gods is an admission that they were really gods, though inferior to Jahveh, is to lay one's self open to a *reductio ad absurdum*. Even the passage which Mr. Spencer quotes from the Song of Moses is interpreted a few verses later¹ by Moses himself, when he says, "They have moved me to

¹ Deut. xxxi. 21.

jealousy with that which is not God," though he had previously spoken of this "not God" as "a god." Just in the same way David says, "All the gods of the nations are idols; but the Lord made the heavens;" and Hezekiah, when admitting the truth of Rabshakeh's boast, explains it by the fact that the gods of the nations "were no gods, but the work of men's hands."¹ It is, therefore, no new view of the heathen gods when, in opposition to the one true God, they are called by the prophets "lies" and the "teachers of lies." A few lines afterwards Mr. Spencer has to admit that there are to be found, in reference to Jahveh, "assertions of universality of rule," but he attributes little importance to this, since similar statements are made by the Egyptians with regard to a living Pharaoh! If an English theologian of the eleventh century had ascribed to God power over the forces of nature, would Mr. Spencer argue that it meant nothing because some flattering courtiers, according to the old story, ascribed similar power to King Canute?

The next count in the indictment is that "there was no claim to omnipotence" for Jahveh. Mr. Spencer discreetly avoids saying what period he is speaking of, but as the passages he quotes under this head are taken from the ante-regal period we will assume (though with very considerable hesita-

¹ 2 Kings xix. 18.

tion) that he is aware of the numerous passages in the Psalms and prophets in which omnipotence and exclusive godhead are ascribed to Jehovah. To prove his case Mr. Spencer quotes two passages, and alludes airily to a third. But of the two passages quoted one is, by Mr. Spencer's request, to be cancelled, presumably because it is based upon a foolish mistake. We are left, then, with two proofs, which are worth noticing. The first is "the alleged failure of his (Jahveh's) attempt personally to slay Moses." No reference is given for this, but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that Mr. Spencer has in his mind the words in Exod. iv. 24. "The Lord met him and sought to kill him." The passage is a difficult one, no doubt, but so far as Mr. Spencer's point is concerned it is transparently clear. Whether the explanation which is commonly given is right or not—viz. that God sent a dangerous sickness to Moses because of his having neglected to circumcise the child—the statement is that the Lord "met him and sought to slay him," but (after Zipporah had performed the rite of circumcision) *let him go*. If this had been quoted in proof that God repents, it might have been worth something. It is absolutely valueless as proving God's inability to slay Moses. Either Mr. Spencer only read the first of the three verses in which the incident is recorded, or (can it be possible?) he interpreted "he let him

go" to mean "he was not able to hold him fast"! Will our readers believe that the only other proof that Jahveh is not conceived as omnipotent (omitting the cancelled passage) is 1 Sam. iv. 3-10, in which the Israelites are defeated by the Philistines, and the Ark is taken! And this is all that we have to set off against the Old Testament revelation of "the Judge of all the earth." Mr. Spencer simply adopts the wildest of Kuenen's fancies, without the ingenuity which Kuenen shows in their defence.

We need not carry our examination further. The statement that God was neither omniscient nor moral we have heard before, and the answer is obvious. Mr. Spencer has nothing new to say about it. Nor have we.

With such a view of religion, and such a theory of Old Testament theology, we cannot hope for much, though there are interesting points we might notice here and there in Mr. Spencer's account of ecclesiastical institutions and the specialization of functions. His categories, however, are all biological, and seldom fit, except metaphorically, the facts of morals and religion. It is no wonder that "a satisfactory distinction between priests and medicine men is difficult to find," if both are concerned only with ghosts. The account of the customs of savage tribes is varied enough, and readable, if not instructive.

We should like to believe that it is more trustworthy than the account of the Hebrew religion. And yet when Mr. Spencer has to depend on secondhand reports brought back by men who did not specially collect materials for the use to which Mr. Spencer puts them, we can hardly hope for accuracy. And as for the use to which Mr. Spencer puts his materials, though it would be hard to press against him the maxim, *Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus*, yet it is, perhaps, as well that the account of the Jews comes so early in the volume, so that readers may test at the outset the critical value of the whole.

Mr. Spencer assumes, not altogether without evidence, that in a polytheistic people there is generally "a gravitation towards monotheism;" and that mental progress helped on the tendency among the Jews. But he doubts whether monotheism ever becomes complete or maintains its purity. By monotheism he understands only the view held "by unitarians of the advanced type, and by those who are called theists," trinitarian monotheism being, we are informed, "partially polytheistic." An ecclesiastical hierarchy arises as soon as there appears "a decided distinction between the affairs of this world and those of a supposed other world." Thenceforward the ecclesiastical and political organizations grow up side by side, first in a state of fusion, then differentiat-

ing, till a perfect separation is effected. But ecclesiasticism always stands for "the principle of social continuity," a social bond of a very conservative character—a fact which is easily explained when we remember that the very *raison d'être* of religion is the propitiation of an ancestral ghost.

On the military and civil functions of priests, and the differentiation of the sacerdotal from the military function, Mr. Spencer has a good deal to say. And he cannot be accused of modifying his statements for fear of giving offence to the clergy. On the subject of war he finds it convenient to ignore the early centuries of Christianity and the unvarying teaching of the Christian Church, in order to emphasize the military functions of some mediæval prelates. His Church history is, however, not his strong point, but he has wonderful powers of seeing resemblances where the ordinary man sees only difference. Who but Mr. Spencer could have detected a survival of the original union of the military and sacerdotal functions in a prayer written by the present Archbishop of Canterbury for the Egyptian war; or found a proof of clerical cruelty in the fact that a little boy was beaten to death at the "clerically governed" King's College?

The chapters on "Church and State" and "Nonconformity" are so sketchy as to be of little

value. Nonconformity may, however, henceforth claim Mr. Herbert Spencer as an honorary member. He affiliates modern Nonconformity to the heresies of every age, congratulates it on the "rebellious movement of the Reformation;" but regrets "the regrowth of a coercive rule," almost as much as he regrets the recrudescence in modern politics of the military spirit:—

"Calvin (he reminds us) was a Pope comparable with any who issued bulls from the Vatican. The discipline of the Scottish Presbyterians was as despotic, as rigorous, and as relentless as any which Catholicism had enforced. The Puritans of New England were as positive in their dogmas, and as severe in their persecutions, as were the ecclesiastics of the Church they left behind."

Still Nonconformity is commended for being steadily antisacerdotal, and for having been the cause of the multiplication of sects. Continental writers, according to Mr. Spencer, are quite wrong in reproaching us with this. "Philosophically considered, it is one of England's superior traits." As there are this year two hundred and twenty-five sects actually registered, England is to be congratulated on her "superiority."

In the last two chapters we find Mr. Spencer posing as historian and prophet in one; only, unfortunately, his history is not such as to make us place unlimited faith in his prophecy. In ecclesiastical institutions it is well to know that there will be complete autonomy in each religious

body, and a complete loss of the sacerdotal character. With the transition from dogmatic theism to agnosticism all ideas of propitiation will lapse, but "there will ever be a sphere for those who are able to impress their hearers with a due sense of the mystery in which the origin and meaning of the Universe is shrouded." This, and the insistence on duty, and the conduct of life, will form the subject matter of the sermons of the future. In religion, the process of "deanthropomorphization"—a word which Mr. Spencer has borrowed from Mr. Fiske—will be complete, and we shall be left with a final consciousness of the Unknowable :—

"One truth must grow ever clearer, the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to which man can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. Amid the mysteries which become more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed."

And, paradox though it may seem, this is the explanation even of ghost-worship. Mr. Spencer and his *bête noire* the theologians have something in common after all. For they, too, believe that all the imperfect and grotesque forms of worship—even ghost-worship, if there is such a thing—owe their reality to, and find their explanation in, the existence of the One Supreme Object of worship. At first it looked as if Mr. Spencer was saying

just the opposite—viz. that the highest religion finds its explanation in ghost-worship, and ghosts have no reality. Now, we are told that there was a germ of truth even in the primitive conception, and its later developments are not *less* real, but *more* real than the earlier forms, because they approximate more closely to the worship of the Unknowable. In other words, according to Mr. Spencer, the worship of the Unknowable is implicit in ghost-worship, and is its ground and underlying truth, though, of course, it is not present to consciousness. Surely the theologian may be allowed to assert the same of "the innate consciousness of God." At all events, he cannot be refuted by the cross-examination of a savage.

XI.

THE DOCTRINE OF HOLY SCRIPTURE
AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH
WITH RESPECT TO WAR.

An address delivered at the Portsmouth Church Congress,
October, 1885.

OUR President has spoken of this subject as a "delicate and difficult" one. I confess I am not greatly troubled by the delicacy of my position. Those who serve their Queen and country as our soldiers and sailors do, will not only allow, they will *expect* the Christian priest to *do his duty*. But the difficulty is a very real one. When Christ was born into the world the angels proclaimed "Peace on earth:" His legacy to us was, "Peace I leave with you, My peace I give unto you:" when He came among us from the grave He said, "Peace be unto you." The new Kingdom was a Kingdom of Peace; the promised Comforter was the Spirit of Peace: Christ Himself was the Prince of Peace. How, then, are we to explain the teaching of the Bible and the attitude of the Church in respect of War? The Old Testament *commands*,

the Church *allows*, that which on any showing is alien from the Spirit of the Gospel.

The solution of this double difficulty is to be found, I believe, in a fuller recognition of two great principles of God's dealing with man, which at bottom are one and the same;—first, that *the Old Testament is a progressive revelation*; and secondly, that *Christianity is a principle of life and growth, not a formal system of conduct*. If I had fifteen hours before me instead of fifteen minutes, I might hope to show how those two principles apply to the difficulties before us; and how, in the last analysis, the two are one. As it is, I can only summarize.

I. *The Bible is a progressive revelation which culminates in the Gospel of Christ*. Not only in its teaching on War, but in its teaching generally, the Old Testament is preparatory and introductory to the New. If, for instance, it could be shown that the Old Testament taught a gospel of war, and the New Testament a gospel of peace, however puzzled we might be by such an opposition, we should still believe that it was somehow the opposition between a lower and a higher revelation. If this is not so, if the Bible has not respect to the gradual education of mankind, if its utterances lie, as it were, all in one plane, I can find in it only a mass of contradictions and inconsistent moralities. But as I listen to those calm words from the lips

of Him Who spoke with authority,—“It was said to them of old time, but I say unto you,”—I see in the Old Testament, as St. Paul did in the Law, a *παιδαγωγός εἰς Χριστόν* leading men on little by little till they could sit at the feet of Jesus. Its teaching is *provisional* only because *propædæutic*. It is destroyed only by being fulfilled.

But if this principle is to help us we must be able to show how the Old Testament teaching about war prepared for, and led up to, the Gospel of peace. It is no use to say the Old Testament wars were commanded by God and that is enough. Undoubtedly the immediate justification for them was the direct command of God, but conscience demands an ulterior justification. If immoral acts become moral when done by God, as Zwingli taught, either there is no morality, or God is not God.

Now the revelation of the Old Testament stands midway between the natural instincts of man and the supernatural life of the kingdom of God. Without committing ourselves to the sophistic fiction of a *bellum omnium inter omnes*, we are bound to admit that, when the struggle for existence among families or peoples comes, the law of force prevails. Man tacitly assumes “that he may take who has the power, and he may keep who can.” No doubt the social instincts on the one hand, and experience of the evils of war on the other, tend to modify this view. The greatest of

heathen teachers declares that "no one chooses war for the sake of war. A man would be blood-thirsty indeed if he turned his friends into foes in order to bring about battle and murder;" but in another context he remarks that "it is mere slavery if a man may not give another as good as he gave." In fact, it would seem that however civilization may mitigate the barbarity of war, it still leaves untouched the idea that *war is a natural right*.

It is here that the teaching of the Old Testament about war, even at its lowest, shows a definite advance. It takes man as he is, with his savage, warlike instincts; it does not ignore his nature, and proclaim at once a reign of peace. It does not even strike directly at the war spirit. It accepts war. But the people to whom are committed "the oracles of God," are to be taught to see war in a new light. It is taken out of the hands of man. It is God's prerogative. Man wages war lawfully only as His vicegerent. He is fighting "the battle of the Lord."¹ There is nothing *personal* in the Israelitish campaigns, nothing even *national* except so far as the cause of Israel is the cause of God. We think it a great advance in civilization when men neither take the law into their own hands, nor suffer a relative to be the avenger of blood, but trust to the administration of an impersonal law. Revenge, which, even in the individual, is "a

¹ 1 Sam. xviii. 17; xxv. 28.

kind of wild justice," is then transformed into that righteous indignation which lies at the root of the judicial system. Such an advance is the teaching of the Pentateuch in respect of War. It was the first, though an indirect blow to the war-spirit among the Jews. But they had much more to learn. That God is a God of battles is a half truth, which, to us, seems almost immoral. The higher truth, which is revealed in the Old Testament, was dimly shadowed forth when the Patriarchal Conqueror, returning from the slaughter of the kings, did homage to a mysterious King of Peace. And when the wars of conquest were over, and the chosen people were established in the promised land, their king, who had fought the Lord's battles, is forbidden to build the Temple, because he has been "a man of war," and "has shed blood abundantly."¹ That honour is reserved for "a man of rest," under whom "peace and quietness" is promised.² The Jews, from first to last, had been taught that the explanation of the present is in the future, and as this future becomes clearer, it is revealed as a Kingdom of Peace. God is no longer "a man of war."³ "He maketh wars to cease in all the earth."⁴ He no longer "teaches the hands to war and the fingers to fight." He "scatters the people that delight in war." Clearer and more clear

¹ 1 Chron. xxii. 8; xxiii. 3.² Exod. xv. 3.³ 1 Chron. xxii.⁴ Ps. xlv. 9.

the promise is seen, that not Israel only, but through them the whole world, shall know the blessings of peace, when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

The Old Testament teaching, in respect of war is thus propædæutic and provisional. The Kingdom of Peace is not an after-thought; the whole of God's ancient revelation leads up to it. The Old Testament accepts war only to destroy war. It lifts war out of the region of personal and national ambition, by claiming it as God's prerogative; and then, as the knowledge of God's nature is broadened and deepened, the promise is given of a Kingdom of Peace under the Messianic rule.

II. But if the Old Testament teaching about war can be explained in the light of the great principle that God's revelation of Himself is progressive, what are we to say about the teaching of the Christian Church? The promised Prince of Peace was born into the world nearly nineteen centuries ago, and war still exists, not among heathens only, but among professedly Christian nations. The Divine Society, the visible embodiment of the Kingdom of Peace, even contemplates the fact of war. How are we to explain this paradox? Some people will offer us a rough and ready solution. They have hardly got beyond the negative idea of peace as given by Mr. Chadband:

"Oh, my friends, what is peace? Is it war? No, it is not war." Therefore, they argue, the Kingdom of Peace excludes war, and either the Church has absolutely forbidden war, or it has been false to its trust.

But what does the Church say about war? I answer, It recognizes war as a *fact*, never as a *right*. Under the Gospel, war is an anachronism and a survival. The Church never condemns the life of a soldier, but it never "contemplates war forensically" as a legitimate international court of appeal. Even Dr. Mozley, in spite of his magnificent *tour de force*, is compelled to admit that "Christianity only sanctions war upon the hypothesis of a world at discord with herself. In her own world war would be impossible."¹ It never forgets that war is alien from the spirit of Christianity; yet it never forgets that Christianity is to work like hidden leaven. No doubt individual Christians from the first have been found to hold the view, which finds its strongest expression in Tertullian, and is, perhaps, also the view of Origen, that the Sermon on the Mount forbids military service altogether, and even the administration of justice in matters of life and death. But this was not the common teaching of the ante-Nicene Church. Even while the Empire was pagan, and military service might

¹ University Sermons, p. 119.

seem to imply acquiescence in heathen ceremonies, Christians in large numbers fought in the Roman army, as Tertullian himself admits, and no disciplinary canons forbade it. The stories of the Thundering Legion and of the Theban Legion a century later, whatever be their literal truth, are sufficient to prove that Christians fought under Marcus Aurelius and Diocletian, and that the profession of the soldier was not like that of the gladiator, the actor, the idolmaker, and the astrologer forbidden to the baptized. The words, "I may not fight, for I am a Christian," were uttered by the martyr Maximilian (295 A.D.), at the very time when large numbers of his brethren were doing what he felt impossible.

When I turn to St. Augustine as representing the post-Nicene Fathers, and to St. Thomas Aquinas as representing the schoolmen, I find the same teaching. It is taken for granted that the case of the faithful centurion in the Gospel, and of Cornelius in the Acts, justified a Christian in bearing arms. If the soldier is the enemy of Christ, it is not his *position* but his *disposition* makes him so (*non militia sed malitia*.) St. Augustine even advises Count Boniface not to enter a monastery, but to do his duty as a Christian general. But under Christian Emperors a wider question is raised, viz. Is war ever lawful for a Christian power? And the answer is, The

Christian must always *will* peace, though war may be forced upon him (*Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum necessitas*); and, even in war, the Christian must labour for peace (*esto ergo bellando pacificus*, etc.). He will fight *misericorditer*, in the spirit of a father who is compelled to chasten those he loves. And St. Thomas closely follows St. Augustine. "Three things," he says, "are necessary for a just war, the authority of the ruler, a righteous cause, and a good intention. Any other war is unlawful."¹ But the rapid deterioration which had taken place in the Western Church between the fourth and the thirteenth century is shown by the numerous canons passed against even clergy bearing arms. The Crusades had familiarized men's minds with bloodshed in the name of Christ, and the wars of Christians with one another had confused their judgment. The proclamation of a "Truce of God" marks the ineffective protest of Christianity against a spirit which it had done so little to overcome.

Why, then, did not the Christian Church from the first prohibit war as Tertullian would have done? Because it had realized the fact that Christianity is a principle of life which is to transform the world into itself. "We see not yet all things put under Him." The ideal is not the actual, either for the Christian society or for the

¹ Summa, Theol., 2, 2, Q. XL. Art. i.

individual Christian, and to attempt to make it so is not really to advance the Kingdom of God. There will always be those

"Whose best hope for the world
Is ever that the world is near its end,
Impatient of the stars that keep their course
And make no pathway for the coming Judge."

But the citizens of the Kingdom of Heaven are to be the leaven of the world, and "they ought not," says St. Augustine, "to wish before the time to dwell with none but saints and righteous men." It is a dangerous thing to ante-date the millennial reign of Christ.

You mean, then, that Christianity takes human nature as it is? Yes; but only that it may make it *what it is not*. Christianity did not prohibit *slavery*; in a sense it accepted it. But it enunciated principles ultimately inconsistent with slavery. It did not prohibit *war*, and say that no Christian might carry arms, but it attacked the war spirit in every form. *Cessante causâ cessat et effectus*. But the converse is not true. You may prohibit slavery, and declare that every man and woman is free whose foot is set on English soil, and, meanwhile, a white slave trade, as anti-christian and as inhuman as anything on the coast of Africa, is in our midst. And if war could be forbidden we might still be as far as ever from the kingdom of peace. Is the lust of glory more cruel than the

lust of gain? Less careful of the good of others? "What is it," asks St. Augustine, "that we blame in war? Not the fact of death, for all must die; but the desire for wrong, the cruelty of revenge, the implacable spirit, the savagery of fighting, the lust of lordship—this is what we blame in war, and this what is condemned by Divine and human law." The attempt to distinguish between just and unjust wars is one which, till the Spirit of Peace inspires our motives, can only lead to casuistry. Not only religious wars, but wars of mere earthly empire darken the page of human history. Yet was there ever a war which could not be justified, on the plea of self-defence, or the service of God? Are we to blame a Christian nation if, like the errant knights of old, it goes about redressing human wrongs with earthly weapons? Does not the end justify the means? Is not there something of truth in the sneer that even missionary work, which was once done by a Henry Martyn, is now done by a Martini-Henry? Has not the maxim *si vis pacem para bellum* been perverted into a justification for all the armaments of Europe, when there was little real thought or wish for peace? What has the religion of Christ to say to us here?

I answer, For the tone and temper of popular "Jingoism," for the thinly disguised policy of bluster, for the craving after military display, for the readiness to stamp every effort for peace as

a weak foreign policy and an abandonment of British interests—for this, I find, in the Bible and in the Church, nothing but unqualified condemnation.

But I find no condemnation of the calling of the Christian soldier, and, therefore, I cannot adopt the teaching of Tertullian in ancient days, or of the Peace Society in our own. We honour them for their noble protest, we thank them for recalling the Church to its high ideal. The question between us and them is one not of *motive* but of *method*. Is the kingdom of peace to win its way by influence or by protest; by a policy of permeation or a policy of separation; by the implanting of a new nature which may transform the old, or by a mechanical substitution of the Divine for the human? In a word, do we believe in "regeneration," or in "instantaneous conversion?"

XII.

THEOLOGY AND LAW.¹

"Lord, what love have I unto Thy Law : all the day long is my study in it."—Ps. cxix. 97.

IT is now hardly more than half a century ago that there came to England, a stranger to a strange land, one² who in his Indian home had spent his life in protests against idolatry, and in earnest efforts to restore a monotheistic religion. Judged as we so often judge those whom we do not know, he was only a heathen, a pious Brâhman who, however well disposed to Christianity, died in Christian England, an alien from the Christian commonwealth. His language was not ours ; his habits of life and thought were strange to us ; his religion was not Christianity.

But, looking earnestly beneath the surface of things, working back in thought from difference to unity, we find it is not altogether so. In race, in language, in thought, he is nearer to us than

¹ An Assize Sermon preached before the University of Oxford on the Twentieth Sunday after Trinity, 1884.

² Râjah Râmmohun Roy.

we dreamed. The Brâhman Reformer and the Christian Priest are different, indeed, in their grasp of truth ; different in the way they would set it forth ; different in their life history. The Brâhman never lived to realize the truth of the God-Man, of the divine mission of the Church of Christ, of the reality of Sacramental grace. But his life was true, and real, and great. Can any doubt that its earnest seeking after God shall have its own reward ? Yet it would have been so easy to say,—We have nothing in common with him ; we do not worship the same God.

So it is that again and again we misread the world around us, seeing the outside differences of things, while their real but hidden unity is lost. And if some unexpected points of likeness force themselves upon our notice, we put them aside as curious parallels, which do not suggest to us a common origin, a kinship which is real.

Is it not so in the case of those two highly-developed systems which stand over against one another in England of to-day, once identified, then associated, but now, as it seems, drifting apart,—*Theology and Law* ? Here it is so easy to point the contrast between the Divine Science, and that which exists only because man is what he is, and not what God made him to be. It is easy to say, they do not speak the same language, their modes of thought are not the same. The one soars

upwards to the very nature of God, the other sounds all the depths and shoals of human selfishness and vice. The one is as a golden net let down from heaven; the other like some huge structure built upon the earth. Law deals with things which perish in the using; Theology with truths which cannot pass away.

I. But such superficial contrasts will not satisfy us. There are strange marks of kinship in these different, and sometimes rival, systems: points of resemblance which are the more remarkable when contrasted with that knowledge of nature, which of late years has almost monopolized the name of *Science*.

(i.) Of these points of resemblance the first is this. Law, like Theology, is a "derived science," and not a science of discovery. We do not live in hope or fear of some new facts which will revolutionize our legal system. Law is essentially derived. It glories in the fact. Its principles lie back, far back in a pre-historic time. With all its minute and complex adjustments to modern civilization and modern life, it can say with one of old, "It was long ago that men found out what is right, and we must learn from them." What was implicit in the principle may be now explicit in the Law, but the principle has not changed. This is why Law is, perhaps inappropriately, said to be *conservative*. It has its roots in the past, not in the

present. Thus, like Theology, it is open to the reproach, if it be a reproach, that it is a derived science, and with Theology it offers its strong but silent protest against the narrowing of the term science to the inductive method.

(ii.) Law is a derived science, but that is not all. It claims *authority*, an authority which is not ephemeral, but eternal; a majesty which the present can neither give nor take away. Its appeal is not to its usefulness, its fitness to the present condition of things, but to men's reverence for authority, to their obedience, to their loyalty. And in this, while its likeness to Theology is obvious, its contrast with the popular science of nature is no less obvious. For both deal with *law*, yet the one is as anxious to assert, as the other is to disavow, the claim to authority for law as law. We have outgrown the confusion which is to be found even in Blackstone. We know that a law of nature is "an observed uniformity of sequence or coexistence," a fact universally true within the limits of scientific observation. But it lays claim to no necessity, it repudiates even "a tacit reference to the will of a superior." It speaks in the indicative, not in the imperative. No real student of nature will go beyond the "is" and "is not" of fact. "Must" and "cannot" lie beyond his range, except when they are illicitly smuggled in for use against the Christian miracles. But Law, in its

other sense, is nothing if it be not *authoritative*, if it cannot command reverence, and challenge the obedience of the enlightened conscience. Here, then, again we have a strange mark of kinship between Theology and Law.

(iii.) But we have not even yet touched the most remarkable point of agreement between the two, wherein *both* are distinguished from the science of external nature. There is another point, which, in our day, is of especial importance. If there is one fact which the science of nature, as we now understand it, is powerless to explain, and is sometimes anxious to explain away, it is the fact of *PERSONALITY*; that which distinguishes the self-conscious moral being from the beasts that perish. Trace out, if you will, the marvellous sympathies of nature; prove, if you will, that man is a microcosm of creation; follow, step by step, the minutest changes of embryological structure and development; and yet before the citadel of *Personality* every effort is in vain; and the besiegers, like the Syrians who came against the Prophet, are blinded and led captive by the very power that they opposed. And Law guards *Personality*, as nothing but Religion and Morality can. In that highly-developed system of Law under which we live, we have in "Person" and "Property" a true dichotomy. The terms exclude one another. No *person* can possess a *person*. The sharp line is drawn, not

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between organic and inorganic, living and dead, but between man as the embodiment of *personality* and all other created beings as void of personality. Even those recent modifications or developments of Law, which we may watch with some foreboding, all tend in one direction. The ideal of Law is universal respect for Personality, and it looks forward to the time when it will recognize no distinctions of race, or sex, or caste, or creed,—neither Jew nor Greek, neither male nor female, neither bond nor free. In that increasing reverence for Personality, even due considerations of subordination, as of wife to husband, son to father, servant to master, are being more and more left out of account. There is to be no respect of persons. All must be equal before the law, because the possession of personality throws into the shade all other distinctions. It is inevitable that it should sometimes seem to us that in emphasizing the fact of Personality the Law is falling short of what charity demands. It recognizes less and less of privilege and protection. Religious tests, hereditary rights, property qualifications, even the difference between man and woman, all these, rightly or wrongly, seem to be ignored. By the law of love I am and must be "my brother's keeper." Yes! says the law of the land, but it is inconsistent with a true reverence for personality that you should make him a slave even for his own good. If there

are φύσει δοῦλοι, men born to be slaves, the law knows nothing of them; philanthropy knows nothing of them; Christianity knows nothing of them. And even Aristotle, who believed in their existence, was puzzled to understand why they were not distinguished to the eye from those who were born to be free. And here again, in its aim, if not in its method, its supreme reverence for personality, its utter jealousy of anything which, though done from the best of motives, may obscure the line which separates person and thing, Law is fighting side by side with Theology.

Thus both are derived sciences; both challenge submission, and claim to speak with authority; both depend for their very existence on the fact of Personality. These are points of likeness which cannot be accidental. We say *cannot*, for, if there be anything on which, in this age of warring words, we are all agreed, it is the elimination of Chance. And all through the biological region likeness suggests kinship, and kinship a common parentage.

II. Where, then, are we to seek the common source of Theology and Law? How can a science, which includes such an unique fact as a Revelation from God to man, have a common origin with one which, in its evolution, if not in its germ, depends so much upon experience?

And here, for our present purpose, we may put on one side those *a priori* theorizings as to the

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nature of justice and the origin of society, which have again and again been proved historically false, and ask ourselves, *What is it which lies at the root of our legislative and judicial system?* It is a question which concerns not any particular laws, nor the various developments of law, but that which is presupposed in all law, that without which law could not be. What, then, is this? The answer is plain. It is CONSCIENCE, the power to judge of acts as right and wrong. We may ignore, for the moment, questions as to its origin and development, and simply take the fact. Man judges because he has what we call a conscience. I must judge as my conscience directs me. Men may laugh at my judgment; they may tell me my conscience is untrained or mistrained; they may tell me it is morbidly sensitive and over-scrupulous, or hint that it is defiled by conscious sin. But my conscience is for me my final court of appeal, and *quicquid fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam*. So it is, and must be, in my private judgments. But the complex fabric of Law must ultimately be traced back to the same fact. For Law is the expression of the "best self" of the community, the judgment of the conscience of the nation, growing in truth and fulness and perfection, as that conscience becomes more pure and clear. Take stone from stone in that majestic edifice of Law; roll back the course of time, and see Law in

its beginnings, and you will find Conscience the first Lawgiver, and Conscience the first Judge.

Or turn your eyes to the present. Look at Law as a finished product, an organism instinct, as it seems, with life. Can we trace in it any rudimentary organs? Is there one part which suffers from the atrophy of disuse? It is where the Conscience of man has outgrown the expression of his earlier and less perfect will, or where (shame to us that it is ever so!) the conscience of to-day has fallen short of its own true judgments in the past. *Quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt?* is the moralist's lament. What a vain thing is Law without that which gives it life and authority and truth! Law, indeed, has learned to reverence personality, it is jealous even of the mystical union of two personalities in Holy Marriage, lest it should carry with it anything of the old idea of possession of the wife by the husband. So careful is it to guard Personality and individual freedom that it treats Marriage not as a mystery, but as a contract. And yet right in the very heart of our civilization is the cancerous growth which is feeding upon the moral life of the people. We talk pompously and insolently of British freedom, and there is that hideous White Slave trade almost at our doors. We talk of reverence for Personality, and there is a vast organized system of tyranny and oppression, which treats man as a brute beast made for sensu-

ality, and woman as a "living tool" to be bought and sold. And Law looks on, almost powerless to assert itself, because it is unsupported by that vague thing called public opinion—No! let us be true with ourselves,—because our conscience, trained in all these centuries of Christianity, gives such an uncertain sound in a matter where Religion and Morality and Law are at one.

Law fails and becomes dead only when the conscience of the nation refuses its support. And no stronger proof can be urged that it is from Conscience that its authority is ultimately derived.

But there is an additional proof to be found in this, viz. that what we have already noticed as characteristic marks of Law belong in a special sense to Conscience. Thus Conscience, whatever its origin, is *authoritative*, it speaks with power, but it speaks not from itself. Its decision is no mere *ipse dixit*. It is a derived authority. And it is bound up so closely with the fact of Personality that there is no attack directed against the one which, if sustained, would not be fatal to the other. Conscience moves solely in the region of Personality. It speaks from a Person to a Person. A thing cannot speak with authority to a Person. And all the attempted analyses of Conscience fail in this,—they do not account for its *authority*. They analyze the evidence on which the judgment is given: they show how different would have

been the judgment if the evidence had been other than it was, but they presuppose the judge and his authority.

Here, then, we have reached the real point of union between the different systems of Theology and Law. They are different. We cannot derive the one from the other. But Conscience is the source of both, and hence it is that Theology, Ethics and Law are, if we may dare to use the phrase, a Trinity in unity. For Conscience, the ultimate authority in our legislative and judicial systems,—the formal principle of ethics and of our moral practice,—is also “the creative principle of religion” and the first source of our knowledge of God. Be it that men have tried to explain it away as a long-sighted selfishness, or an instinctive power of measuring utility, or the growth of many an age of ingenious self-seeking : yet in the strong vigorous life of intellectual and moral health it stands firm as it has ever done, claiming to be, what it has been grandly called, “the messenger from Him, Who both in nature and in grace speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by His representatives, . . . the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas !”—the undying witness in the heart of man to the sacerdotal principle. In religion it speaks as the Prophet of Him, Whom now we

cannot see ; in morals it is the ever present Priest, who walking on the earth yet holds of heaven ; while in the calm royal majesty of Law it sustains its kingly character.

But here it may be objected : this is an old-world view. We know better now. As for religion, a man must settle that with his God, if indeed there is a God, but in Ethics and in Law we are wiser than our fathers. We have got rid of supernaturalism. Conscience is indeed a representative, and hence its authority ; but in the individual it represents the crystallized experience of the past, while in law it almost openly professes to represent the will of the majority. It is the condensed wisdom of the sovereign people. Yes ! the people is sovereign, but in the grim words of the Prophet of Pessimism, it is a sovereign which never outgrows its minority, but is under tutors and governors. And who are they ? Or if we allow that law is but the expression of the judgment of the majority, yet just in so far as it is a judgment of true and false, of right and wrong, and not of useful and useless, or pleasant and painful, it speaks by an authority which has to be accounted for. Whether it be the many or the few who judge, the question must ultimately be shifted back to the individual. "Who art thou that judgest another ?" Is not man, in his separateness, "the measure of all things ?" What right has one to


judge another? It is a challenge to philosophy and to religion, to ethics and to law. And the answer is as terrible as it is true. By right of reason and of conscience I wield the sword of God. In every judgment of true or false in speculation, of right or wrong in practice, I judge God's judgment. And so firmly do men believe this, that for what they hold to be truth they are ready to die, though all the powers of earth, and even religion itself, be against them. So fearlessly do they believe the absoluteness of their moral judgments, that they will dare to say, with the great Utilitarian, —A God who is not moral, as my conscience judges morality, is not God. I will not worship Him. Through faith in God, I reject as God one who is not good and just and true.

It is God's revelation, then, that Theology unfolds; God's will that ethics declares; God's judgments that Law enforces. And hence it is that, in the evolution of Law, Revelation has played so prominent a part. Never has the Conscience been strengthened and informed by new truth, but Law has faithfully reflected the new light. Hegel, indeed, declares that the highest truth of which Law is possessed, the idea of Personality, it owes to the religion of Christ. "Entire quarters of the globe," he says, "Africa and the East, have never had, and have not yet, the idea. The Greeks and Romans, Plato and

Aristotle and the Stoics, had it not. . . . This idea came into the world through Christianity, in which the individual, as such, has an infinite worth as being the aim and object of the love of God." But looking back through the revelation of the Old Testament, we can see how the Jews were trained and educated up to the fulness of the truth, as side by side with the *patria potestas* we see the personal relations of patriarch and prophet with God. Nor is the idea of Personality the only gift of Revelation to Law. In the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount it has unfolded the Royal Law, and it has revealed it to us as the will of a Personal Being, "Our Father, which is in heaven."

And it is because it is God's Law that we may love it. We cannot love an abstraction, an idea, a generalization, a uniformity. Yet the 119th Psalm is full of love and devotion to the Law, because it is God's. And it is just here that the Christian conception of Law is so much truer than that which we are familiar with in Aristotle or even in Kant. The older philosopher glories in the impersonality of law, as contrasted with the injustice of individual judgments. So far we can go with him. But Aristotle's fear of what is human, and his indefinite attitude towards what is Divine, leaves us with a law which we cannot love. It may be just and good and true. It may













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be a natural product of society, and therefore not a thing to be apologized for. It may have force before which we must bow or break. But it is neither human nor divine. We cannot love it. And so there is a never-ending opposition between the law and the will.

So even with the theory of Kant. Nothing can be grander than the passages in which he speaks of the universality of the moral law, and the greatness of the name of Duty. But when he asks what it is which lies behind duty, which gives it its greatness and its grandeur, in a word, its *authority* over man, the answer is one which fails to satisfy us. It is *personality*, he tells us, which gives the moral law its grandeur. Man in obeying the moral law is "subject to his own personality." "He regards with reverence that which is highest in himself, and therefore respects its laws." Yes! Kant has reached the great truth that only a Person can speak authoritatively to a Person. But man cannot love and reverence a law which is his own, nor can he divide himself in twain, and worship in his lower self that which is the will of his higher and personal being. "The respect-inspiring idea of Personality" looks well enough in an ethical treatise. Will it stand the inrush of temptation when the enemy comes in like a flood?

Human love and the memories of home, the thought of mother or sister, or of one dearer,

perhaps, than either, may stand us in good stead in the hour of need. The love of Him Who is the Father of all families, of Christ Who gave Himself for us, has power to stem the torrent of evil desire. But not an impersonal law, nor a law which draws its authority from ourselves.

Lord, what love have I unto Thy law! It is Thine, therefore I love it; therefore I reverence it; therefore I see my "best self" reflected in it; therefore I obey and trust and hope. And in constant meditation of Thy Law I train my conscience, the organ of Divine truth. For the pure shall see God; and the meek shall He guide in judgment; and the gentle shall He learn His way. Purity, humility, and gentleness, are notes of the scholars of the truth.

It cannot be that the differentiated spheres of Theology and Law shall again become one as under the old Theocratic idea. And yet in God's purpose there is a pre-established harmony in them, because both speak from Him. Their ultimate unity in Conscience is no mere fact in the past. They are what they are now only as Conscience still lives and speaks in them, interpreting truly on the one hand the Revelation of God, and on the other embodying in Law its judgments, which are true because they are divine.

The two cannot be identified, and yet it is fatal if we lose sight of their inter-relations, and forget

that, in its solemn march, Law is ever leaving behind the false or transient settings of eternal truths, that it may attain more perfectly to its ideal, and be to us the earthly counterpart of the Justice of God. Human Law, so far as it is true, is not human but divine, and hence it is that they who interpret that Law to us speak with the authority of Him Whose Law they uphold. "They are God's Ministers," says St. Paul; therefore they claim our reverence, our obedience. "They are God's Ministers,"—therefore in His Presence they bow their heads, "remembering the account that they must make."

But the making of that Law which they administer, with whom does it rest? It is so easy to settle down in complaisant optimism and imagine that things will go right as a matter of course; that by a kind of natural selection Law will inevitably advance, because laws are not made, but grow. Ah! but growth in the moral world is never independent of moral effort. Does Conscience in the individual always speak as the Vicar of Christ? Is its hold on truth always firm and clear? Does it always command with the voice of the "categorical imperative?" Has it no life-history, no development which may be checked and retarded and even finally arrested? Is the "weak"¹ conscience of which St. Paul speaks a

¹ 1 Cor. viii. 7.

rare thing? or the "evil"¹ and "defiled"² conscience? or the conscience "seared as with a hot iron"?³ Or are these less common than the conscience which is "good"⁴ and "pure,"⁵ and "without offence,"⁶ and therefore strong and authoritative, as in them "who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil?"⁷ And in the nation at large are there not,—short of National Apostasy,—conditions in which the conscience no longer speaks, or claims to speak, as the voice of God? when considerations of right and wrong give way to considerations of finance; and expediency takes the place of truth; and a narrow and false view of British interest obscures the moral law; and a fear of ideal legislation results in immoral selfishness?

These may seem far-off dangers, dangers with which we, at least, have nothing to do. But it is not so. You and I may have no direct mission to legislate, and yet it is true that in every judgment we pass we are doing something to form that body of opinion which will some day crystallize in law. The judgment of him who speaks with the authority of the Law is yet different only in degree from the moral judgments which we so lightly pass. And here in Oxford we are nothing if we are not

¹ Heb. x. 22.⁴ Ibid. i. 5.² Tit. i. 15.⁵ 2 Tim. i. 3.³ 1 Tim. iv. 2.⁶ Acts xxiv. 16.⁷ Heb. v. 14.

critical, though every judgment of true and false, of right and wrong, is a wielding of the sword of God. Men who shrink with no feigned sensitiveness from God's stern judgments, as they are pronounced in the Bible or in the solemn warnings of the Athanasian Creed; men who call righteous anger vindictiveness, and the loyal hatred of a lie intolerance, yet fling abroad their rash and random judgments, and know not that they, too, wield the sword. There is no such thing as irresponsible judging. Yet within the little circle of our friends we have our own canons of taste, our own rules of right, our own views of unpardonable sins. And it seems as if it matters not whom our criticisms wound, or what are the principles on which we judge. We, the younger members of this University, are specially open to this danger of thoughtless judging. Without the wise reticence of age, without the sense of responsibility attaching to those who are in authority, without the knowledge of those who study all day long the law of God, without the tender sympathy of Him, the Judge of all, Who came in great humility, we rashly dare to wield the sword of judgment.

Yet every judgment is a pre-judgment. We are formulating for ourselves and for others principles, right or wrong, on which our future judgments will proceed; by which, so far as we have power, we shall influence Law itself. It is here, at

the very fount of Law, that Truth is made or marred ; here, therefore, that some safeguard is needed most. Where shall we find it ? It must be something external to ourselves, something we can reverence, something we can love, something which for us is the Law of God, in meditation of which we may train our conscience. I know but of one rule which will avail for those who hold, and those who hold not yet, the faith of Christ, and it is a rule not quite unknown even to non-Christian ethics. Act up to that which is purest ; have faith in that which is truest ; judge always by that which is highest ; reach forward to that which is noblest. It is for you the revelation of God, till He vouchsafe more light, more knowledge of Himself. And the Law, which is holy, and just, and good, shall not condemn you in the judgment of the Great Assize.

XIII.

THE PRIDE OF INTELLECT.¹

"Who is sufficient for these things."—2 COR. ii. 16.

ST. PAUL is thinking of the Christian minister, and of the greatness of the charge entrusted to him. He is a steward, a messenger commissioned by God to declare the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Whether men will hear or whether they will forbear, his duty is the same. Whether men are pleased or offended at his words, he cannot but speak. And he may not shrink from declaring the whole counsel of God, though the inevitable result must be that to some it is the savour of death unto death, and to others the savour of life unto life. Is not such a trust too high for man? Will it not inevitably tend to one of two results? Either men conscious of their own unfitness will shrink from the work, like Moses when he asked, "Who am I that I should go before Pharaoh?" or else it will carry with it a fatal sense of self-importance which will be the ruin of the work.

¹ The "Pride" Sermon; preached before the University of Oxford, on Sunday, November 24, 1889.

Of these the latter, if not the commonest, is the most obvious danger. The "pride of the priesthood" is no mere scandal invented by those who are enemies of the faith; and we feel that the common protest against what men call sacerdotalism is a true and at heart a Christian protest, though it is little careful to distinguish between the true and the false. Yet true sacerdotalism is not a theory but a fact, the fact that God appoints to all their work, and in religious truth as everywhere else uses the ministry of some for the good of all. The Jews he chose to be the priests of the pre-Christian world, the Church to be the priests of the whole family of man, the ministry to be the priests of the Church; while Christ is Himself the Eternal Priest, the one and only source of Priesthood from whom through all and to all the love of God is revealed.

But it is so hard for man not to assume that a special function or work for God carries with it a magnifying of the individual or official self. We think to magnify our office, and almost without knowing it we come to magnify ourselves. It is against this danger, the pride of the ministry, that St. Paul warns us, when he asks, "Who is sufficient for these things?" and answers the question with the words, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God; who hath also made us able

ministers of the New Testament." "For we preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord ; and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake."

The twelve passages of Holy Scripture from which the text for this morning has to be chosen, seem to indicate clearly that the primary object of the "Pride" sermon was to warn the clergy against personal or official pride. But there are two reasons which seem to justify us in taking a more general view of the matter. First, the proportion of clergy to laity in the University, and of their representatives in the University Church, is very different from what it once was ; and secondly, we are learning to realize more fully the truth that the Ministry is itself the type of a wider and more generally distributed stewardship, the stewardship of the Christian layman, and in their degree of all those who have a truth to deliver to the world. For everywhere God uses the few for the good of the many, and truth always and everywhere is a sacred trust from God for the service of man. It follows, then, that the very same danger which lies so near the life of the Christian Priest is no less near to the life of every one who dares to handle truth, and that which vitiates and destroys the work of the Christian Priest is that which is no less fatal to the philosopher, the man of science, the critic, the artist, the musician. That danger is the thought of self-sufficiency—in one word, of

pride: the readiness to forget or overlook the truth that there is nothing which we did not receive, and that we may not glory as if we had not received it. Whether we are priests or laymen it is true that "our sufficiency is of God."

But if it is hard for a Christian Priest to distinguish between the uncompromising fidelity to the message he is charged to teach, and a mere defiant self-assertion, it is certainly not less hard for those, who are entrusted with other forms of ministry by God, to distinguish between a loyal devotion to the cause of truth and the self-sufficiency of the individual discoverer or teacher. And the difficulty reaches a climax when religion claims the submission of the reason, or censures the pride of intellect, or speaks of "rationalism" as the foe of faith. For at once we are put upon the defensive. We feel that Reason is not something unholy and impure that it must be banished from the courts of the temple of our God; nor is it some outside power which may indeed become the ally, but more naturally is the foe of the deepest convictions of our religious life. It is the power which God has given us to enable us to know Him; and we slight and despise our birthright if we do not try "to know the things which are freely given us of God." It is not pride in reason to try and know, nor can reason without being false to itself, submit to that which is not true, nor is there any,

even the most sacred region, where it is inconsistent with reverence to ask the question Why? though we may have to answer our own question with the words—"Behold, we know not anything."

The truth is that we are wrong to speak of pride or humility as if they could be properly predicated of the reason. Pride is always in the Will.¹ And that which is rightly called Pride is an attitude of the reasoner towards truth, not the process by which he seeks it. It is in this sense that Pride is said to lie at the root of all sin, because it is the unwillingness to recognize our true relation towards God and our fellow man,—

"Whence flowed rebellion 'gainst the Omnipotent,
Whence hate of man to man, and all else ill?"

In the case of our fellow men this is obvious, though we rather call it selfishness than pride. For at the root of selfishness lies the belief, a belief indeed which is seldom consciously expressed, that the individual is complete in himself. It follows as a natural consequence that while he is an end, others are but means, and that he may make use of them, so far as he is able to do so, for his own enjoyment. Such pure unvarnished selfishness is, indeed, rarely stated. But it is none the less the unavowed, if not quite unconscious, principle of every self-indulgent life, though, like the theoretical basis on which it logically rests, it needs only

¹ St. Thom. Aqu., *Summa Theol.*, 2, 2, Qu. clxii. Art. iii.

to be stated to be at once rejected as false. For whatever may be our views as to the true end of life, and differ as we may as to moral theory, we are wonderfully agreed now that the one impossible theory of man is that he is independent of his fellow man, an atom or a point, not the centre of a circle, a complete and self-sufficing being and not a member of an organic social body.

We are all agreed, then, in condemning the man whose self-sufficiency and supposed independence sets him up against the society to which he belongs, even though he may stop short of carrying out his theory into any of the grosser violations of his duty to his neighbour. We know that "where pride begins, love ceases," and the duty of loving one another is assumed even by empirical moralists nowadays as almost an intuitive principle. Theoretically, at all events, then, we have abolished that pride of self-sufficiency which lies behind selfishness, and recognized the truth that we are "members one of another," bound each to each by the law alike of nature and of love. We have not indeed abolished selfishness, but the theory on which it rests, the *αὐταρκεία* of the individual atom, is no longer tenable.

But the same attitude of the will which leads man to set up his individual pleasure against the common good, leads him also to assume the completeness of human nature as a whole, and its

independence of God. The inter-dependence of all the members of the body social, and the crime of isolating the part from the whole, or making one's self an exception, all this a man may be willing to admit. But then the pride which has been ousted from his individual life reappears when he thinks of himself in his universal character :—

Hence man's perpetual struggle, night and day,
To prove he was his own proprietor
And independent of his God, that what
He had might be esteemed his own, and praised
As such. He laboured still and tried to stand
Alone, unpropped—to be obliged to none.
And in the madness of his pride he bade
His God farewell, and turned away to be
A God himself.

Here again the theory is rarely stated, though it is the ultimate major premiss of much of our reasoning. Few will dare to say plainly, as was said recently by a well-known Positivist, that the worship of God has in our day given place to the worship of man ; and yet we are vainly trying to construct a system in which man, not indeed as an individual, but as conscious reason, shall be the centre of all that is. We assume the completeness, the self-sufficiency of man if only he can be brought to his highest level. And if God touches man at all it is but at the outer edge of his life, religion being treated as a graceful embellishment of some lives, in some even a help to morality, but

in most only a cause of divisions, which the non-religious philosopher can serenely ignore.

Against this modern Ptolemaic system of thought Christianity holds up, as it were, the idea of Copernicus. Against the geocentric view it proclaims the great Theocentric principle. God is the centre of all that is, the only Being Who has life in Himself and of Himself. Like the sun in the visible universe He is both centre and source of the universe of being; and humanity apart from God, as independent, self-sufficing and complete, is no less an unreal abstraction than the individual separated from his society. Everywhere and in all departments of life religion declares the incompleteness of man. We are "not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." All truth is thus a revelation from Him Who is the Truth. Salvation from sin is not of ourselves but from Him Who loved us. Grace is the freely given gift of God. Sacraments and priesthood are the "chartered channels" by which He has willed to give His gifts to man. If the priest is His commissioned minister, a steward and dispenser of the mysteries of God, so from a religious point of view and in his own work is the philosopher, who uses the reason which reflects God for interpreting to all the coherence of the parts of truth. So is the scientific investigator, who patiently searches for

that revelation of God in nature which is vouchsafed only to reverent and earnest study. So is the self-forgetting critic, who seeks at all costs to learn and teach what is true, though after years of study he may have to tell us no new thing but an old truth recovered or enriched or established by new proofs. So is it no less in the humbler vocations in life, which are great and noble in proportion as they are recognized as vocations, and therefore as a ministry which can only rightly be discharged by those who know that their sufficiency is of God.

Thus the religious view of man and his relation to God carries with it a sense of human insufficiency, and the correlated truth of our dependence on Him Who is the source of Truth. We are encompassed by the unknown. Our knowledge, whether of God, of nature, or of ourselves, is but as a scintillation in the darkness. May not all our boasted knowledge of nature be, as the greatest of its champions suggests, "an ordinary phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness"?¹ And if so, is it worth while to go on? Who is sufficient for the work of interpreting the mystery which lies about us? And the answer of religion implies a change in our whole attitude of thought. The darkness is in us; the light is

¹ Huxley's "Hume," p. 81.

beyond: and every ray which pierces the darkness is a ray from the source of light. We may dare then, in the patience of hope, to press forward to the light till we know Him in Whom is no darkness at all. Our sufficiency is of God, Who has made us His ministers, Who has chosen us to be His priests, His stewards, His messengers, the depositaries of His truth, the revealers of His secrets, whether in nature or in grace, for the good of man. That is sacerdotalism, if you will, but it is a sacerdotalism which is true.

But against this view our pride rebels. We want to be creators or discoverers, not receivers of truth. We do not like to be reminded that our knowledge is an experiment which, though it may verify itself by success, can only justify itself in the belief of a real relationship of man with God. We would fain be complete in ourselves, sufficient of ourselves, able to stand alone. And the very pride which in the individual we recognize as self-sufficiency and hate as selfishness, that very pride, which by advancing knowledge and a higher general morality has been driven from its outwork, has fortified itself in the citadel. Yes! the offence of the Cross has not ceased. For Christ upon the Cross is the continual reproach of the proud. We can indeed go so far as to know that we must forget ourselves and do good to others. We are all humanitarians nowadays. But the moral

law has two tables. And we have still to learn the lesson that man has nothing which he has not received, that "every good gift and every perfect gift," whether of grace or truth, "is from above," and that even while we think that we are "rich and increased with goods and have need of nothing," we are "wretched and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked," and that even that which we have is not our own.

There are two forms in which this claim of man to be sufficient of himself, and his refusal to recognize himself as God's minister and messenger to the world, is commonly seen.

I. We recognize it first in what is called the *rationalistic* temper. What is rationalism? If rationalism means the attempt to bring every truth home to the reason and make it intelligible by relating it with everything else, then to rationalize is not only our privilege as thinking men but our duty as Christian men.

But rationalism is used as a term of reproach. It is quoted as the typical form of pride of intellect. It is, we are told, the "asking for reasons out of place," it is "a forgetfulness of God's power," "disbelief in the existence of a first Cause sufficient to account for facts which to us are extraordinary." Or it is "a limiting the possible by the actual," and "measuring the credibility of things by our knowledge of them." It is

clear that what is censured here is the tone and temper of the questioner, not the questions which he asks; the presuppositions which he brings to the inquiry, not the method of the inquiry itself; in a word, it is the attitude of his will towards truth, not the process by which he seeks to arrive at it. To say that rationalism is "asking questions out of place" is to assume that we know what questions may be asked and what may not. Yet surely every question is a lawful one which has an answer which human reason, enlightened by the grace of God, can understand. And it is only by asking that we can find out what questions are unanswerable. Nothing can be more irrational than to map out beforehand the limits of our possible knowledge, for this mapping out already assumes that we have got beyond the very limits which we profess to lay down. Neither in the interests of faith, nor on the basis of a critique of the human understanding have we any right to say, "This is a question which may not be asked." The most that we can say is that here we are face to face with a question which has never been answered. But when we conclude that therefore we have reached the limits of knowledge, we adopt a method which, if consistently applied, would have paralyzed reason and made progress impossible.

It is not, then, either the asking a question or the attempt to answer it in any region of our life which

constitutes rationalism, in the sense in which that term is a term of reproach. It is *the refusal to recognize as true anything which we cannot explain*, the self-sufficiency which sets up the reason in its present stage of development as the measure of truths actual or even possible. Hence the irreverence and self-assertion of what is rightly called rationalism. For when a man has come to assume that human reason is the measure of all truth, it is an easy step to the belief that of that reason he is the truest if not the only exponent.

The fact that rationalism implies a wrong attitude of the will towards truth rather than any method or manner of reasoning, explains the fact that a theory which in one age is rejected as rationalistic may be accepted by a later age as true. A theory or premature synthesis which has nothing to commend it but its novelty, or its ingenuity, or its apparent inconsistency with the received body of doctrine of the day is rightly rejected, and the defiant defender of it is rightly called a rationalist ; yet the very same theory supported by new facts, modified by wider knowledge, and championed by men of other temper is afterwards received, with whatever necessary readjustments, and fitted into the growing body of religious truth. It is easy to represent this as a triumph of rationalism, but it is more truly represented as a triumph of faith. For all that is rationalistic is gone, and what remains

is rational, and therefore the friend and not the foe of faith. If it were not for the glamour of the name of "heretic" and the fascination of knowing that we are upsetting established beliefs, rationalism would long ago have been discredited as intensely unscientific, as far removed from the work of those who are reverently interpreting to us the word or works of God, as is the reckless theorist from him who realizes the greatness of his mission to be an interpreter of truth to the world.

Really rational inquiry into truth, whether in religion or in nature, must be reverent, must recognize its mission, and in recognizing this must admit its own insufficiency. *Homo naturae minister et interpres*,—they are well-known words—*tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturae ordine re vel mente observaverit: nec amplius scit aut potest*. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of every rational inquiry. "Thou hast hid these things," says the Divine Teacher, "from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." Only when we become "as a little child" can we hope to enter into the kingdom of the truth.

But the becoming "as a little child" implies not only the laying aside preconceived notions and the submission of the will to truth, but the willingness to put ourselves, as it were, to school with those who, in whatever department of life, have been in God's purpose the channels by which

hitherto He has taught the world. To be teachable it is not necessary to be uncritical, but if ever we are to become true critics we must begin by the readiness to learn. And the rationalism which is rightly treated as the enemy of faith implies an attitude of the will which makes the attainment of truth impossible. Who are they who have proved themselves sufficient for so great a work as the interpreting of truth to man? Those, surely, who have most clearly recognized the greatness of the truth they handle and the insufficiency of man to do anything but to receive the truth which is given and truly to reflect the truth he sees.

II. But what is called "rationalism" is not the only form in which man asserts his self-sufficiency and independence of God, and so adopts a false attitude of will towards truth. It is shown in what it is the fashion to call the *agnostic* temper. Here, so far from reason proclaiming its competence to judge of great matters, it declares itself unable to deal with them at all. Can anything be more modest, less self-assertive? And yet experience tells us that self-depreciation is not always humility, and that the repudiation of any knowledge of some subjects is consistent with much self-satisfaction and self-conceit elsewhere.

But indeed this attempt to settle the boundaries of knowledge off-hand is as impossible as to say beforehand where we may and where we may not

ask questions. And with regard to any other kind of truth it is at once seen to be so. The unknown stimulates, the unknowable paralyzes knowledge ; but we can only assert that the unknown is unknowable on the assumption that we already know all that can be known. If it is true that God cannot be known by man, it will be the last truth which man will ever learn. At the close of a long life of struggle we sometimes see the reason falling back baffled by the difficulties which perhaps it has made or multiplied for itself, and there is no sadder sight than the despair of reason. But what are we to say of young men who affect "the premature age of disconsolate wisdom," and talk as if they had already "sounded all the depths and shoals" of knowledge and all the time adopt a careless, almost jaunty air, as though it made but little difference whether God could be known or not. It is a significant fact that Agnosticism never finds its way into those departments of life in which it is to our interest to know ; and it requires a good deal of charity to make us believe that a man who is quite sure that he cannot know God, is not one who would not know Him if he could. At all events there is no defence in reason or morality for the calm self-satisfaction of uninquiring indolence. Agnosticism is not the admission that there is much which we do not know, for this is a recognition which humility demands ; it is the proud

assumption that what we do not know cannot be known. And in tone and temper there is little to choose between the rationalistic refusal to accept what as yet we cannot explain, and the confident assumption that what cannot be known without an effort can never be known at all.

Behind both rationalism and agnosticism there lies the conviction that man is sufficient of himself to know all that can be known. The one explains away, the other denies the possibility of knowing, that which at present lies beyond its ken. And both are opposed to true knowledge, which is earnest, patient, humble, reverent, willing to wait for more light ; strong enough to bear disappointment, and yet all the time pressing on to know ; hopeful and fearless, self-distrusting yet with the sure belief in truth ; content to be unknown, and satisfied if only it may do its part, however little, in advancing the kingdom of the truth ; looking outward not inward, and drawing its unfailing strength from the consciousness of ministry and the belief that it can be used by God for the good of man.

It is in the sense of mission, of vocation, of ministry, that we find the true corrective for that self-sufficiency which everywhere mars and hinders the progress of truth ; and it is in that same sense of mission and ministry that we find the strength to struggle on, through doubt and difficulty and

almost despair, in the search for truth. We are not rationalists; we are not agnostics; for we believe that God is the only source of truth, that in Him are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and that though we have nothing which we do not receive, yet He giveth to all men liberally of His gifts of grace and truth.

It is, on the whole, a true instinct which makes men judge of truth by the temper of the teacher. *Ubi humilitas, ibi sapientia.* Perhaps in the great unveiling of secrets there will be found among the greatest saints some whose names never found their way into the Church's calendar; and among the noblest lives the lives of those whom their contemporaries never knew; and among the most real benefactors of mankind those whose ambition it was to remain unknown; and among the truest pioneers of truth the men who could not, or would not, recognize their greatness. The really great men of every age are those who do not fear to confess their littleness, their insignificance compared with the truth they teach, their dependence on that truth for all that they have or are. Their greatness is that they are ambassadors, ministers, stewards; their littleness that they are what they are, ready to read their own meaning into what they teach and so failing to teach it truly. In them, as in the great forerunner of the Christ, the greatness of their message dwarfs into insignificance

nificance their own personality. "Who art thou?" men asked of the Baptist. And the answer comes: Repent; the King is at hand, whose forerunner I am. "He must increase; I must decrease." "Who art thou?" I am the voice. Look not at me, but at Him who speaks by me. "Behold the Lamb of God."

THE END.

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